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                                             Chapter 1 
 Introduction 
 
Risk management began to be studied after World War II. Several sources 
(Crockford, 1982; Harrington and Neihaus, 2003) date the origin of modern risk 
management to 1955-1964. Prior to that time there were no references found in 
textbooks about risk management and no business schools offered courses in the 
subject. Risk management was first associated with the use of insurance to cover 
various losses associated with accidents (Harrington and Neihaus, 2003). During 
the 1970s derivatives were introduced as innovative risk management instruments. 
During the 1980s the use of derivatives expanded rapidly as companies intensified 
their risk management. It was also in the 1980s when companies began to pay 
attention to financial risk management.  
Concomitantly, new statistical tools were put in place in financial institutions to 
facilitate the assessment of default and credit risk, to facilitate risk based pricing 
(e.g. credit scoring) and to manage credit risk. In 1994 and 1997 JP Morgan 
developed the two well-known internal risk management models - RiskMetrics for 
market risk and CreditMetrics for credit risk. The publication of the RiskMetrics 
model spread the Value-at-Risk (VaR) rapidly among practitioners and academics. 
These new risk management tools are important instruments to calculate banks‟ 
regulatory capital.  
Regulators also started to focus on risk with the Basel I Accord of 1988 as a first 
key regulatory benchmark. After a series of credit risk crises - the Asian crisis, the 
Russian crisis and the collapse of Long Term Capital Management - in the late 
1990s risk management became a corporate affair and adequate capital reserves 
became a major concern. Basel II introduced more rigorous rules but authorized 
banks to use internal models in calculating their regular capital. Financial 
institutions developed internal risk management models to be Basel compliant and 
to formulate capital calculation to hedge against unanticipated risks and reduce 
regulatory capital. In the wake of various scandals and bankruptcies resulting from 
poor risk management, the Sarbanes-Oxley regulation was introduced in the United 
State in 2002. Stock exchanges also added risk management governance rules for 
listed companies (Blanchard and Dionne, 2003).  
However, these regulations, rules, and added risk management methods did not 
suffice to prevent the financial crisis that began in 2007. The roots of the crisis go 
back much further, and there are various views on the fundamental causes. In his 
report prepared for the members of Congress in the US, Jickling (2010) presents a 
number of factors that have been identified as causes of the crisis: from the credit 
standards in U.S. mortgage lending that were relaxed in the early 2000s to the 
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long-term developments in financial markets to blame for the instability. In this 
dissertation, we strive to provide a better understanding on these factors: we 
investigate risk management both at the institutional level as well as at the macro 
level. To that aim, we focus our research on four factors out of those presented in 
Jickling (2010): “Securitization” and “Bad computer models” as institutional risk 
management and “No systemic risk regulator” and “Tail risk” as macro risk 
management. In this dissertation: (i) we show under which circumstances banks 
require credit support, e.g. collateral, for borrowers (Chapter 2); (ii) we 
demonstrate how to overcome the limitations of credit scoring models to sustain 
their performance over the recent financial crisis period (Chapter 3); (iii) we 
discuss the systemic risk and tail risk in US financial institutions (Chapter 4); (iv) 
we analyze the co-movements of these risk measures among different asset classes 
across different business cycle regimes (Chapter 5).   In the next section, I outline 
each chapter briefly by presenting the background, the research questions, 
followed by discussions on the most important findings and their implications. 
The institutional financial risk management 
Chapter 2 studies factors that influence the decision to securitize a consumer loan 
with collateral. Collateral is one of the key features of a loan contract together with 
the loan‟s interest rate, maturity, size and possible covenants. Theories about the 
use of collateral, however, are contradicting and the empirical literature has not yet 
helped to settle important issues such as whether collateral signals a more risky or 
a safer loan, or whether relationship banking increases or decreases the use of 
collateral. In addition, very little is known about how macro-economic conditions 
affect the use of collateral. Most of the existing studies on collateral examine 
business loans and thus very little is known about securitization of consumer loans. 
Thanks to a unique data set, we are able to examine as-of-yet unexplored 
determinants of collateral for consumer loans and we provide a sharper test of the 
relation between collateral use and a borrower‟s credit risk. To be more specific: 
we consider the determinants of the incidence of collateral and the degree of 
collateral with specific focus on the role of the borrower‟s ex ante credit risk as 
perceived by the bank, the borrower‟s ability to pledge collateral and the bank-
borrower relationship. We find that lenders are more likely to require collateral 
from ex-ante riskier borrowers. At the same time, borrowers with ability to pledge 
collaterals prefer securitized loans in order to benefit from a reduction in their 
interest costs. The strength of the relationship between banks and borrowers 
influences the use of collateral. However, the scale and scope of the relationship 
have opposite impacts: while the scale increases the use of collateral due to the 
hold-up effect, the scope decreases the incidence of collateral due to a reduction in 
information asymmetry. The use of collateral also increases significantly during 
economic downturns. 
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As aforementioned banks started to develop internal models - Credit Scoring 
Models (CSM) - to help select borrowers in the late 1980s.  The rules newly 
introduced in Basel II that authorized banks to use internal CSMs in calculating 
regular capital have further prompted the attention of financial institutions towards 
CSMs. Furthermore, nowadays reversing credit rationing in a responsible manner 
is a vitally important step towards mitigating the tremendous impact of the global 
financial crisis on the corporate and retail sector. An effective credit decision 
system that enables sound lending decisions is a critical part of the solution. CSMs 
are central components of such a system. They are key to bank‟s survival and 
profitability in this new and constantly changing environment. However, the global 
environment has experienced a fundamental shift due to the crisis and that the 
existing CSMs which were built on data collected during a period of economic 
strength probably no longer function as they once did. In Chapter 3 we examine the 
impacts of the global financial crisis on CSMs and outline how those models need 
to be adjusted to ensure that credit providers can avoid an onset of delinquencies 
and bad debt. We also outlines how CSMs can be utilized to improve credit quality 
and consequently to increase profitability and efficiency of the lending business. 
To be more specific, we estimate separate CSMs for a pre-crisis, crisis and post 
crisis period, respectively. Firstly, we note that the predictors of default change 
over time. For example, post-crisis personal information appears to lose 
importance and is no longer predictive, whereas information about bank-borrower 
relationships becomes more predictive of default. Characteristics of the bank-
borrower relationship represent soft information that cannot be observed directly 
but persists over the crisis whereas the value of hard information, e.g., borrower 
characteristics, diminishes with fundamental economic changes triggered by the 
crisis. Second, we assess the performance of these different models on a post-crisis 
holdout sample. In this way, we put ourselves in the position of a loan officer 
required to assess the unknown ex-ante creditworthiness of a loan applicant in 
2011. Different performance measurements are deployed such as power statistics 
(ROC, GINI) and accuracy rates (PCC, Sensitivity and Specificity) to assess the 
accuracy of different models with ex-post observed defaults. We then 
hypothetically replicate the bank strategies and show that an updated model can 
maximize a bank‟s profit by more accurately identifying defaults, increasing 
efficiency by reducing the manual assessment, and increasing its competitiveness 
by more precise risk-based pricing.  
Macro financial risk management 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we investigate alternative measures of tail risk and systemic 
risk for financial institutions (chapter 4) or, more generally, to assess systemic 
instability and risk spillovers in financial markets (chapter 5). We therefore put 
statistical extreme value analysis at work in order to capture the low frequency 
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character of crises and crisis spillovers in financial markets.  In Chapter 4 we 
question whether the risk of financial institutions - either the idiosyncratic tail risk 
or the systemic risk – depends on the type of financial institutions. In line with 
Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2011) we distinguished between 
deposit banks, insurance companies, and broker-dealers (investment banks) with an 
eye towards tail risk and systemic risk measurement. Given the cross-industry 
differences in business models, it is to be expected that the type of financial 
industry partly determine their risk taking behavior. We observe that the tail risk 
and systemic risk indeed differs quite substantially across different types of 
financial institutions. Moreover, tail risk and systemic risk tell fundamentally 
different stories if one wants to use these risk dimensions as inputs for financial 
regulation. More specifically, the ranking of financial institutions on the basis of 
tail risk vs. systemic risk is substantially different. Whereas the insurance industry 
seems to exhibit most tail risk, deposit banks seem to contribute most to systemic 
instability. The latter outcome is somewhat surprising given the popular perception 
that broker-dealers played a crucial role in triggering the banking crisis. We also 
find that rankings of financial institutions according to tail risk or systemic risk 
measures stay relatively stable over time. In other words, although tail risk and 
systemic risk can vary quite a lot over time, the positioning of institutions relative 
to each other is not dramatically changed over time. Finally, size proxies seem to 
correlate with systemic risk although the outcomes differ a lot depending on the 
used size proxies and considered subsamples (full sample, pre-crisis or crisis).   
In Chapter 5 we investigate whether extreme risks (e.g. a single banking crisis) and 
risk comovements (e.g. a systemic banking crisis) are more likely to happen during 
recession phases of the business cycle. From a methodological point of view, we 
introduce regime dependence within the statistical theory of extremes (EVT). 
Traditionally, EVT assumes that all data come from one and the same underlying 
unconditional (long-term) distribution that stays invariant over time.  We allow for 
regime changes in the parameters that govern the univariate (power law type) and 
multivariate (tail copula) behavior. In the empirical application, we construct 
recession and expansion subsamples in the financial data and perform subsample 
analyses for our indicators of tail risk and tail risk spillovers (systemic risk). We do 
not solely apply these concepts to the tails of bank equity losses but also to a 
variety of other financial assets. First, we find that tail risk rises during recessions 
for a variety of financial assets (stocks, bonds, currencies and commodities). Next, 
also market-based indicators of bank systemic risk rise during recessions. Third, 
upon comparing the likelihood of co-crashes between stocks, bonds or gold vs. the 
likelihood of flight-to-quality from stocks into bonds or gold, the spread between 
flight-to-quality and co-crash likelihoods widens during recessions. Finally, 
diversifying portfolio tail risk becomes more difficult during recessions because 
both (linear) correlations and general tail dependence across assets rises during 
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periods of economic recession. In other words, diversification meltdowns do not 
only happen during periods of high financial market volatility but do also depend 
on the state of the real economy.   
 7 
 
                                                                                  Chapter 2 
When are Consumer Loans Collateralized in  
Emerging Markets? Evidence from Vietnam
1
 
 
2.1. Introduction 
While there is a significant amount of research addressing the role as well as the 
determinants of collateral for commercial loans, there is little empirical work on 
the factors that affect decisions to pledge collateral for consumer loans. 
Theoreticians have argued that collateralization is a useful tool in resolving 
asymmetric information problems associated with both adverse selection and moral 
hazard and providing respite against default and bankruptcy loss. Empirical 
evidence based on accounting data supports these arguments for commercial loans. 
In contrast, evidence for consumer loans is not available due to the fact that public 
information about individual borrowers is almost impossible to obtain. However, 
in consumer lending the information asymmetry problem is especially severe and 
collateral is thus essential. Using a unique and confidential dataset of more than 
30,000 consumer loans from one of the largest private banks in Vietnam, we are 
able to answer the following questions regarding the choice between collateralized 
and uncollateralized consumer loans: Does the bank require riskier borrowers to 
pledge collateral? How does the availability of pledgable assets influence the 
borrower‟s loan choice? How does the relationship between bank and borrower 
influence the loan choice?    
Our analysis contributes to the understanding of the consumer banking market in a 
developing country, e.g. Vietnam, which is currently engaging in a process of 
economic liberalization. Prior empirical evidence on collateral almost exclusively 
focusses with developed economies with a few exceptions for Thailand (Menkhoff 
et al., 2006) and Mexico (La Porta et al., 2003). In emerging markets with 
potentially severely underdeveloped financial systems, information asymmetry 
problems between borrowers and lenders are severe and collateral is an important 
instrument of dealing with these information asymmetry problems. At the same 
time, however, collateral might only provide weak protection in case of borrower 
default if loan contracts cannot be fully enforced in emerging countries with weak 
legal systems (Menkhoff et al., 2006). Given these counteracting forces, we expect 
collateral to play a different role in emerging than in developed economies. As 
                                                          
1 This chapter is based on „When are Consumer Loans Collateralized in Emerging Markets? Evidence 
from Vietnam‟ co-authored with Stefanie Kleimeier and Christa Hainz. 
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such, we cannot assume that existing developed-market evidence on the use of 
collateral is also valid in emerging markets. An investigation of the use of 
collateral in emerging markets is therefore essential. 
Drawing on current theories, we empirically model the use of collateral as a 
function of borrower characteristics such as ex-ante credit quality, wealth and age 
of the borrower, loan characteristics such as loan amount and duration, the scale 
and scope of the borrower-lender relationship, credit market characteristics and 
regional governance conditions. We test this comprehensive model for the 
determinants of collateral using cross-sectional data on 32,655 consumer loans 
granted between 2007 and 2011 to Vietnamese borrowers. In line with the major 
empirical findings for commercial loans in developed markets we find, first, that 
the likelihood of pledging collateral is higher among borrowers who are observed 
by the bank as ex ante riskier borrowers. We also find that among borrowers with 
the same level of observed risk, wealthier borrowers are more often pledging 
collateral. In addition, the bank-borrower relationship matters. The scale and scope 
of this relationship have opposite effects on collateral: collateral increases with the 
duration of the relationship and number of prior loans, and decreases in its scope 
which is measured by the number of different services that the borrower purchases 
from the bank.  
Our paper makes three main contributions. First, we use data on consumer loans 
in an emerging market. Thereby, we can obtain new insights that differ from 
those papers that study corporate loans mostly in developed markets. Second, 
this study is among a few (Elsas et al., 2000; Macheuer et al., 1998) that use an 
internal ex ante credit risk score, which directly reflects how the bank observes a 
borrower‟s credit profile. This allows us to better test the observed risk 
hypothesis than most previous studies. Indeed, our results are consistent with the 
idea that observationally riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral. 
Finally, we observe information regarding the borrower‟s wealth. This allows us 
to differentiate between the bank‟s requirement to pledge collateral for risky 
borrowers and the borrowers‟ ability to pledge collateral. 
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview of the relevant 
existing theory and empirical evidence on the determinants of collateral use 
focusing on the borrower quality and the bank-borrower relationship. Section 3 
describes the Vietnamese banking market. Section 4 presents our empirical model 
and derives our hypotheses. Section 5 describes the data, variables and 
methodology. We present the results of our empirical analysis in section 6. Section 
7 concludes. 
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2.2. Determinants of collateral 
2.2.1. Collateral and borrower quality 
Collateral is a defining feature of the loan contract, together with the interest 
rate, maturity, size, and any possible covenants. Drawing from current theories, 
collateral helps banks to solve two main problems. First, liquidating collateral in 
case of default limits a bank‟s losses. Second, collateral can solve the problem of 
asymmetric information between banks and borrowers arising when borrowers 
own private information that is not available to banks. Theories about collateral 
solving the asymmetric information problem can be divided into two main 
streams. First, collateral can be used as a signaling instrument providing banks 
with valuable information about the borrower‟s quality that would not be 
available otherwise. High-quality borrowers who have private information about 
their good creditworthiness know that their likelihood of loan default and 
consequent loss of their collateral are unlikely. Therefore, high-quality borrowers 
are more willing to pledge collateral in return for more favorable contract terms 
than low-quality borrowers (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Bester, 1985; Chan and 
Kanatas, 1985; Besanko and Thako, 1987). Banks offer a menu of contracts to 
borrowers: one loan contract with high collateral and low interest rate and 
another loan contract with low collateral and high interest rate. Borrowers 
choose their preferred contract and signal their status as high-quality borrowers 
when selecting the collateralized loan. Second, collateral helps to solve the 
problem of moral hazard after the loan is granted (Booth et al., 1991). Collateral 
provides an incentive to borrowers to exert optimal effort, as their payoff in the 
case of default is lower with collateral than without collateral. The presence of 
collateral is therefore associated with lower ex-post default. In general, these 
quality-signaling theories that view collateral as a solution to the asymmetric 
information problem predict a negative relation between presence of collateral 
and the borrower‟s risk level, both ex-ante and ex-post. 
However, collateral requires monitoring and increases legal costs that reduce the 
benefit of collateral for a bank. More importantly and contradictory to the 
arguments of the asymmetric information theories, there is a common view 
among bankers that collateral is associated with riskier borrowers (Berger and 
Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004; Inderst and Mueller, 2006). The 
observed-risk hypothesis reflects this view and argues that banks are able to 
identify risky borrowers through ex-ante screening.  Since collateral helps to 
reduce the loss given default, banks require more collateral from borrowers with 
higher default risk. 
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Although a substantial amount of empirical work is devoted to banking issues, 
there are only a limited number of studies investigating the determinants of 
collateral in bank loans. Moreover, this scarce empirical literature has not settled 
whether collateral is associated with riskier or safer borrowers. On one hand, 
empirical studies explain the use of collateral as a consequence of adverse 
selection and/or moral hazard and conclude that the presence of collateral is a 
signal of safe borrowers. In this context, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina (2006) find 
that the possibility of using collateral to signal credit quality occurs mainly 
among young borrowers who have no previous record of financial or commercial 
activities. Focusing on the associations between collateral, banking relationship 
and risk premium, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) find a negative link 
between the presence of collateral and the loan‟s interest rate (a proxy for risk 
premium) for a sample of 18,000 Belgian loans. On the other hand, the majority 
of studies find that collateral is associated with high-risk borrowers and therefore 
support the observed-risk hypothesis. In an early study Berger and Udell (1990) 
investigate the relationship between collateral and credit risk for a sample of one 
million loans from US banks and find that banks require more collateral from 
risky borrowers while at the same time charging them higher interest rates. 
Jimenez and Saurina (2004) analyze 3 million loans provided by Spanish banks 
and find a positive relation between the ex post credit risk and the presence of 
collateral. Booth and Booth (2006) examine the relation between the borrowing 
cost and the presence of collateral for sample of 977 US loans raised between 
1987 and 1989 and find that a number of observable risk characteristics are 
related to the probability that a loan is secured. Regarding emerging markets La 
Porta et al. (2003) and Menkhoff et al. (2006) tentatively confirm the observed-
risk hypothesis for Mexico and Thailand and we thus consider ex ante risk as one 
of the core determinants of collateralization in our sample of Vietnamese 
consumer loans. 
2.2.2. Collateral and bank-borrower relationship 
The theories and empirical studies of relationship lending are also inconclusive 
about the influence of bank-borrower relationships on collateral (Greenbaum et 
al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Boot et al., 1994).  On the one hand, the strength of the 
bank-borrower relationship indicates the degree of information asymmetry 
between bank and borrower. Thus, the incidence of collateral should decline with 
the strength of the relationship, e.g. with the reduction in the information 
asymmetry. On the other hand, the ability of the bank to privately observe 
proprietary information about the borrower can generate a lock-in problem, e.g. a 
situation where it is costly for the borrower to switch to another lender. In this 
case the incidence of collateral should increase with the strength of the 
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relationship (Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992). Proxies for the intensity of the bank-
borrower relationship consist of scale proxies including the duration of the 
relationship (Dianmon, 1991; Petersen et al., 1994) and the number of prior loans 
as well as scope proxies such as the number of bank products used by the 
borrower.  
The empirical evidence regarding the influence of bank-borrower relationships 
on collateral is limited to corporate lending. Using the 1987 NSSBF data, Berger 
and Udell (1995) find that in the US the use of collateral falls with the length of 
the bank-borrower relationship. Chakraborty and Hu (2006) use the 1993 NSSBF 
data and share the same conclusion. Moreover, they find that the use of collateral 
decreases with the scope of the relationship. Degryse and Cayseele‟s (2000) 
findings based on European data also indicate that collateral requirements 
decrease with the duration of relationship and increase with its scope. In line 
with the locked-in hypothesis, Elsas and Krahnen (2000), Lehmann and 
Neuberger (2001) and Machauer and Weber (1998) document a higher fraction 
of collateralized loans when borrowing from a housebank. Regarding emerging 
markets, La Porta et al. (2003) find that the incidence and degree of collateral are 
significantly lower for Mexican borrowers with a strong bank relationship. 
Menkhoff et al. (2006) analyze 560 credit files of Thai commercial banks. As 
long credit relationships do not reduce collateral requirement, they conclude that 
market imperfections result in a lock-up effect for housebank borrowers in 
Thailand. Overall, the evidence on the relationship between bank-borrower 
relationships and collateral is inconclusive. 
2.3. The Vietnamese banking market 
In 1987, Vietnam started its transformation to a market economy. Part of this 
process is the replacement of the monopoly of state-owned banks by a two-level 
banking system consisting of a national central bank on one level and state-owned 
as well as commercial banks on another level.
2
 Projects to modernize the inter-
bank market, to create an international accounting system, and to allow outside 
audits of major Vietnamese banks are ongoing. However, the banking system 
continues to suffer from lack of capital, inadequate provisions for possible loan 
losses, low profitability, inexperience in capital markets, and the slow pace of 
institutional reform. With respect to risk assessment and management, there are 
numerous difficulties including a lack of transparency in non-performing loan 
                                                          
2 In 2005, this second level of the Vietnamese banking system contained five state-owned commercial 
banks, one social policy bank, 31 foreign bank branches, 40 foreign credit institution representative 
offices, five joint-venture commercial banks, 36 domestic joint-stock commercial banks, seven finance 
companies, and the Central People‟s Credit Fund System with 23 branches and 888 local credit funds. 
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disclosure. In order to improve risk management in light of Basel II, Vietnam‟s 
central bank has been reviewing its risk management regulations. As part of a 
broader strategy - which also addresses the banks‟ business strategy, assets and 
liability management, and internal audit - all state-owned commercial banks and 
joint-stock commercial banks have been asked to develop a comprehensive credit 
manual which takes international practices in risk management into account. 
In this double-level banking system, the national central bank is not engaged any 
more in trading activities, nor is it directly involved in the process of acquiring or 
locating capital in the banking and financial market. Commercial banks and other 
financial companies perform these activities. These banks also provide banking 
services to corporations and individuals including traditional services like payment 
transactions, deposit taking, lending, issuing credit and debit cards and modern 
services like Internet banking. This second level is dominated by the state owned 
commercial banks, which accounts for almost of 80% of commercial bank 
operations in Vietnam in 2005. However, despite the inadequacy of the legal 
framework and transitional problems, private commercial banks have made 
significant progress due to their more customer-oriented approach and distinct 
profit motive. 
Among commercial banks in Vietnam, about 60% to 70% of a bank‟s capital assets 
are employed for lending activities and profit from lending accounts for a major 
part of bank‟s total profit. Strategically these banks focus on the retail sector, i.e. 
lending to consumers, entrepreneurs, and SMEs. During Vietnam‟s recent period 
of high economic growth and transformation to a market economy, there has been 
an increasing demand of loans from the retail sector. Lending volumes have grown 
substantially since 1990 and although state owned enterprises are still the dominant 
users of credit, their share in bank credit fell from 86% in 1991-1992 to 58% in 
December 2005 due to growing loan demand from retail borrowers. Within the 
retail credit sector, joint stock commercial banks play an important role as they 
account for more than 50% of outstanding loan value. Nevertheless, consumer 
credit continues to encounter barriers to growth due to, for example, the unreliable 
credit rating systems and complicated application procedures in Vietnam. 
However, the government and other financial institutions are expected to increase 
their efforts to resolve these issues in the near future. 
Due to its strategic focus on retail lending, i.e. on consumer lending, the bank from 
which our data originates has developed competencies regarding the risk 
assessment during the initial screening of its borrowers. As a first step in the 
process of credit approval at the bank, borrowers have to complete a loan 
application form which requires personal information (age, address, occupation, 
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marital status, relation with any other bank, income, home ownership, etc.) as well 
as information about the desired loan (amount, purpose, etc). Secondly, all 
information provided by the borrowers is certified by the bank regarding its 
correctness. Thirdly, a set of quantitative rules is used by credit officers as a 
benchmark for their lending decision. Generally, if the requested loan amount is 
less than 100 million Vietnamese dong (VND, approximately 3,000 euro) and all 
the criteria are met at the minimum required level then the loan application will be 
approved without requiring collateral. If the loan amount is more than 100 million 
VND then all criteria will be assessed at a more critical level and a collateral 
requirement becomes more likely. The criteria that the bank uses to assess their 
borrowers include the borrower‟s monthly income, her occupation, years with the 
current employer, the industry of occupation, etc. These criteria are combined into 
a simple ex ante risk score. For more detailed information about how this score is 
computed, please refer to Table 2.A1 in the appendix. Recently, the bank has 
implemented a sophisticated credit scoring system in some of its branches to 
replace the existing set of rules. We also consider this new risk score generated 
when testing the robustness of the impact of the ex ante risk score measure on the 
collateral use.  
2.4. Empirical model and hypotheses 
We model collateral as determined by borrower characteristics, the bank-borrower 
relationship, economic conditions and controls for loan characteristics, bank 
branch operational characteristics and regional governance characteristics. We use 
a Probit regression model to estimate the probability of a loan being secured by 
collateral. Our dependent variable is a binary variable CollateralD, which takes the 
value of one if a loan is collateralized and zero otherwise. The probability of a loan 
being secured is thus given by equation (1) where   is the standard normal 
distribution function. 
    (             )   (  ∑                              
∑                                                 
∑                         ∑              ∑                  )   
                           (2.1) 
Borrower characteristics include the borrower‟s Ex ante risk score as described in 
Table 2.A1 in the appendix, a dummy Home ownerD indicating whether the 
borrower owns rather than rents her place of residence and the borrower‟s Age. 
The scale of the bank-borrower relationship is measured by the number of Years 
with bank and the Number of prior loans that the borrower obtained from the bank. 
The scope of the bank-borrower relationship is indicated by the Number of bank 
products that the customer purchases from the bank, a dummy indicating if the 
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borrower has a business relationship with another bank (Other bankD) and a 
dummy indicating whether the borrower is from the neighborhood where the bank 
branch is located (Local borrowerD). The proxy for economic conditions in 
Vietnam is the Base rate, a policy tool used by Vietnam State Bank. 
We include three sets of control variables to measure loan, bank branch and 
regional characteristics. Loan characteristics include proxies for Loan duration and 
Loan size. We include bank branch controls as our data consists of loans from one 
bank with a large number of branches spread over the country. We specifically 
control for the operational characteristics of branches by the distance from their the 
headquarter (Distance to headquarter) and by a dummy to indicate whether the 
branch is a main branch in the province (Main branchD).
3
 We consider two 
regional control variables. First, the Provincial legal index measures how 
transparent and supportive the provincial legal framework is toward enterprises.  A 
higher value indicates a more supportive legal framework. Second, a dummy 
MunicipalityD indicates whether the bank branch is located in one of the five most 
economically developed municipalities in Vietnam. Finally, we include year 
dummies indicating the time of loan signing. Details on the definitions of all 
variables can be found in Table 2.A2 in the appendix. 
Next to the incidence of collateral modeled in equation (2.1), we also analyze the 
degree of collateral using a Tobit model. We construct an index, which is based on 
the collateral value to loan value ratio and ranges from zero to five with higher 
values indicating a higher degree of collateral. Since this collateral index contains a 
cluster of zeros, OLS would result in biased and inconsistent coefficients and the 
Tobit model as an extension of a censored regression model is an appropriate 
choice (Elsas et al., 2000; Lehmann et al., 2001; La Porta et al., 2003). In order to 
reduce the impact of outliers, i.e. loans with very high collateral to loan ratio, we 
use a Collateral index instead.  
Predictions regarding the independent variables are derived from the previous 
theoretical and empirical research on the determinants of collateral. We focus our 
testable hypotheses on three main determinants: borrower quality, the bank-
borrower relationship and economic conditions. First, for consumer loans in an 
emerging market, the information asymmetry problem can be quite severe and a 
lender might therefore heavily rely on collateral to overcome the information 
asymmetry problem and to reduce loss given default. It is therefore particularly 
                                                          
3 In each city or province, the bank operates several branches and generally considers one of them - or 
two in big cities or provinces - as a main branch. These main branches have more authority regarding 
loan decisions e.g. authority to approve larger loans or to approve higher interest rate reduction. 
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important in our paper to test hypotheses between collateral and borrower quality. 
Second, in emerging markets the bank-borrower relationship plays a very 
important role. Thus, it is critical to understand how the bank-borrower 
relationship influences the use of collateral. Third, the recent financial crisis has 
dramatically changed the economic conditions and we want to study how this 
influences the use of collateral. 
First, we hypothesize that borrowers that the bank observed as more risky are 
more likely to pledge collateral. This hypothesis is directly based on the observed 
risk argument and in line with empirical findings (Boot et al., 1991; Berger and 
Udell, 1990; Jimenez and Saurina, 2004). In contrast to these studies that use 
proxies for ex ante default risk, we can directly observe the Ex ante risk score of 
each borrower and thus directly measure the credit quality as perceived by the 
bank. The higher the score the lower the borrower‟s credit risk. A positive 
coefficient for this proxy indicates that the observed risk hypothesis holds. 
Second, we hypothesize that given the same observed credit quality, wealthier 
borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral in order to benefit from a lower 
borrowing rate. This hypothesis is based on the quality signaling argument and the 
menu of loan contracts that is offered (Bester, 1985; Chan and Kanatas, 1985; 
Besanko and Thakor, 1987a). Knowing that secured loans will be charged a lower 
interest rate, borrowers who are able to pledge collateral have a strong incentive to 
do so. Collateral in Vietnam is typically provided in form of real estate. Thus, we 
proxy the ability to pledge collateral by a dummy variable that indicates whether 
the borrower owns his place of residence. In addition, Age of borrower is also 
included as a simple proxy for wealth. 
Third, we hypothesize that the likelihood of pledging collateral decreases with the 
length of the borrower-lender relationship if the benefits of relationship lending 
dominate and increases with the length of the relationship if the costs of the “hold-
up” problem dominate. This hypothesis is based on studies about the effect of 
relationship lending on the likelihood of collateral (Boot, 2000; Berger and Udell, 
2002, Jimenez et al, 2006). In addition, Boot et al. (1991) find that collateral can be 
a solution to problems of moral hazard and Boot and Thakor (1994) show that 
relationship lending can be viewed as a substitute for collateral in terms of 
reducing moral hazard as the repeated interaction between borrowers and lenders 
helps to build trust. In this case, Years with bank or Number of prior loans should 
carry a negative coefficient. In contrast, bank borrower relationships can result in a 
higher likelihood of collateral use if severe hold-up problems exist (Greenbaum et 
al, 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992, Farinha and Santos, 2002). If so, the 
coefficient of Years with bank or Number of prior loans should be positive. 
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Moreover, as another aspect of the borrower-lender relationship, we include Other 
bankD indicating whether or not the borrower has a relation with other banks. 
When there is competition among lenders or when there are various sources of 
lending, there is a smaller hold-up effect. One last characteristic of the borrower-
lender relationship that can influence the hold-up effect is the dummy Local 
borrowerD which indicates whether the borrower comes from the area where the 
branch locates as the bank can easily value and monitor the collateral and the 
borrower. 
Fourth, we hypothesize that the likelihood of collateral decreases with the number 
of different financial services that a borrower purchases from the bank. We base 
this hypothesis on a number of studies that differentiate between the scale and 
scope of the lending relationship and the use of collateral (Degryse and Cayseele, 
2000; Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Chakraborty and Hu, 2000). We focus on the 
scale of a lending relationship in hypothesis three. Regarding the scope of the 
lending relationship we consider that lenders have better access to private 
information when borrowers use non-loan financial services (such as checking 
accounts, saving accounts, or other financial services). This information can easily 
be quantified, transmitted, and combined with other available information to 
effectively assess different aspects of the borrower‟s profile. An increased scope 
should therefore reduce the need for collateral. We measure the scope with the 
Number of bank products used by the borrower, which can consist of a saving 
account, a current debit account and a credit card. We predict a negative coefficient 
for this explanatory variable.  
Fifth, we hypothesize that the use of collateral increases during economic 
downturns. It is commonly believed that uncertainty increases during economic 
downturns and that banks would require more collateral to overcome the increase 
in adverse selection and moral hazard problems as well as reduce loss given 
default. To the best of our knowledge, Jiminez (2006) is the only study that 
investigates the relation between the use of collateral and economic conditions 
using GDP and interest rates to proxy for economic conditions. Our data allows us 
to test this hypothesis in two ways: First, since our sample period includes the 
2007/08 banking crisis, we can use time dummies to identify when the crisis hit the 
Vietnamese banking market. Second, we use the Base rate as a proxy for economic 
conditions. The Base rate has been employed by the State Bank of Vietnam as a 
powerful monetary instrument in order to control lending rates in Vietnam. 
Specifically, commercial banks are only allowed to charge their borrowers a 
maximum lending rate equal to 150 times the Base rate. During crisis times 
government raises the Base rate to control inflation and to create more room for 
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commercial banks to increase their lending interest rate. We predict a positive 
coefficient for the Base rate. 
In assigning control variables we include some loan characteristics such as Loan 
duration and Loan size. Though all bank branches belong to one single bank their 
operation can differ from each other and the differences in operation can influence 
the use of collateral. We argue that the way one branch operates depends on its 
authority hierarchy and therefore include in the left hand side of equation (2.1) the 
dummy variable Main branchD indicating whether the loan is granted by a main 
bank branch with higher authority or not. Additionally, we control for the Distance 
to headquarter from each branch. We believe this distance also plays a role in 
defining the way each branch operates. Finally, we control for the regional 
characteristics by including the Provincial legal index that shows enterprises in 
different provinces have different view on how transparent and supportive the 
provincial legal framework and MunicipalityD, taking value of 1 if the branch is 
located in one of the five municipalities
4
 and 0 otherwise. 
2.5. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our sample represents consumer loans granted between January 2007 and June 
2011 by all 163 branches of a commercial bank in Vietnam. In total 32,655 loans 
were raised by retail borrowers mainly to pay for living expenses but also to 
finance weddings or to pay university tuition fees. Table 2.1 provides a snapshot of 
this part of the bank‟s outstanding loan portfolio. 52% of the bank‟s consumer 
loans are collateralized and on average, the collateral value is more than five times 
as large as the loan value. In a survey of collateral usage in different countries, 
Menkhoff et al. (2006) find that in mature markets, the percentage of collateralized 
loans varies between 13% and 88% and the collateral to loan ratio ranges from 
0.32 to above 1. For Mexico and Thailand, La Porta et al. (2003) and Menkhoff et 
al. (2006) document 53% to 84% collateralized loans and collateral to loan ratios 
from 5.3 to 29. In comparison our values for Vietnam are at the lower end of this 
scale
5
. Hainz (2003) indicate that collateral plays an especially important role in 
transition economies leading to high levels of collateral. As such our Vietnamese 
data appear to be reasonable. 
                                                          
4 The five municipalities in Vietnam include Ha Noi, Ho Chi Minh city, Hai Phong, Da Nang, and Can 
Tho. These municipalities are the highest ranked-cities and form the most developed urban areas in the 
country. They are centrally controlled by the government and serve as the core development areas. 
5  To compare the data above with the data in developed markets: The data presented by Berger and 
Udell (1995) for the U.S., and by Harhoff and Korting (1998) for Germany, bearing in mind that these 
two papers deal only with credit line data show that in the U.S. sample, 53% of the loans have collateral 
while in the German sample this figure is 62%. 
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Table 2.1    Characteristics of the bank's loan portfolio 
This table presents the fraction of collateralized loans and the average of collateral value for the whole 
loan sample and for different loan types 
 
    All loans 
Small 
loans 
Large 
loans 
Short-term 
loans 
Long-term 
loans 
Number of loans signed 2007-2011 32,655 21,244 11,411 21,408 11,247 
Fraction of collateralized loans average 51.7% 37.1% 79.0% 36.8% 80.1% 
Value of collateral in collateralized loans           
  Collateral value (ml VND) 1,461 885 1,959 1,516 1,412 
  Collateral to loan value ratio 5.1 4.9 5.6 4.3 6.7 
Average interest rate           
  Uncollateralized loans 24.1% 24.5% 22.3% 24.2% 23.5% 
  Collateralized loans 18.8% 18.6% 19.1% 17.9% 19.7% 
 
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics for the explanatory variables of the model for 
the whole sample in Panel A and separately for collateralized versus 
uncollateralized loans in Panel B.  The Ex-ante risk score reveals that our bank 
focuses on relatively safe borrowers: The average score is 41 out of a maximum of 
50. Collateralized loans are associated with on average riskier borrowers with a 
score of 40.60 compared to 41.37 for uncollateralized loans. This provides initial 
support for the observed-risk hypothesis. The percentage of home owners among 
borrowers is 63% but the differences between uncollateralized versus collateralized 
loans are substantial: 38% versus 86%. This supports the idea that borrowers 
provide collateral if they are able to do so – possibly in order to benefit from the 
lower interest rates for collateralized loans as documented in Table 2.1. Regarding 
the bank-borrower relationship, borrowers with collateralized loans have a longer 
relationship and more prior loans but use fewer bank products and are less likely to 
have another banking relationship. Surprisingly, more uncollateralized loans seem 
to be granted when the Base rate is higher. Furthermore, collateralized loans have 
longer maturities, are larger in size and are more likely to be made by a branch 
further away from the bank‟s headquarter. 
In Panel C of Table 2.2 we present separate statistics for four sub-samples. First we 
differentiate small from large loans. Loans of less than 100 million VND, which 
account for almost 65% of the sample, are classified as small loans. Loans of more 
than 100 million VND are classified as large loans.  As discussed above, the bank 
is more likely to require collateral for loans above 100 million VND. This is 
confirmed by table 2.1 that shows the frequency of collateralization of the small 
and the large loans are 37.1% and 79.0%, respectively. Large loans are associated 
with better borrowers as shown be the Ex-ante risk score of 42.2 compared to 40.3 
for small loans. Large loans are also granted to wealthier borrowers: 78% of 
borrowers who are granted a large loan own a house while only 55% of borrowers 
who are granted small loans own a house. Finally, large loans are associated with 
longer and stronger relationships with the bank. The differences we find between 
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the terms and characteristics of loans of different size suggest that to preserve 
homogeneity, we should estimate the model separately for each size. Second, we 
differentiate between short-term loans with a maturity of less than 36 months and 
long-term loans. This separation follows Jimenez et al. (2006) who claim that loan 
terms differ substantially across loans of different maturities. In our sample 
collateralization rates do indeed differ with 36.8% for short-term loans compared 
to and 80.1% for long-term loans. Furthermore, long-term loans are 50% larger on 
average than short-term loans. Long-terms loans are granted to ex ante safer 
borrowers, to wealthier borrowers, and by branches further away from the 
headquarter. 
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Table 2.2       Descriptive statistics 
This table presents descriptive statistics for all loans (Panel A), for collateralized versus uncollateralized loans (Panel B) 
and for four sub-samples (Panel C). The exact definitions and sources of our variables are listed in Table A2.2 of the 
appendix. 
 
Panel A: All loans 
Variable Mean  Minimum Maximum   
Standard 
deviation    Observations   
Borrower characteristics         
 
    
  Ex-ante risk score 40.97 15.00 50.00      6.85 32,655   
  Home ownerD 0.63 0.00 1.00      0.48 32,655   
  Age  39.10 19.00 88.00     10.11 32,655   
Bank-borrower relationship         
  
  
  Years with bank 2.26 0.00 10.00      2.65 32,655   
  Number of prior loans 4.96 0.00 519.00    12.87 32,655   
  Number of bank products 1.14 0.00 3.00     0.85 32,655   
  Other bankD 0.06 0.00 1.00     0.24 32,655   
  Local borrowerD 0.94 0.00 1.00     0.24 32,655   
Economics conditions         
  
  
  Base rate 7.30 0.00 14.00     3.10 32,655   
Control variables         
  
  
  Loan characteristics         
  
  
  Loan duration 39.10 1.00 360.00   21.21 32,655   
  Loan size  (ml VND) 134.31 10.00 6,000.00           167.71 32,655   
  Branch operation characteristics         
  
  
  Distance to head-quarter 46.80 0.00 1,047.38           139.45 32,655   
  Main branchD 0.60 0.00 1.00    0.49 32,655   
  Regional characteristics         
  
  
  Provincial legal index  4.14 2.79 6.70    0.74 32,655   
  MunicipalityD 0.94 0.00 1.00    0.25 32,655   
Panel B: Collateralized versus Uncollateralized  loans 
    Collateralized loans   Un-Collateralized loans 
Variable Mean  
Standard 
deviation 
Obser- 
vations        Mean  
Standard 
deviation 
 Obser- 
vations 
Borrower characteristics               
  Ex-ante risk score 40.60 6.54 16,883   41.37 7.15 15,772 
  Home ownerD 0.86 0.34 16,883     0.38 0.48 15,772 
  Age  43.87 9.93 16,883   33.99 7.46 15,772 
Bank-borrower relationship   
 
    
 
    
  Years with bank 2.87 2.82 16,883    1.60 2.29 15,772 
  Number of prior loans 8.07 16.42 16,883    1.63 5.73 15,772 
  Number of bank products 1.01 0.94 16,883    1.28 0.70 15,772 
  Other bankD 0.05 0.21 16,883    0.08 0.28 15,772 
  Local borrowerD 0.96 0.20 16,883    0.92 0.27 15,772 
Economics conditions   
 
    
 
    
  Base rate 7.06 3.41 16,883    7.55 2.70 15,772 
Control variables   
 
    
 
    
  Loan characteristics   
 
    
 
    
  Loan duration 46.16 25.09 16,883   31.54 12.12 15,772 
  Loan size  (ml VND) 199.19 207.26 16,883   64.85 54.09 15,772 
  Branch  operation characteristics   
 
    
 
    
  Distance to head-quarter 63.49 167.88 16,883   28.94 97.36 15,772 
  Main branchD 0.64 0.48 16,883     0.57 0.50 15,772 
  Regional characteristics   
 
    
 
    
  Provincial legal index  4.26 0.76 16,883    4.00 0.69 15,772 
  MunicipalityD 0.92 0.26 16,883     0.95 0.22 15,772 
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2.6. Regression results 
2.6.1. Empirical evidence regarding our hypotheses 
Table 2.4 presents the Probit model‟s estimations for the whole sample of 
consumer loans). Since the coefficients of Probit models cannot be interpreted 
directly, the marginal effect of each variable is additionally calculated and also 
presented in Table 2.4. The coefficient and marginal effect of the Ex-ante risk 
score are negative and significant therefore confirming our first hypothesis: In line 
with the observed risk hypothesis, borrowers with lower credit quality are more 
likely to pledge collateral. The marginal coefficient of the Ex-ante risk score 
indicates that, ceteris paribus, one point increase in Ex-ante risk score is likely to 
reduce the collateral requirement by 1.6%.  This magnitude corresponds to those 
obtained for the emerging market of Mexico (La Porta, et al., 2003) and for 
developed markets (Degrayse and Van Cayseele, 2000; Harhoff and Korting, 1998; 
Lehmann and Neuberger, 2001). However, these studies need to approximate the 
borrower‟s ex ante credit risk while we directly measure the Ex-ante risk score. 
Hence, we are able to provide direct evidence for the observed-risk hypothesis in 
an emerging market like Vietnam. 
Home ownerD has a positive and significant coefficient and the corresponding 
marginal effect indicates that, ceteris paribus, being a home owner is likely to 
increase the use of collateral by 31% compared to a borrower who does not own 
the house he lives in. We thus can confirm our second hypothesis and our results 
are in line with Booth and Booth (2006) who show that collateral pledging 
decisions are generally consistent with borrowing cost minimization. Existing 
studies are unable to distinguish between the borrowers‟ willingness to pledge 
collateral and their ability to do so. However, our proxy allows us to directly 
measure the ability to pledge collateral and we can thus test the hypothesis more 
accurately. Given the same level of observed credit risk and thus the same 
requirement from the bank‟s side to collateralize, borrowers with the ability to 
pledge collateral are more likely to do. So in return, they pay a lower interest rate 
as documented in Table 2.1. Similarly, the coefficient of Age is positive and 
significant and also indicates that – if age is a proxy for wealth – wealthy 
borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral. 
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Table 2.4     Determinants of the incidence of collateral 
This table presents coefficients and marginal coefficients of the Probit regression for all 
loans. For each independent variable, the coefficient and the z-statistic are shown in the 
coefficient column and the marginal coefficient at the mean is shown in the marginal 
column. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and clustered by borrower. ***, 
**, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
      Incidence of collateral 
  Coefficient Marginal effect 
Intercept   -6.78 *** 
     -33.84 
  Borrower characteristics   
    Ex-ante risk score -0.04 *** -0.016 
    -23.80 
    Home ownerD 0.81 ***   0.312 
    33.93 
    Age  0.04 ***   0.016 
    32.19 
  Bank-borrower relationship   
    Years with bank 0.08 ***   0.031 
    15.62 
    Number of prior loans 0.05 ***   0.019 
    17.54 
    Number of bank products -0.63 *** -0.247 
    -38.94 
    Other bankD -0.23 *** -0.091 
    -5.36 
    Local borrowerD 0.01 
 
  0.004 
    0.21 
  Economics conditions   
    Base rate 0.07 ***   0.027 
Control variables   
    Loan characteristics   
    Loan duration 0.03 ***   0.010 
    41.45 
    Loan size 1.03 ***   0.403 
    62.79 
    Branch operation characteristics   
    Distance to head-quarter -0.02 ** -0.010 
    -1.98 
    Main branchD 0.17 ***   0.067 
    7.67 
    Regional characteristics   
    Provincial legal index  0.31 ***   0.120 
    15.82   
   MunicipalityD -0.41 *** -0.152 
    -8.11   
     2.97   
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
(Continued) 
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Quarterly dummies     
   II-2007 0.08 **   0.030 
    2.36   
   III-2007 -0.04   -0.014 
    -1.40   
   IV-2007 -0.05 ** -0.021 
    -2.48   
   I-2008 -0.03 * -0.012 
    -1.70   
   II-2008 0.02   0.007 
    1.14   
   III-2008 0.09 ** 0.036 
    2.83   
   IV-2008 0.12 *** 0.046 
    8.24   
   I-2009 0.07 *** 0.028 
    5.40   
   II-2009 0.06 *** 0.022 
    4.43   
   III-2009 0.06 *** 0.023 
    5.03   
   IV-2009 0.06 *** 0.023 
    5.61   
   I-2010 0.01   0.005 
    1.34   
   II-2010 0.01   0.002 
    0.67   
   III-2010 0.00   0.000 
    -0.01   
   IV-2010 0.01   0.003 
    1.18   
   I-2011 0.01   0.002 
    0.69   
   II-2011 0.00   0.001 
    0.53   
   III-2011 0.01 * 0.005 
    1.87   
         
 Log likelihood -8,825   
 Pseudo R2  0.610   
 Number of observations 32,655   
  
How do the effects of the Ex-ante risk score and Home ownerD relate to each 
other? We believe that the relation between collateralization and Ex-ante risk score 
reflects the bank‟s policy to demand more collateral from risky borrowers, whereas 
Home ownerD reflects the choice of the borrower. This can be seen as a simple 
demand-supply system of collateral. Figure 2.1 presents predicted probability of 
collateral relative to the level of the Ex-ante risk score for home owners and non-
home owners. The predicted probability of pledging collateral for home owners 
lies persistently above the predicted probability of pledging collateral for non-
home owners. This indicates that at each level of risk borrowers more frequently 
choose to pledge collateral if they are able to do so. This finding again confirms 
our second hypothesis on the supply side of collateral. In addition, from the 
WHEN ARE CONSUMER LOANS COLLATERALIZED IN EMERGING MARKETS? 
EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM 
26 
 
demand side the downward slopping lines confirm that the bank requires less 
collateral from safer borrowers, both home owners and non-home owners. The 
interaction between Ex-ante risk score and Home ownerD regarding the collateral 
decision becomes visible when we compare the slope of the two lines. The slightly 
more negative slope for non-home owners indicates that for the same decrease in 
credit risk, the decrease in the collateralization requirement is larger for non-home 
owners than for home owners. Thus, non-home owners‟ collateral decision is 
slightly more sensitive to credit risk.  
Figure 2.1    Interaction between Home ownerD and Ex-ante risk score 
This figure presents the interaction between two factors, Home ownerD and Ex-ante risk 
score, on the use of collateral. 
  
Regarding our third hypothesis, our results for Vietnam are in line with existing 
findings for developed markets: Collateralization depends on scale of the bank-
borrower relationship. The likelihood of collateralization increases with Years with 
bank and Number of prior loans by 3.1% and 1.9%, respectively. This indicates 
that one more year with the bank with one more prior loan in the past would 
increase the use of collateral by 5% in total. This finding confirms that the “hold-
up” effect dominates the benefits of the lending relationship. In Vietnam it is not 
possible to pledge the same asset as collateral with different banks at the same 
time. Thus, the borrower tends to stay with the same bank that holds the pledged 
asset. Due to these institutional circumstances the hold-up effect is very persistent 
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in Vietnam. This provides a support for the conclusion made in previous studies 
(Greenbaum et al., 1989; Sharpe, 1990; Rajan, 1992, Farinha and Santos, 2002) 
that a frequent borrower can be associated with higher likelihood of collateral use. 
In addition, a relationship with an Other bankD has a negative coefficient 
indicating that the existence of an alternative lending source reduces the hold-up 
problem and consequently reduces the likelihood of collateralization. Local 
borrowerD is not significant. 
The proxy for the scope of the lending relationship, Number of bank products, has 
a negative and significant coefficient for all loans. The corresponding marginal 
effect implies that, ceteris paribus, using one more service at the bank would 
reduce the likelihood of being asked for collateral by approximately 25%. 
Compared to the average fraction of collateralized loans of 51.7%, this effect is 
substantial. This result strongly confirms our fourth hypothesis and is furthermore 
consistent with the results found in the previous studies about the effect of the 
scope of the lending relationship on collateral use (Degryse and Cayseele, 2000; 
Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Chakraborty and Hu, 2000). Thus, while the scale of the 
lending relationship increases the likelihood of using collateral, its scope, e.g. the 
number of different services that the borrower uses from the same bank, actually 
reduces the incidence of using collateral. The information the bank acquires about 
the borrowers through different kinds of services, for example different types of 
account such saving account, or debit account, is important for a consumer loan 
because it is harder to access private information than business information. This 
convenient source of information helps the bank to reduce both adverse selection 
and moral hazard and therefore the bank requires less collateral. 
In line with our fifth hypothesis about the relationship between economic 
conditions and the use of collateral, we find that the incidence of using collateral 
significantly increases during the crisis period. In particular, the time dummies 
from the third quarter of 2008 until the fourth quarter of 2009 have positive and 
significant coefficients and the collateral requirement peaks in the fourth quarter of 
2008 corresponding to the time when the bank‟s lending volume is at its lowest 
(see Table 2.3). In addition, we find a significant and positive coefficient for the 
Base rate. It implies that during the economic downturns when the State Bank 
increases its Base rate  (Figure 2.2), commercial banks require more collateral. The 
marginal coefficient shows that every 1% increase in the Base rate increases the 
likelihood of being asked for collateral by 2.7%. We conclude that over crisis 
periods when uncertainty increases and adverse selection and moral hazard become 
more severe, banks require more collateral as a solution to these asymmetric 
information problems and reduce their loss in case of default.  
WHEN ARE CONSUMER LOANS COLLATERALIZED IN EMERGING MARKETS? 
EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM 
28 
 
Figure 2.2      Change of the Base rate over time 
This figure presents the Base rate over time. This base rate is deployed by the State Bank as a 
monetary instrument and commercial banks in Vietnam are allowed to charge a maximum 
lending rate of 150% of this Base rate. 
  
Regarding control variables, Loan size and Loan maturity both increase the 
likelihood of collateralization. Branch characteristics also matter as Distance to 
headquarter has a negative and only marginally significant coefficient while Main 
branchD has a positive and significant coefficient. Collateralisation is also a 
regional issue. The coefficient of the Provincial legal index is significantly 
positive. This result suggests that a better legal environment increases the use of 
collateral. This can be explained by the lower cost of collateralization in a good 
legal environment than in a bad one and therefore enhances the use of collateral 
The negative coefficient of MunicipalityD can be understood in the context of the 
difference in economic development between the first-class cities and the rest of 
Vietnam. MunicipalityD - which is set equal to 1 for loans to borrowers in first-
class cities - then implies that economic development reduces information 
asymmetries and thus reduces the likelihood of collateral. 
For the four sub-samples of small versus large and short-term versus long-term 
loans
6
, Panel A of Table 2.5 indicates many similarities but also some differences 
regarding the determinations of collateral incidence. In general, the results for the 
                                                          
6 Jimenez et al (2006) made similar disentangling loan size and maturity but with different thresholds. 
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four sub-samples  provide robust results for our five hypotheses. Some differences, 
however, emerge. The coefficient of Home ownerD is smaller for small loans than 
for large loans and is smaller for short-term loans than for long-term loans. We 
interpret this as evidence that for large loans and long-term loans the 
collateralization is being more influenced by the demand side, e.g. the bank, while 
for small loans and short-term loans the decision to pledge collateral lies more in 
the hands of borrowers and therefore the ability to pledge collateral has more 
influence. Years with bank is negative but not significant for large loans and 
positive but less significant for long-term loans. This implies that the hold-up 
effect might only be important for small and short-term loans. Finally, large loans 
seem to be most vulnerable to the economic conditions as only large loans have a 
positive and significant coefficient for the Base rate. Large loans are also the first 
one that responds to the impact of the crisis as its coefficients for the quarterly 
dummy variables start to be positive and significant from the first quarter of 2008. 
The impact of the crisis also seems to be most persisted for this sub-sample as its 
coefficients for these time dummies stay positive and significant until the last 
quarter in our sample which is the third quarter of 2011 although their magnitude 
reduces from the beginning of 2009.  
Panel B of Table 2.5 presents the results of the Tobit model regarding the 
determinants of the degree of collateral use.  The model is estimated for the whole 
sample and for the four sub-samples. The model has the same explanatory 
variables as the model for collateral incidence. Overall, we can observe that the 
factors that determine whether or not collateral is provided also affect the amount 
of collateral in the same direction. Interestingly, the Base rate is now positive and 
significant for all four sub-samples. This result is consistent with the prediction by 
Boot et al. (1991) and Jimenez (2006) that the amount of collateral pledged in a 
particular loan will increase if the loan is granted in a period of higher interest 
rates.  
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2.6.2. Economic relevance 
Table 2.6 illustrates the change in the predicted probability of collateralization for 
a one-standard deviation change in each independent continuous variable or for a 
change from 0 to 1 for each independent dummy variable. The results are reported 
for our main regression shown in Table 2.4. Overall, the model predicts that 57.6% 
of loans are collateralized which is fairly close to the sample frequency of 51.7%. 
The largest impact on collateralization can be observed for Loan size (+38.6%) 
followed by Home ownerD (+31.2%). The effect of the Ex-ante risk score is only 
moderate with -1.6%. This can however be explained with the relatively low 
variability of the score as reported in Panel A of Table 2.2 and the similarity of the 
average scores for collateralized and uncollateralized loans as reported in Panel B 
of Table 2.2. The effect of the crisis shows a clear trend: From the second quarter 
of 2008 till the end of the sample period which is the third quarter of 2011 the 
likelihood of collateralization increases by 4.6% compared to the first quarter of 
2007. In conclusion, the estimated coefficients of our Probit model reported in 
Table 2.4 generally imply an economically substantial impact of the significant 
borrower characteristics, bank-borrower relationships and economic conditions on 
the use of collateral. 
In addition, Table A2.3 in the appendix shows the marginal effects of changes in 
values of the explanatory variables on the likelihood of collateralization for the 
whole sample and for four sub-samples. This result is obtained from the Probit 
estimation of table of Table 2.5. The marginal effects help to calibrate the 
economic significance of explanatory variables. For all the significant variables, 
the magnitude of these effects is much larger for small loans and short-term loans 
than for large loans and long-term loans. For example, a 10 points increase in the 
ex-ante risk score would increase the likelihood of collateralization by 13% and 
11% for a small loan and a short-term loan, respectively, while it increases the 
likelihood of collateralization by only 5% and 3% for a large loan and a long-term 
loan, respectively. The explanation lies in our sample where large loans and long-
term loans have by far higher probability of collateralization and so the room for 
these effects is not as big as that of the small loans and short-term loans. The 
quarterly dummies, which have a statistically significant effect, also show an 
economically significant effect here.    
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Table 2.6     The determinants of collateral-Economic relevance 
This table presents the effect of a change in each independent variable from half a standard deviation 
below the mean to half a standard deviation above the mean on the predicted probability of collateral. If 
the independent variable is a dummy, a change from 0 to 1 is considered. All other independent 
variables are kept at their mean values. The overall predicted probability of collateral is calculated when 
all independent variables are at their mean. 
      Predicted probability of collateralization 
         from     to       change 
Borrower characteristics       
  Ex-ante risk score 58.4% 56.8% -1.6% 
  Home ownerD 37.6% 68.9% 31.2% 
  Age  56.8% 58.4% 1.6% 
Bank-borrower relationship 
  
  
  Years with bank 56.1% 59.2% 3.1% 
  Number of prior loans 56.7% 58.6% 2.0% 
  Number of bank products 69.4% 45.1% -24.3% 
  Other bankD 58.2% 49.1% -9.1% 
  Local borrowerD 57.3% 57.7% 0.4% 
Economics conditions 
  
  
  Base rate 57.2% 58.0% 0.8% 
Control variables 
  
  
  Loan characteristics 
  
  
  Loan duration 57.1% 58.1% 1.0% 
   Loan size 37.4% 76.0% 38.6% 
  Branch operation characteristics 
  
  
  Distance to head-quarter 57.6% 57.6% -0.01% 
  Main branchD 53.6% 60.3% 6.7% 
  Regional characteristics 
  
  
  Provincial legal index  51.6% 63.5% 12.0% 
  MunicipalityD 71.8% 56.6% -15.2% 
Quarterly dummies 
  
  
  II-2007 57.0% 60.0% 3.0% 
  III-2007 58.1% 56.7% -1.4% 
  IV-2007 59.1% 57.0% -2.1% 
  I-2008 58.4% 57.2% -1.2% 
  II-2008 57.4% 58.1% 0.7% 
  III-2008 57.6% 61.1% 3.5% 
  IV-2008 56.4% 61.0% 4.6% 
  I-2009 56.5% 59.3% 2.8% 
  II-2009 56.5% 58.8% 2.2% 
  III-2009 56.3% 58.6% 2.3% 
  IV-2009 56.0% 58.2% 2.3% 
  I-2010 57.4% 57.9% 0.5% 
  II-2010 57.4% 57.6% 0.2% 
  III-2010 57.6% 57.6% 0.0% 
  IV-2010 57.1% 57.4% 0.3% 
  I-2011 57.4% 57.6% 0.2% 
  II-2011 57.5% 57.6% 0.1% 
  III-2011 57.2% 57.7% 0.5% 
Overall predicted probability of 
collateralization 
 
57.6%   
Fraction of collateralization loans in sample 
 
51.7%   
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2.6.3. Robustness of the results 
Our study explores the Ex-ante risk score as one determinant of the use of 
collateral and its amount. As shown in Table A2.1 in the appendix, this score is 
generated using a list of simple rules made available by the bank to its loan officers 
for the loan assessing purpose. These rules have been employed at the bank for the 
whole sample period and our results so far show a solid relationship between this 
score and the incidence and degree of collateral. However, the bank has recently 
implemented a more sophisticated credit scoring system in some of its branches. 
We therefore perform a robustness test by replacing the Ex-ante credit score by 
with this New ex-ante risk score. Table 2.7 shows the results of our Probit 
(Regression 1 and 2) and Tobit (Regression 3 and 4) models. The New ex-ante risk 
score includes of several explanatory variables that are included in our model and a 
mutlicollinearity problem might thus exist. To avoid this problem, we include the 
New ex-ante risk score as well as its residual. The coefficients and the marginal 
effects are shown for Regression 1 and 2 where the New ex-ante risk score and the 
residual of the New ex-ante risk score are included, respectively. The coefficients 
are shown for Regression 3 and 4 with the New ex-ante risk score and the residual 
of the New ex-ante risk score, respectively. Except for the fact that the New Ex-
ante risk score and its residual are not significant in the Tobit model, new model 
estimations leave the main result unchanged and the goodness fit of the model 
remains stable.  
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2.7. Conclusions 
In this study we identify the factors that influence the decision to secure a 
consumer loan in Vietnam. We focus our analysis on five main hypotheses 
regarding borrower quality, bank-borrower relationship and economic conditions. 
We test these hypotheses using a unique data set of loans originated by a large 
commercial bank in Vietnam between 2007 and 2011. Previous empirical research 
focuses on commercial loans in developed markets and shows that for these loans 
lenders require collateral for loans granted to borrowers with lower credit quality. 
The results in our study are based on a direct measure of credit risk as observed by 
the bank and confirm that the observed credit quality of the borrower is an 
important determinant of the use of collateral for consumer loans as well. In 
addition, we find that wealthier borrowers who are able to pledge collateral do so 
to benefit from low borrowing rates. We also find that the hold-up effect dominates 
the benefit of relationship lending in terms of a higher likelihood of collateral in 
new loans, especially for relatively small loans. However, the scope rather than 
scale of the borrower-lender relationship actually improves the terms of the loan 
contract as the usage of collateral decrease. Finally, we find that during crisis 
periods when uncertainty increases and lending resources are limited, 
collateralization also increases.  
Overall, we find that both incidence and degree of collateralization are higher for 
consumer loans in Vietnam as a developing banking market compared to 
developed markets. Regarding determinants of collateral, our findings are in parts 
consistent with existing evidence from developed markets and for commercial 
loans. As a typical fact in developing markets the hold-up effect is particularly 
strong, especially for the small loans for which collateral value is much higher than 
the loan amount. If property rights can be improved the borrower can make more 
flexible choices of pledging their asset, for instance to pledge one asset at several 
banks with clearly identified seniority, and thus reduce the hold-up problem.  
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2.8. Appendix  
Table A2.1    Borrower characteristics included in the bank's ex-ante credit score 
To calculate the ex ante risk score, all points are added up. A higher score indicates lower risk. 
 
Characteristic Subdivision Points 
Years in current 
employment/business 
Unemployed or 0 years 0 
Less than 2 years but more than 0 years 5 
More than 2 years 10 
Industry where the loan 
will be invested in  
Transportation, Tourism, Store/Office renting,  0 
Service sector 
Agriculture, Construction 5 
Other or consumer loan 10 
Years of education Less than 14 years or missing 0 
More than 14 and less than 16 years 5 
More than 16 years 10 
Industry in which 
borrower is engaged 
Unemployed 0 
Service sector 5 
Other 10 
Monthly Income No income 0 
Less than 7.000.000 VND (in Hanoi or HCM city)   
or less than 5.000.000 VND (in other provinces) 5 
More than 7.000.000 VND (in Hanoi or HCM city)   
or more than 5.000.000 VND (in other provinces) 10 
 
Table A2.2       Variable sources and definitions 
Unless otherwise indicated the variables are obtained from the Vietnamese bank which makes the loan. Subscript 
D indicates dummy variables. 
Category Variable Definition 
Dependent 
variable 
    
  CollateralD Dummy equal to 1 for collateralized loans, 0 otherwise. 
  Collateral index Index based on collateral to loan value ratio (CLR): 0 if unsecured; 
index=1 if 0<CLR<1; index=2 if 1<= CLR <1.5; index=3 if 1.5< 
=CLR<5; and index=4 if CLR>=5. 
Borrower characteristics   
  Ex-ante risk score Score assigned to borrower during initial screening process. Range from 
0 to 50 with higher value indicating lower risk. 
  Home ownerD Dummy equal to 1 if the borrower is the owner of his current resident, 0 
otherwise. 
  Age  Age of borrower in years. 
Bank-borrower relationship   
  Years with bank Number of years since the first business contact (e.g. first loan or 
account) with the bank. 
  Number of prior 
loans 
Number of prior loans that the customer has had with the bank. 
  Number of bank 
products 
Number of different bank products that the customer uses with the bank. 
This includes saving accounts, debit accounts, prepaid cards and credit 
cards. 
  Other bankD Dummy equal to 1 if the borrower indicated to the lender that she is 
holding accounts with another bank, 0 otherwise. 
  Local borrowerD Dummy equal to 1 if the borrower comes from the province where the 
branch locates, 0 otherwise. 
   (Continued) 
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Economics condition 
  Base rate Regulatory interest rate set by the Vietnamese central bank. Commercial 
banks are only allowed to lend at interest rates of 150% or less of this 
base rate. This base rate is adjusted over time, and being used by the State 
Bank of Vietnam as a monetary policy instrument. Source: This rate over 
time can be obtained at the official website of the State Bank of Vietnam: 
http://www.sbv.gov.vn/wps/portal/vn 
Control variables   
  Loan 
characteristics 
  
  Loan duration Loan duration in years. 
      
  Loan size Natural Logarism of the size of the loan in million Vietnamese dong 
(VND). 
  Branch operation characteristics 
  Distance to 
headquarter 
Distance in km between branch and bank headquarters. 
  Main branchD Dummy equal to 1 if the bank classifies the branch, which makes the loan 
as one of the main branches in the province, 0 otherwise. 
  Regional 
characteristics 
  
  Provincial legal 
index  
An index measuring how transparent and supportive the provincial legal 
framework it towards enterprises. The original scale of the index ranges 
from 0 to 10 with higher values indicating better legal framework. 
Source: Provincial Competitiveness Index. PIC Survey instruments and 
methodology can be obtained at http://www.pcivietnam.org. 
  MunicipalityD Dummy equal to 1 if the branch is located in one of the 5 first class cities 
(or centrally governed municipalities) as defined by the Vietnamese 
government, 0 otherwise. Source: This information can be obtained at the 
official website of the Vietnamese government: http://www.chinhphu.vn 
 
Table A2.3      Determinants of collateral: marginal coefficient 
This table replicates the Probit regressions of Panel A in Table 5 but reports marginal coefficients in stead of 
coefficients. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for collateralized loans and zero otherwise. For each 
independent variable, the marginal effect at the mean is reported. Standard errors are heteroskedasticity robust and 
clustered by borrower. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
         All loans  Small loans Large loans    Short-term 
loans 
     Long-term 
loans Borrower characteristics   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Ex-ante risk score -0.016 *** -0.013 *** -0.005 *** -0.011 *** -0.003 *** 
  Home ownerD 0.312 *** 0.293 *** 0.077 *** 0.267 *** 0.057 *** 
  Age  0.016 *** 0.013 *** 0.005 *** 0.014 *** 0.002 *** 
Bank-borrower relationship    
 
                
  Years with bank 0.031 *** 0.043 *** -0.002   0.036 *** 0.001 *** 
  Number of prior loans 0.019 *** 0.018 *** 0.004 *** 0.016 *** 0.002 *** 
  Number of bank products -0.247 *** -0.241 *** -0.044 *** -0.244 *** -0.027 ** 
  Other bankD -0.091 *** -0.079 *** -0.023 ** -0.064 *** -0.016 *** 
  Local borrowerD 0.004 
 
0.027   -0.010   0.015   0.001 ** 
Economics conditions   
 
                
  Base rate 0.027 *** 0.016   0.013 *** 0.014   0.005   
Control variables   
 
                
  Loan characteristics   
 
                
  Loan duration 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.003 *** 0.000   0.004 *** 
  Loan size 0.403 *** 0.412 *** 0.183 *** 0.327 *** 0.042 *** 
  Branch operation characteristics   
 
                
  Distance to head-quarter 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000   0.000   0.000   
  Main branchD 0.067 *** 0.056 *** 0.017 *** 0.071 *** 0.001 *** 
            
            
            
(Continued) 
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Regional characteristics   
 
                
  Provincial legal index  0.120 *** 0.111 *** 0.031 *** 0.079 *** 0.022 *** 
  MunicipalityD -0.152 *** -0.166 *** -0.032 *** -0.156 *** -0.017   
Quarterly dummies   
 
                
  II-2007 0.030 ** 0.022 * 0.021 ** 0.023 * 0.002   
  III-2007 -0.014 
 
-0.011   0.006   -0.010   -0.002   
  IV-2007 -0.021 ** -0.015 * 0.007   -0.017 ** -0.003   
  I-2008 -0.012 *  -0.013 * 0.014 *** -0.013 * -0.001   
  II-2008 0.007 
 
-0.001   0.021 *** 0.003   0.001   
  III-2008 0.036 ** 0.023 * 0.024 ** 0.024 ** 0.000   
  IV-2008 0.046 *** 0.037 *** 0.026 *** 0.030 ***    
  I-2009 0.028 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.016 *** 0.009 *** 
  II-2009 0.022 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.010 **    
  III-2009 0.023 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 *** 0.012 ** 0.008 *** 
  IV-2009 0.023 *** 0.017 *** 0.016 *** 0.012 ** 0.007 *** 
  I-2010 0.005 
 
0.004   0.009 *** 0.001   0.002 * 
  II-2010 0.002
 
0.001   0.008 *** -0.002   0.001 ** 
  III-2010 0.000
 
-0.001   0.007 *** -0.003   0.001 * 
  IV-2010 0.003
 
0.000   0.008 *** -0.001   0.001 ** 
  I-2011 0.002
 
0.001   0.007 *** -0.001   0.001 
   II-2011 0.001
 
-0.001   0.007 *** -0.002   0.001* 
  III-2011 0.005  0.003   0.007 *** 0.001   0.002 *** 
      
 
            
Log likelihood -8825.451
 
-5643.298   -2807.7    -6085.6     -2115.1 
Pseudo R2 60.98
 
59.71   52.18   56.78        61.46 
Number of observations 32655
 
21244   11411   21408       10717 
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  Chapter 3  
Bank Lending Strategy, Credit Scoring and  
Financial Crises
7
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Economic and financial crises are commonly accompanied by reductions in bank 
lending. During the financial crisis of 2007/08, banks substantially reduced credit 
to both domestic borrowers (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010) and international 
borrowers (Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2010 and 2012; Herrmann and Mihaljek, 2010; 
Milesi-Ferretti and Tille, 2010; Peek and Rosengren, 1997; Popov and Udell, 2012; 
Takats, 2010).
8
 According to Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), new loans to large 
US borrowers fell by 47% during the peak of the financial crisis (fourth quarter of 
2008) relative to the preceding quarter and by 79% relative to the peak of the credit 
boom (second quarter of 2007). The observed reduction in bank lending is driven 
by shifts in supply, e.g., credit rationing, as well as by shifts in demand (Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1995). While a reduction in loan demand can be attributed to the 
deterioration of economic conditions, i.e., fewer profitable investment 
opportunities for corporations or increased unemployment risk for consumers, the 
reduction of loan supply can be understood as the result of an increase in 
uncertainty and asymmetric information and an accompanying increase in adverse 
selection.  
Lending is characterized by information asymmetry between banks and borrowers. 
Borrowers have an informational advantage over lenders because they know more 
than lenders do about the investment projects they wish to undertake. This 
informational advantage results in adverse selection and the classic “lemons” 
problem (Akerlof, 1970) that occurs because banks cannot differentiate “good” 
borrowers (low default risk) from “bad” ones (high default risk). Banks will 
therefore only make loans at interest rates reflecting average borrower quality, with 
high-quality borrowers paying an interest rate that is too high and low-quality 
borrowers paying an interest rate that is too low. Consequently, some high-quality 
borrowers may decide to drop out of the market. Adverse selection can also be 
described as a problem that occurs because potential bad borrowers are the ones 
that most actively seek loans which increases the chance that a loan might be made 
                                                          
7 This chapter is based on „Bank lending Strategy, Credit Scoring and Financial Crises‟ co-authored 
with Stefanie Kleimeier and Stefan Straetmans. 
8 The collapse of corporate borrowing and lending should be distinguished from the liquidity crunch in 
short-term interbank borrowing and lending during the 2007/2008 banking crisis. Although the causes 
are comparable, i.e., increased asymmetric information and adverse selection, this paper focuses rather 
on the collapse of corporate borrowing and lending.        
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to a bad borrower. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) analyze adverse selection and 
incentive effects in the loan market and show that a bank that raises its interest rate 
may suffer because only risky borrowers will be willing to borrow at higher rates. 
Thus, banks might choose not to raise their interest rates to eliminate credit 
demand, resulting in possible credit rationing. 
During an economic and financial crisis, the adverse selection problem typically 
intensifies on two fronts. First, the degree of information asymmetry increases as 
banks find it more difficult to distinguish good from bad borrowers. The behavior 
and performance of borrowers are expected to change significantly during a crisis, 
but banks have difficulties in correctly anticipating these changes and 
incorporating them into their credit decision-making process (AD&B, 2009). 
Second, increased default risk translates into a higher risk premium. These higher 
borrowing costs in turn cause more good borrowers to drop out of the market 
(Kirabaeva, 2011).         
Banks have limited options to deal with adverse selection. On the one hand, they 
can ration credit. However, there are limits to how much banks can reduce credit 
supply in times of crises because a bank‟s business model and profitability still 
depend to an important extent on the size of its loan portfolio. In other words, they 
can also ration themselves into bankruptcy. On the other hand, banks can try to 
better control the adverse selection problem by incentivizing borrowers to behave 
well (e.g., by giving them “skin in the game” by requiring collateral) or by 
improving their ex-ante screening of potential clients. Through such measures, 
banks rely mainly on “relationship” banking by having frequent contacts with their 
clients or using quantitative tools, such as credit scoring models (CSMs). However, 
CSMs are expected to quickly become unreliable when an economic and financial 
crisis strikes and when the economic environment, and thus borrowers‟ true default 
risk, deteriorates. For example, Jankowitsch et al. (2007) show that enhancing the 
statistical power of a rating system decreases the potential effects of adverse 
selection. We argue that re-estimating CSMs by using more recent data constitutes 
one way of improving the performance of rating systems such as CSMs.  
Our study contributes to the existing literature on the relationship between rating 
system performance and macro-economic performance; see, e.g., Avery et al. 
(2004), Bonfim (2009), Lucas and Klaassen (2006) or Carling et al. (2007). The 
existing literature claims that the failure to consider general economic 
circumstances in a continuous way can diminish the performance of rating models. 
Our approach, however, is more specific in that we explicitly focus on the impact 
of financial crises on credit rating systems. To our knowledge, this approach is 
novel to the literature concerned with performance evaluation of dynamic credit 
rating systems such as CSMs. We estimate CSMs over different sample periods to 
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show how a CSM‟s performance can be improved through re-estimation. More 
specifically, we hypothesize that updating a CSM using post-crisis data can 
improve the bank‟s screening ability and thus reduce adverse selection. 9  We 
estimate a CSM for the Vietnamese retail banking market for the period around the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. Our focus on Vietnam as an emerging country has two 
advantages. First, although developing markets were not directly affected by the 
crisis, they were nevertheless indirectly exposed through export and foreign 
investment channels. For example, credit grew in Vietnam between 2000 and 2011 
at the substantial average annual rate of 31.45%. However, the global crisis 
affected the Vietnamese banking market in 2008, as credit growth dropped to 
approximately 20%. Similarly, non-performing loans rose to 3.5% in 2008 but in 
2009 had dropped back to the 2007-level of approximately 2.0% (Quach, 2011). 
According to an IMF survey
10
, developing markets are now leading the global 
recovery out of the financial crisis, and Vietnam is among the emerging markets 
that have seen growth bounce back in 2011.
11
 Vietnam is thus a banking market in 
which crisis effects are clearly present, but short-lived. This allows us to 
investigate not only pre-crisis and crisis periods but also a distinct post-crisis 
period. Last but not least, the use of emerging market data enables us to evaluate 
the post-crisis performance of CSMs, which may provide useful insights for 
bankers, policy makers or regulators in the more-developed financial systems still 
faced with crises and unresolved structural problems.  Second, we expect that the 
use of emerging market data produce value-added, as adverse selection is plausibly 
at least as severe – if not worse – in emerging markets as in developed markets, 
regardless of whether crisis periods are considered. This is because in developing 
markets information asymmetry can be substantial, due, e.g., to weak financial 
disclosure laws or the absence of credit bureaus. This problem is further 
aggravated by an underdeveloped banking system in which CSMs are not 
commonly used. The lack of government regulation and the weak institutional 
framework within which banks must operate makes the use of appropriate 
screening mechanisms, such as CSMs, relatively more important for emerging 
market banks than for banks in more developed banking systems.  
Anticipating our results, we find (i) that estimated CSM parameters differ 
considerably for pre-crisis, crisis or post-crisis data and (ii) that updating CSMs 
using post-crisis data would help banks contain the increase in adverse selection 
                                                          
9  Adverse selection also increases the likelihood of credit rationing in which some borrowers are 
arbitrarily denied loans. Consequently, profitable investment projects are not undertaken, which is bad 
for the economy as a whole and might prolong the effects of a crisis (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
10 See http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/new120910a.htm for details. 
11 Developing East Asia, excluding China, is performing better with growth projected to be 5.6% in 
2012, higher than the 4.4% recorded in 2011. Vietnam‟s recovery from the global economic crisis has 
been rapid. The growth rates of key economic indicators, including real GDP, industrial production, 
investment, and exports, are expected to recover to near their pre-crisis trend growth rates. 
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problems occasioned by the crisis. In fact, post-crisis CSM can provide banks with 
several benefits. First, banks can substantially improve profitability. Second, banks 
can reduce their adverse selection problems because they can price loans more 
accurately. Third, an updated CSM more effectively identifies good and bad loans 
and thus reduces the number of loans that must be reviewed in detail by the loan 
officer. Thus, banks can conduct their relationship lending more efficiently.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents a general 
CSM as currently applied to retail credit and illustrates the modeling steps and 
decisions that must be taken in formulating a CSM. In section 3, credit scoring 
models are estimated using different samples of period-specific input data. Specific 
applications of different models regarding bank profitability, risk-based loan 
pricing, and relationship lending are explored in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2. A credit scoring methodology for retail loans  
CSMs are commonly structured along the lines of Altman‟s (1968) Z-score model 
in which variables are selected based on their predictive power.
12 
 Typically, a 
CSM is estimated using historical loan and borrower data to identify which 
borrower characteristics are most strongly associated with defaulted and non-
defaulted loans. Based on a CSM estimated with historical data, a credit score can 
now be calculated for each new loan applicant, where a higher score indicates a 
better-expected performance of the borrower and thus a lower probability of 
default (PD). This score must be compared with the CSM‟s cut-off rate to 
determine whether the loan application is accepted, rejected or requires further 
assessment. Thus, as part of the CSM developmental stage, calibration is also 
necessary so that an optimal cut-off rate, in line with the lender‟s objectives, can be 
determined.  
The 2007/2008 financial crisis caused a fundamental change in the global 
economic environment. This change entails that existing assessment systems, 
including CSMs, based on historical pre-crisis data, are likely to have poor default-
predicting power for post-crisis applicants. The crisis changed borrowers‟ payment 
behavior; therefore, adjustments will be required at all stages of CSM 
development, from variable selection to variable coding and from probability of 
default (PD) calibration to cut-off setting.  
 
                                                          
12
 For an overview of the bankruptcy prediction literature since Altman‟s original study, see Byström et 
al. (2005) or Philosophov and Philosophov (2002). The former paper is also the only one to investigate 
the issue for a developing country. See Laitinen (1999) for a discussion of the related literature on the 
prediction of credit risk ratings. 
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3.2.1. The estimation method 
The development of a CSM starts with a decision about the specification of the 
model, i.e., one must choose among decision trees, linear probability models, Logit 
or Probit regression models or multiple discriminant analyses. Following most of 
the existing literature, we opt for the logistic regression method. We start with a 
retail loan sample containing information on borrower characteristics and ex-post 
default status. A borrower‟s ex-ante PD is unobservable, but the logistic regression 
technique enables us to estimate it. This technique assumes the existence of a 
continuous latent variable Zj that is linear in the loan characteristics x of the bank‟s 
retail clients: 
    
                                     (3.1) 
where wk is the coefficient of the k
th
 variable xjk is the value of variable k for 
applicant j. Zj  is known as the j
th
 applicant‟s Z-Score. Zj is ex-ante unobservable, 
and default can only be defined ex-post as a dummy variable (with default 
corresponding to a value of 1 and 0 otherwise). Equation (3.2) relates the default 
probability π to the latent variable Z by assuming that they are linked via a logistic 
distribution model. We estimate the parameters using iterative maximum 
likelihood estimation. Larger values of π reflect a higher PD.   
   
 
    ( 
  )
 
            
3.2.2. Variable identification  
 A choice must be made about which variables to initially consider for equations 
(3.1) and (3.2). There is no overall consensus regarding the number or types of 
initial variables to try. Some models start with as many as 50 variables. Table 3.1 
presents a list of the more commonly used variables for retail CSMs. In CSMs for 
corporate loans, the variables are relatively similar across countries and are limited 
to financial statement data (Allen et al., 2004). For retail loans, direct measures of 
the financial strength of the borrower, such as income or the value of one‟s home, 
are included. Given the limited availability of such proxies for individuals, proxies 
that measure the financial strength of a borrower indirectly (e.g., education, 
household size, years at employer or postal code) must also be used. There appear 
to be only a few variables that are typical for developing countries, such as gender, 
religion, branch and loan officer. This finding can be explained by the fact that 
banks in most developed countries are prohibited by law from using variables such 
as gender, whereas banks in developing countries are not. Branch and loan officer 
variables can reflect branch policy, bonuses, experience or training levels. Their 
inclusion in the CSM for Bolivia might indicate that differences across branches 
(3.2) 
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and loan officers are more pronounced in less-developed banking markets. Except 
for these few variables, however, it appears that retail CSM for a developing 
country can generally start with the same set of variables as a retail CSM for a 
developed country.  
Note that not all variables are fully available. Values may be structurally missing 
(e.g., questions that are asked conditionally on the responses to previous 
questions). Alternatively, missing values might be due to a deficient information 
system in some branches or to customers who are unwilling to completely fill out 
application forms. Excluding all variables with missing values might substantially 
reduce sample size and lead to a loss of valuable information, whereas including 
variables with only a few valid observations might lead to unreliable results. To 
balance these two disadvantages, we first identify those variables that show a 
substantial number of missing values. Second, we rely on loan officers‟ expert 
knowledge and feeling for the data and borrower characteristics to identify which 
of these variables can or cannot be excluded from the model (Henley and Hand, 
1997).  
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3.2.3. Variable categorization 
After the choice of the initial set of independent variables has been made, 
qualitative as well as quantitative variables must be coded. Coding of a quantitative 
variable is required when the relationship between the variable and default 
probability is nonlinear. As Thomas (2000) argues, instead of trying to map such a 
relationship as a straight line, borrowers can be grouped into various categories, 
thus generating a categorical variable. The latter approach is more commonly used 
in credit scoring, mainly because it can also be applied to qualitative variables. 
Thus, we adopt this approach for all our variables. To complete the coding of the 
variables, a value must be attached to each category. Boyle et al. (1992) show that 
variables can be coded based on the distribution of defaulted and non-defaulted 
loans in the sample. If a variable has m categories, let gi be the number of good 
(non-defaulted) loans belonging to the i
th
 category and bi the number of bad 
(defaulted) loans belonging to the i
th
 category. G and B are the total number of 
good and bad loans, respectively, in the whole sample, such that 
      ∑   
 
        and      ∑   
 
                
Instead of using a simple coding rule
13
, estimates of the odd of good and bad loans 
in the i
th
 category are commonly used. We follow Crook and Shumway (1992) and 
code our variables as
14
 
ln(gi/bi) + ln(B/G)       (3.4) 
For qualitative variables, for which the number of possible categories is very large, 
coding all categories becomes infeasible. For such cases, we follow Thomas (2000) 
and Boyle et al. (1992) recommendation and aggregate values of similar PD 
measured as bi/(gi+bi).  
3.2.4. Variable selection and estimation of the CSM 
Once the variables have been coded, equation (3.2) can be estimated. As is evident 
from retail CSMs in developed countries, the model can initially contain a large 
number of variables. While this might be statistically feasible for large samples, 
there are practical restrictions. Too many questions in an application form deter 
loan applicants, who may not answer all questions or decide to apply for a loan 
elsewhere. Efficiency and applicability thus require that the number of variables be 
reduced. We therefore apply a forward as well as a backward stepwise method that 
                                                          
13 A simple rule assigns, for example, a value of 1 to the category with the lowest PD, a value of 2 to the 
category with the second highest PD, etc. 
14 In each sub-sample, ln(B/G) is constant. In practice, when banks are updating their CSM at regular 
intervals, this value will change with every update. 
(3.3) 
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sequentially adds or withdraws variables to maximize the model‟s predictive 
accuracy (Henley and Hand, 1997). At this point, the final version of the CSM can 
be determined and the coefficients wj of equation (3.2) can be estimated. 
3.2.5. CSM’s predictive accuracy 
The CSM should be tested for its predictive accuracy out-of-sample. The PD it 
produces is then compared to a cut-off value to establish whether a loan applicant 
will be a good (non-defaulting) or bad (defaulting) borrower. Initially, a cut-off 
value of 50% can be chosen so that an applicant whose estimated PD is greater 
(smaller) than 50% will be classified as a bad (good) borrower. This classification 
is then compared with the observed incidence of default to establish the accuracy 
of the model. A classification table, as shown in Table 3.2, is commonly employed 
at this stage. Gg represents the number of correctly classified good loans, whereas 
Gb represents the number of good loans that are incorrectly classified as bad loans. 
Similarly, Bb represents the number of correctly classified bad loans, whereas Bg 
represents the number of bad loans that are incorrectly classified as good loans. 
The percentage of correctly classified (PCC) loans serves as an accuracy measure. 
The percentage of correctly classified good loans (PCCgood) is defined as the 
proportion of correctly classified good loans to the total number of observed good 
loans. Correspondingly, the percentage of correctly classified bad loans (PCCbad) is 
defined as the proportion of correctly classified bad loans to the total number of 
observed bad loans. Finally, the percentage of correctly classified total loans 
(PCCtotal) is defined as the number of correctly classified loans relative to the total 
number of loans. Though simple to use, PCC may not always be an appropriate 
accuracy measure, as it implicitly assumes that the costs of misclassification of bad 
and good loans are equal. For banks, however, one classification error may be 
much more costly than another. To address this issue, Baesens et al. (2003) use two 
additional accuracy measures called sensitivity (SENS) and specificity (SPEC). In 
contrast to PCCbad, which relates the predicted bad loans to the total number of 
observed bad loans, SPEC is defined as the ratio of the number of correctly 
classified bad loans to the total number of classified bad loans. Correspondingly, 
SENS is defined as the ratio of the number of correctly classified good loans to the 
total number of classified good loans. Banks may wish to minimize both Bg and Gb 
simultaneously. However, reducing Bg comes at the expense of increasing Gb, and 
vice versa. Thus, banks should take into account differences in cost arising from 
misclassified good versus misclassified bad loans.  
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Table 3.2     Predictive accuracy of credit scoring models 
For the abbreviations Gg, Gb, Bb and Bg the capital letter indicates the actual nature of the 
loan whereas the subscript indicates the predicted nature. Based on these four measures, 
the accuracy of a credit scoring model can be assessed by the percentage of correctly 
classified loans (PCC), sensitivity (SENS) and specificity (SPEC).   
    Prediction     
Observation   Non-default Default   PCC 
Non-default   Gg  Gb   PCCgood = Gg / (Gg+Gb) 
Default   Bg  Bb   PCCbad = Bb / (Bb+Bg) 
          
PCCtotal = (Gg+Bb) / 
(Gg+Gb+Bb+Bg) 
SENS   Gg / (Gg+Bg)       
SPEC     Bb / (Bb+Gb)     
 
One major drawback of the aforementioned assessment measures is that they 
depend on the selected cut-offs and default percentage of the sample. Therefore, 
these measures are not appropriate for comparing the performances of models 
constructed from different data sets. CSMs are therefore usually evaluated using a 
power curve such as the Cumulative Accuracy Profile (CAP)
15
 or the Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve (Kraznowski and Hand, 2009). Unlike the 
CAP curve and the aforementioned measures, a ROC curve represents the CSM‟s 
performance for all possible cut-off values and is independent of the composition 
of the loan portfolio. A ROC curve is the most popular graphic representation of 
CSM performance. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the ROC curve and its 
summary index, known as the Area Under the Curve (AUC), to compare the 
performance of our different models.  
The ROC curve is represented by the non-diagonal plot of the true positive rate 
(SENS) on the vertical axis and the false positive rate (1-SPEC) on the horizontal 
axis, for all possible cut-off points. In Figure 3.1, a hypothetical ROC curve is 
plotted. A perfect model would correctly classify all defaults, and be represented 
by the horizontal line at the unit true positive rate. On the other side, a model with 
zero predictive power is represented by a 45-degree line. Any other model with 
some predictive power would be represented by a concave curve positioned 
between the two extreme cases. 
 
 
                                                          
15  The CAP curve depends on the composition of the portfolio (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2005). Hence, the CAP curve cannot be used to monitor scoring models over time when 
the composition of the portfolio changes or to compare classifier performances of rating models across 
two different portfolios (Sobehart and Keenan, 2001). 
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Figure 3.1 ROC curve 
This figure shows an example of a ROC curve and its interpretation. 
 
 
 
 
In Figure 3.1, the area between the axis of the abscissa and the ROC curve (AUC) 
is a measure of discriminatory power. It takes values in the [0.5,1] interval, where 
the two bounds correspond to models with zero and full discriminatory power, 
respectively. By normalizing the AUC index (AUC-0.5)/0.5=G, the Gini index G 
is obtained. This index, which can be considered as a general power statistic, is 
widely used in banking practice. The rule of thumb is that a CSM should be 
updated if G falls below approximately 20%. 
Neither AUC nor G depends on the proportion of defaulted loans in the bank‟s 
portfolio. Therefore, they can be used to monitor the performance of a CSM over 
time. However, similarly to measures such as PCC, SENS and SPEC, the main 
drawback of the ROC and AUC curves is the assumption of equal misclassification 
error costs. For most banks, the cost of Bg will be much higher than the cost of Gb. 
In section 3.4.1, we therefore introduce a more advanced method that explicitly 
takes these two costs into account. 
3.3. An application to the Vietnamese retail lending market 
From 1987 onward, Vietnamese economic reforms put the economy on a path from 
a centrally planned economy to a market economy. To date, however, Vietnamese 
banks have suffered from insufficient capital buffers, inadequate provisions for 
possible loan losses or defaults, low profitability and the slow pace of institutional 
reform. With respect to risk assessment and management, there are numerous 
difficulties, including a lack of transparency in non-performing loan disclosure. As 
part of a broader strategy, all banks have been asked by the State Bank of Vietnam 
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(SBV) to develop a comprehensive “credit manual” that accounts for generally 
accepted international risk management practices and standards. The development 
of a proper CSM is an integral part of this initiative. By 2006, a number of large 
banks had implemented their CSM to meet the SBV‟s requirements.  
Like many other open developing economies, Vietnam was affected by the 
2007/2008 global financial crisis, which revealed structural weaknesses in 
Vietnam‟s economy.16 The direct impact on the Vietnamese economy remained 
small due to Vietnam‟s limited linkages with international financial markets and 
the fact that more than 50% of the banking sector remains state-owned. 
Nonetheless, Vietnam was affected indirectly through trade FDI and financial 
capital movements. In addition, Vietnamese employment and economic growth 
were both negatively affected by the global financial crisis. According to reports 
from 41 of the 63 provinces and cities of Vietnam
17
, 66,700 workers (of a total 45 
million) lost their jobs in 2008, raising the national unemployment rate to 4.65%. 
The situation deteriorated further in 2009, with unemployment rising to 5% and 
economic growth slowing to a 6.5% annual rate. The rise in unemployment 
adversely affected domestic demand and consumer sentiment in Vietnam. In 2008, 
investment volumes slumped as investor concern about the long-term prospects of 
the Vietnamese economy grew. Credit growth declined to 20% compared with 
54% in 2007. The stock market experienced its worst performance since it was 
established. As a result, the government started easing monetary policy beginning 
in July 2008 by decreasing its benchmark interest rate six consecutive times.  
Thus, like many other countries, Vietnam has experienced unprecedented and rapid 
changes resulting from the global financial crisis. Because lower economic growth 
and higher unemployment adversely affected loan performance, credit managers 
were obliged to reassess the accuracy of their credit assessment processes.  
To better understand the potentially changing borrower credit risk faced by banks 
in developing countries affected by the global financial crisis, we estimate our 
credit scoring models based on the retail loan portfolio of a single privately owned 
Vietnamese commercial bank. We consider 66,226 retail loans signed between 
July 2006 and August 2010 and observe their performance, e.g., defaults versus 
non-defaults, through August 2011. The crisis affected Vietnam‟s banking market 
only in 2008, and our bank is representative of the Vietnamese banking market in 
terms of loan volume. Figure 3.2 shows the monthly number of new loans supplied 
                                                          
16 An example is the low efficiency of investment, especially public investment. The incremental capital 
output ratio (ICOR) is significantly higher in Vietnam than in other Asian countries, suggesting the 
lower efficiency of capital usage in Vietnam. 
17 There are large differences in the reported Vietnamese unemployment rate, depending on the data 
source. We use the unemployment data announced by the Vietnamese labor and employment ministry. 
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by our bank from 2006 to 2010. The number of loans rose steadily and steeply in 
2006 and 2007 and reached a maximum of more than 3,000 new loans in January 
2008. During 2008, however, the number of new loans dropped sharply to almost 
zero in August 2008. Since then, the number of new loans has steadily increased 
again and by late 2010 had almost reached pre-crisis levels. Motivated by these 
observations, we split the bank‟s loan portfolio into the following sub-samples: a 
pre-crisis sample, which contains 25,302 loans signed between July 2006 and 
February 2008; a crisis sample, which includes 7,432 loans signed between March 
2008 and December 2008; and a post-crisis sample, which includes 18,704 loans 
signed between January 2009 and December 2009. Finally, our out-of sample 
contains 14,788 loans signed, following the post-crisis period, between January 
2010 and August 2010. We estimate four models based on different combinations 
of the three samples. Model 1 uses the full-period sample, combining pre-crisis, 
crisis and post crisis samples. Model 2 covers periods of stability, combining the 
pre-crisis and post-crisis samples. Model 3 uses the pre-crisis sample. Finally, 
model 4 uses the post-crisis sample. We then assess the performance of these 
different models based on the post-crisis out-of sample. In this way, we put 
ourselves in the position of a loan officer required to assess the unknown ex-ante 
creditworthiness of a loan applicant in 2011. The accuracy of a model can be 
evaluated by comparing its predictions with ex-post observed credit risks. 
Figure  3.2    Number of new loans before, during and after the crisis 
This figure present the number of new loans funded by our bank from 2006 to 2010. The 
dotted part of the line indicates those months that we consider as our crisis period. 
 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
n
ew
 lo
an
s 
Month of loan signed 
BANK LENDING STRATEGY, CREDIT SCORING AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
54 
 
3.3.1. Variable identification 
As Panel A of Table 3.3 shows, the bank distinguishes four borrower groups based 
on loan purpose: borrowers raising money to finance their business (commercial); 
borrowers raising money for living expenses or consumption (consumer); 
borrowers raising money for the purchase or maintenance of a home (real estate); 
and borrowers raising money via the bank‟s credit card facility or the bank‟s 
employees borrowing money for unknown purposes (other). Thus, our sample 
includes both consumer and business loans. In Vietnam in general and in our bank 
in particular, business loans typically finance relatively small private businesses. 
Due to a lack of reliable up-to-date financial data on these corporate borrowers and 
due to the boundary between the private and business property of an entrepreneur 
often being vague, the bank assesses these loans based on the personal information 
of the entrepreneur. Real estate and consumer loans are the most frequent loans, 
accounting for 37% and 26% of the bank‟s loan portfolio, respectively. The 
remaining loan types account for only 16% to 20% of the bank‟s loan portfolio. 
Over the pre-crisis sample, the bank appears to grant more loans for commercial 
and other purposes than for consumer purposes: the bank grants 24% of its loans 
for other purposes, 21% for business purposes and only 14% for consumer 
purposes. In terms of loan size, loans granted post-crisis are much larger than loans 
granted pre-crisis. This can be partly explained by the high inflation rates in 
Vietnam, which usually run at 7-9% annually but sharply increased in 2008 to 
23.1%. It is also possible that since the crisis, the bank has focused on larger loans 
for more effective scanning and monitoring. However, the variations in loan size 
between the crisis and pre-crisis samples are substantially smaller than in the post-
crisis samples. Thus, the pre-crisis and crisis loans are more homogeneous with 
respect to size than the post-crisis loans. 
As Figure 3.2 shows, our bank‟s loan portfolio represents the development of the 
overall Vietnamese banking market very well. The crisis is reflected in a sharp but 
short-lived reduction in lending, as the number of loans in our sample drops from 
25,302 in the pre-crisis period to 7,432 in the crisis period. Thus, in terms of loan 
volume, e.g., credit rationing, the bank appears to have recovered rapidly. The 
bank considers 90 days of payment delay, or at least three consecutive payment 
delays, as loan default. Defaulted loans account for 3.8% of the 66,226 loans in our 
sample, which is slightly lower than the 4.9% of defaulted loans in the bank‟s total 
loan portfolio.
18 
Over time, default rates vary, ranging from as little as 2.6% for 
                                                          
18 The population PD of 4.9% is in line with the PD reported on banks‟ financial statements but is far 
below the alternative figures of 35% to 70% reported by the World Bank. For the purposes of this study, 
we assume that the data provided to us by the bank are an accurate record of all defaults. As long as any 
potential misreporting is not structurally related to borrower characteristics (i.e., the variables included 
in our CSM), this assumption is acceptable, as it does not affect the estimation of the model but would 
lead only to an overstatement of the predictive accuracy of the model.  
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post-crisis loans to 5.1% for pre-crisis loans. The low default rate for post-crisis 
loans may be attributable to the bank reserving loans for its best customers at this 
stage and to the fact that the most severe impact of the financial crisis was over 
before these loans were signed. The high default rate on loans signed before the 
crisis is understandable, as these loans suffered during the crisis period. Comparing 
defaulted and non-defaulted loans of different sub-samples (cf. Panel B of Table 
3.3) reveals additional differences. For all samples, the defaulted borrowers are 
younger, have been bank customers for shorter periods of time, have fewer savings 
accounts at the bank and have less collateral. In contrast to the other samples, in 
the post-crisis sample, the defaulted borrowers have higher incomes, more past 
loans and more current accounts. It appears that after the crisis, the bank has given 
priority to high-income repeat borrowers. When discussing the coding of variables 
in section 3.3.2, we will investigate in greater detail the relationship between 
borrower characteristics and default probability. 
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3.3.2. Variable coding, selection and model estimation 
We can only estimate a CSM when the loan applicant provides the relevant 
information at the time of loan application. Currently, the bank records more than 
30 variables pertaining to loan and borrower characteristics. The bank, however, 
grants a loan even if the applicant does not provide full information. More 
specifically, less than 10% of borrowers provide complete information at the time 
of application. The difference between samples versus population PD thus implies 
that a borrower who sufficiently fills in the loan application form has a lower PD 
than someone who does not properly complete the form. This is also consistent 
with one of the strategies used in practice to cope with missing values, as noted by 
Henley (1995): “a refusal to answer a particular question may be indicative of 
greater risk”. Additionally, we eliminate certain variables from our CSM that 
almost exclusively take one value. For instance, the field „Home phone (yes/no)‟ 
is filled with “yes” by more than 99% of borrowers. To obtain a sufficiently large 
sample of loans with complete and meaningful information, we rely on the expert 
knowledge of the loan officer and identify 17 relevant variables with relatively 
few missing values, as listed in Table 3.4.
19
 Our sample of 66,226 loans is thus 
based on 17 variables, and the criteria for selecting them are based on expert 
knowledge.  
For each variable, borrowers are first grouped into categories. Categories can 
differ by sample. In preliminary analyses we found that the impact of our 
quantitative variables on default probability is rather similar in all samples except 
in the post-crisis sample. Thus, we use the same categories in models 1 to 3 but 
create slightly different categories for model 4. The categories of models 1, 2 and 
3 are shown in Table 3.4, together with the default rates estimated for each 
category using the total data set, which is equivalent to the data set used for model 
1. Categories and their default rates in model 4 are shown in Table A3.1 of the 
Appendix. The values of the categories are then estimated using equation (3.4). 
These values differ by model, as the numbers of bad and good loans in each 
category differ by data set.
20  
 
                                                          
19  We exclude the following characteristics: credit line, living expenses, frequency of principal 
payment, frequency of interest payment, outstanding balance in saving account, outstanding balance in 
debit account, sub-income and number of days in arrears, relations with other banks, number of 
dependents, home phone, mobile phone, age of partner and occupation of partner. 
20 In line with our general discussion in section 3.2.2, we find that most of our variables are not unique 
to Vietnam in particular or even to developing countries in general. However, when categorizing and 
coding the variables, we take the specific circumstances in Vietnam into account. See Appendix B for 
details. 
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Table 3.4    Loan and borrower characteristics considered for the credit scoring model
 
The Table presents the categories of each independent variable considered for the CSM in the top rows followed 
by the default probabilities in the bottom row in italics. 
Variable                          Categories and default frequencies 
Age 18 to 35 36 to 50 more than 51   missing 
  6.51% 4.68% 2.65%   7.14% 
Gender male female       
  6.38% 3.73%       
Marital status married single widowed divorced   
  4.45% 7.81% 4.52% 8.39%   
Education university graduate, 
post graduate 
college, high school 
graduate 
occupational 
school graduate 
  missing 
  5.11% 6.53% 3.22%   2.66% 
Resident status house owner tenant living with 
parents/relatives 
& other 
  missing 
  3.23% 8.30% 8.04%   16.07% 
Time at present address 
(in years) 
less than 1 2 to 15 more than 16   missing 
5.59% 4.61% 5.65%   3.70% 
Monthly income   
(in million VND /month) 
less than 5 5 to 10 more than 10   missing 
9.07% 5.68% 2.87%   4.40% 
Occupation management labour work retired, 
unemployed 
other missing 
  7.16% 4.73% 1.07% 5.45% 6.78% 
Time with present 
employer (in years) 
less than 1 1 to 9 10 to 20 more than 21 missing 
2.89% 8.10% 4.78% 7.21% 4.82% 
Loan purpose commercial consumer real estate other   
  2.88% 5.81% 3.19% 7.69%   
Loan duration  
(in months) 
1 to 12 13 to 48 49 to 120 more than 120   
  1.55% 6.83% 3.74% 2.78%   
Collateral to loan ratio  0 more than 0 up to 1 more than 1 up to 
1.5 
more than 1.5 
up to 5 
more 
than 5 
  7.50% 2.75% 3.07% 2.30% 1.59% 
Time with bank   
(in years) 
0 1 to 2 3 to 6 more than 7   
  7.16% 4.33% 2.87% 5.62%   
Number of prior loans 0 1 to 2 3 to 7 8 to 23 more 
than 24 
  8.19% 3.67% 2.04% 1.28% 0.49% 
Number of current 
accounts 
0 1 2 more than 3   
  4.08% 8.06% 2.57% 1.28%   
Number of saving 
account 
0 1 to 3 4 to 8 more than 9   
  6.56% 3.15% 1.72% 0.77%   
Region central highland, 
south central coast 
south east Red river delta Mekong delta 
river, north 
central coast, 
north east 
missing 
  9.09% 5.12% 7.39% 9.56% 6.78% 
 
For each model, after the variables are coded the forward stepwise method is used 
to select among these 17 initial variables. This method starts with a model without 
any independent variables and sequentially adds variables. At each step, the 
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variable that leads to the greatest improvement in predictive accuracy – in terms of 
the highest score statistic conditional upon a significance level of less than 10% - 
is added. The process continues until no variable with a significance level of less 
than 10% remains. Based on the forward stepwise method, a subset of the initial 
17 variables is included in the CSM. To ensure that the selected variables are the 
most powerful predictors, the backward stepwise method is applied as well. Here, 
the starting point is a model that contains all 17 initial variables. At each step, the 
method eliminates the weakest variable so that only the strongest predictors are 
retained in the final CSM. As expected, the backward stepwise method selects the 
same number of variables as the forward stepwise method. The remaining 
variables are excluded for one of two reasons: first, because they have 
insignificant coefficients and do not contribute to the explanation of the dependent 
variable‟s variance; second, because they are correlated with included variables. 
Together with adding the most predictive variables to the model, at each step of 
the backward stepwise regression, the tolerance (1-  
 ) of every excluded variable 
is calculated. Those variables with tolerances of less than 80% (i.e., with 20% or 
more of the variance of the variable explained by variations in the other variables) 
are considered for deletion. In the case of multicollinearity, the inclusion of all 
variables leads to inferior results in the out-of sample.  
As observed in Table 3.5, models 1 to 4 have 13, 11, 12, and 10 selected variables, 
respectively. The four models have substantial overlap in the variables selected. 
Fifteen variables are selected in at least one of the four models. Variables 
pertaining to the bank-borrower relationship (Time with bank, Number of prior 
loans) become more important during the post-crisis period, whereas borrower 
characteristics such as income, education, occupation and residential status 
become less important. Income appears only in model 3, which uses the pre-crisis 
sample only. Five of the 12 predictors in Crook et al. (1992) CSM for the UK, as 
shown in Table 3.1, are incorporated into our CSM: Time with bank, Number of 
saving accounts, Region, Residential status, and Number of current accounts. 
Crook‟s longer list of the 24 most typical variables overlaps with eight of our 
variables. Thus, our CSMs reflect – to some extent – the international norm of 
credit scoring. Such variables as Loan duration or Gender, however, are unique to 
developing country credit scoring and are indeed very effective predictors in our 
CSMs. First, Gender might be truly indicative of default or might simply reflect 
underlying risks. For Vietnam, we conclude that gender helps in the proper 
assessment of credit risk, even when other risk factors such as loan purpose or 
collateral value are taken into account. As shown in Table 3.4, women have a 
lower probability of default than men. Consequently Gender is significant and 
selected in all 4 models. Goetz and Gupta (1996) also find that women in 
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Bangladesh have higher repayment rates than men due to their meaningful control 
over their investment activities. Furthermore, Gender might also be indicative of 
income, a fact that may explain the absence of more-traditional income proxies 
(Income, Occupation or Time at current employer) from most of our models. 
Second, Loan duration, as a measure of the borrower‟s intentions, risk aversion, or 
self-assessment of repayment ability, is unique to the Vietnamese context, which 
indicates that Vietnamese banks cannot rely solely on their own assessment of the 
borrower but must also rely on the borrower herself, who appears to honestly and 
accurately state her own loan capacity. In this context, Time with bank and 
Number of prior loans, as the first and third most important predictors, reflect the 
borrower‟s relationship with the bank and, thus, the role such relationships play in 
the Vietnamese loan market. The first indication of crisis effects on the CSM is 
observed in differences between the variables selected pre- and post-crisis and in 
the switching of certain variables‟ importance rankings. For example, post-crisis 
personal information appears to lose importance and is no longer predictive, 
whereas such variables as Time with bank and Number of prior loans
21
 become 
more predictive of default. These characteristics of the bank-borrower relationship 
represent soft information (repayment incentives and behavior, for instance) that 
cannot be observed directly. With fundamental economic changes triggered by the 
crisis, the value of hard information, e.g., borrower characteristics, diminishes, but 
the value of soft information persists. However, to properly assess the accuracy of 
these CSMs, they should be applied out-of-sample.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 Similarly, Vogelgesang (2003) finds that frequent borrowers face higher repayment problems during 
economic crises.  
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Table 3.5     The estimated credit-scoring model 
This table presents the models estimated by Probit regression. The dependent variable is a dummy 
equal to one for defaulted loans and zero otherwise.  For each independent variable, the first row shows 
the coefficient and the second row shows the z statistic. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
   
pre-crisis, crisis, 
and post-crisis 
samples 
pre-crisis, 
and post-crisis 
samples 
pre-crisis 
sample 
post-crisis 
sample 
Intercept -1.66 *** -1.15 *** -1.60 *** -1.88 *** 
  -100.44   -32.45  -112.67   -91.88   
Gender -0.31 *** -0.28 *** -0.34 *** -0.31 ** 
  -7.37   -5.89  -6.52   -2.53   
Marital status -0.18 *** -0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.26 *** 
  -5.39 
 
-5.05  -3.50   -3.65   
Eduation -0.11 **   
 
-0.19 ***   
  -2.19       -2.90       
Resident status -0.18 *** -0.18 *** -0.14 ***     
  -7.54   -7.44  -4.18       
Time at present 
address     -0.15 *     -0.41 *** 
      -1.67      -4.67   
         
Income          -0.11 ***     
          -3.19       
Occupation -0.43 *** -0.24 ***         
  -6.52   -7.90          
Time with 
present employer -0.19 *** -0.18 *** -0.51 *** -0.24 *** 
  -5.48   -4.78  -11.64   -3.40   
Loan duration -0.15 *** -0.11 ***     -0.36 *** 
  -6.15   -3.76      -5.66   
Collateral to loan 
ratio  -0.08 **     -0.06 * -0.14 ** 
  -2.94       -1.68   -2.17   
Time with bank  -0.06 ** -0.10 ***     -0.26 *** 
  -2.21   -3.43      -4.87   
Number of prior 
loans -0.14 *** -0.14 *** -0.20 *** -0.22 *** 
  -5.61   -5.22  -6.49   -4.37   
Number of 
current accounts -0.12 *** -0.11 *** -0.16 ***     
  -4.57   -4.10  -5.08       
Number of 
saving account -0.23 *** -0.21 *** -0.24 *** -0.21 *** 
  -9.27   -8.07  -7.52   -3.67   
Region -0.30 *** -0.31 *** -0.21 ** -0.26 *** 
  -4.64   -4.25  -2.03   -2.92   
                  
Log likelihood -8,128   -6,980  -4,767   -2,108   
Pseudo R2 0.085   0.833  0.0915   0.689   
Number of 
observations 51,438   44,006  25,302   18,704   
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3.3.3. Model calibration and out-of-sample assessment 
Table 3.6 shows AUC and Gini measures in-sample and out-of-sample for our 
four estimated models, and ROC curves are shown in Figure 3.3. The in-sample 
performance measures of the four models are very close, whereas the out-of 
sample measures are quite distinct. Because we are most interested in the 
performance of these models with respect to the out-of sample, we now focus on 
the out-of sample performance measures. Model 3, estimated using the pre-crisis 
sample, performs worst, with a Gini coefficient of 12% and an AUC of 56%. In 
contrast, model 4, estimated using the post-crisis sample, performs best, with a 
Gini coefficient of 26.22% and an AUC of 63.11%. Models 1 and 2 perform at 
intermediate levels between the other two. This preliminarily assessment indicates 
that the borrower population has changed over time and that the CSM constructed 
based on pre-crisis data is out of date following the crisis. This result answers the 
banks‟ question of whether to reformulate their CSMs following the crisis: Yes, 
they should adjust their CSMs, if not redevelop them entirely. Additionally, banks 
in general do not want to waste any data and, hence, may want to include loans 
signed before and during the crisis in their updated CSMs. They should, however, 
consider this step very carefully, as it could significantly reduce the performance 
of their new model, as we show in the cases of models 1 and 2. To emphasize the 
improvement in the performance of model 4, we continue to look more closely 
into the calibration of this model compared with those of the others, particularly 
model 3.  
Table 3.6 Model predictive performances 
The table presents two predictive statistics that are commonly used to assess CSM performance by 
banks. The higher these statistics the more predictive the CSM is. 
       Predictive statistic GINI   Predictive statistic AUC 
  Estimation sample   
In 
sample 
Out-of 
sample   
In 
sample 
Out-of 
sample 
Model 1 pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis   47.60% 20.80%   73.80% 60.40% 
Model 2 pre-crisis, post-crisis   47.00% 22.08%   73.50% 61.04% 
Model 3 pre-crisis   47.80% 12.00%   73.90% 56.00% 
Model 4 post-crisis   44.56% 26.22%   72.28% 63.11% 
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Figure 3.3     ROC curves 
The figure presents ROC curves of the four different CSMs both in and out of sample. A more concave 
curve (larger area under ROC curve) indicates a better predictive power of the CSM. 
            Panel A: In-sample ROC curves            Panel B:  Out-of-sample ROC curves 
        
         Model 1                    Model 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
          Model 2                  Model 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         Model 3                             Model 3 
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        When the out-of sample is used to calibrate models 3 and 4, we find, as 
expected, a significant difference in the predicted PDs between observed defaulted 
and observed non-defaulted borrowers. Table 3.7 shows that for model 3, the 
average of predicted PDs is 2.53% for non-defaulted loans compared with 7.25% 
for defaulted loans. However, the ranges of predicted probabilities are rather large 
and overlap for the two loan groups. For defaulted loans, the PDs range from 
0.34% to 31.53% compared with 0.03% to 21.82% for non-defaulted loans. The 
results are slightly better for model 4, where the average of the predicted PDs is 
2.37% for non-defaulted loans and 8.24% for defaulted loans. Defaulted loans, 
under model 4, have PDs that range from 0.40% to 24.69% whereas non-defaulted 
loans have PDs that range from 0.00% to 23.37%. Table 3.7 also reports the 
observed versus predicted PDs for different loan groups, generated by sorting all 
loans of similar predicted PDs into five groups of approximately equal size. The 
average estimated PD of model 3 is 2.66%, compared with an observed PD of 
2.58%, whereas the average estimated PD of model 4 is 2.95. Thus, model 4 
overestimates default probabilities more often than model 3. However, if we more 
closely examine the different loan groups, we see that model 4 is better at 
distinguishing between the lowest and highest risk groups from the remaining 
groups, as shown by the larger gap between their observed PDs. A more detailed 
accuracy analysis using the PCC, SENS and SPEC indicators is thus warranted. 
Table 3.7    Goodness of fit based on predicted versus observed                               
               probabilities of default in the out-of sample 
This table presents predicted probability of default versus observed frequency of 
default. Loans are ranked and grouped into 5 groups according to the predicted 
probability of default. Average of predicted probability and observed frequency 
of default are calculated and shown here. 
Default probabilities by loan groups       
    Probability of default (in %) 
Loan             Predicted 
Group # Loans Observed Min Mean Max 
Panel A: Model 3 based on pre-crisis sample     
1 2,959 1.08 0.03 0.31 0.58 
2 2,958 1.52 0.58 0.91 1.25 
3 2,980 1.28 1.25 1.75 2.34 
4 2,934 2.59 2.34 3.23 4.31 
5 2,957 6.46 4.31 7.10 31.53 
Total 14,788 2.58 0.02 2.66 31.53 
Non-default   0.03 2.53 21.82 
Default     0.34 7.25 31.53 
Panel B: Model 4 based on post-crisis sample     
1 2,958 0.74 0.00 0.45 0.91 
2 2,972 0.57 0.91 1.31 1.75 
3 2,944 1.29 1.75 2.28 2.86 
4 2,957 1.29 2.86 3.61 4.51 
5 2,957 9.03 4.52 7.13 24.69 
Total 14,788 2.58 0.00 2.95 24.69 
Non-default   0.00 2.37 23.37 
Default     0.40 8.24 24.69 
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The determination of the optimal cut-off point for a CSM depends on the 
preferences of the bank. Our bank – though it does not have a CSM in place, 
relying instead on subjective credit assessment – has set a target for non-
performing loans. Assuming this target is 1.5%, we must set the cut-off point to 
achieve a SENS of 98.5% (SENS = 100% - 1.5% = 98.50%). At first glance, one 
might think that to achieve this target, banks should accept only customers who 
have predicted PDs of less than 1.5%. A cut-off of 1.5% would, however, lead to a 
SENS higher than 98.50% and, thus, a lower expected PD. Panels A and B of 
Table 3.8 show that a cut-off of 5.3% would achieve the desired result for model 
3, and a cut-off of 7.4% would do the same for model 4. Comparing the accuracy 
of these cut-offs in the two models reveals the following dynamics: assuming 
tolerance of a small number of bad loans (a decrease in PCCbad from 49.97% to 
45.81%), model 4 increases its number of correctly accepted good loans 
substantially compared with model 3 (a rise in PCCgood from 86.92% to 94.58%). 
Hence, following the crisis, when credit managers would tend to be prudent in 
their loan approvals, a more accurate model, such as model 4, will achieve greater 
certainty regarding good and bad loans in the bank‟s portfolio. Credit managers 
could now be more confident that a large number of good loans can compensate 
for a small number of bad loans and that profit can thus be maximized. In terms of 
SENS and SPEC, both models have a SENS of 98.50%, while the SPEC for model 
3 is 9.2% and that for model 4 is 18.3%. Our SENS accuracy is slightly higher 
than that reported in other studies, while our SPEC accuracy is average or slightly 
below average. For example, Baesens et al. (2003) survey reports SENS measures 
up to 96.36%, whereas some models of UK data have a SPEC of 0%. SENS and 
SPEC, however, depend on the default percentage of the sample, so any 
comparison of these can be misleading unless the models are applied to the same 
data as our models. Compared with model 3, model 4 can improve SPEC by 9.1% 
at no cost to SENS. Nevertheless, to conclude that model 4 can indeed improve 
the bank‟s economic performance, the costs of different error types must be taken 
into account.  
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Table 3.8     Predictive accuracy for credit scoring models with one cut-off 
This table presents how well the model 3 and 4 can predict probability of default and how accurate they 
can identify defaulted and non-defaulted loans. To calculate the economical benefit made by these 
models we assume that the cost per bad loan is ten times the benefit per good loan and the annual 
margin is 2 %. Given the average loan amount of VND 337 million and the average loan duration of 48 
months the change in profit can be estimated using the equation: ∆profit = cost per bad loan* B_b  -  
benefit per good loan*G_b. 
Panel A: Predictive accuracy of model 3 with a pre-specified cut-off (5.3%) to achieve a target PD of 1.5% 
  
Predicted 
   Observed 
 
Non-default 
 
Default 
 
PCC 
Non-default 12521 
 
1885 
 
86.92% =  PCCgood 
Default 
 
192 
 
190 
 
49.74% =  PCCbad 
      
84.67% =  PCCttal 
SENS 
 
98.5% 
     SPEC 
   
9.2% 
   Change in Profit 404 mil VND 
     
        Panel B: Predictive accuracy of model 4 with a pre-specified cut-off (7.4%) to achieve a target PD of 1.5% 
  
Predicted 
   Observed 
 
Non-default 
 
Default 
  
PCC 
Non-default 13,625 
 
781 
 
94.58% =  PCCgood 
Default 
 
207 
 
175 
 
45.81% =  PCCbad 
      
93.32% =  PCCttal 
SENS 
 
98.5% 
     SPEC 
   
18.3% 
   Change in profit 26,124 mil VND 
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3.4. Credit scoring and bank strategy 
In the previous section, cut-off values of 5.3% and 7.4% were chosen for the bank 
to achieve its assumed default target of 1.5% under models 3 and 4, respectively. 
However, is this optimal when the bank follows other strategies such as 
minimizing the time spent on credit assessment or maximizing returns? To answer 
this question, we examine alternative ways to set the cut-off points for the CSM. 
3.4.1. Profitability 
A CSM‟s benefit may lie in the positive effect a new credit assessment policy has 
on the bank‟s profitability, which is especially important following a crisis. If an 
updated CSM leads to increased bank profits, then the loan officer has a clear 
incentive to increase loan approvals following periods of depressed loan supply. 
Schreiner (2003) suggests measuring changes in profits in terms of opportunity 
cost. In particular, he focuses on the ratio of good loans lost (Gb) to bad loans 
avoided (Bb).  
profit = cost per bad loan * Bb - benefit per good loan * Gb         (3.5) 
Given the selected cut-offs, as shown in Panels A and B in Table 3.8, a 
comparison between models 3 and 4 shows that model 3 avoids 15 additional bad 
loans (190 minus 175) by foregoing 1,104 good loans (13,625 minus 12,521). 
Thus, the tradeoff factor in model 3 is quite high: it foregoes 73.6 good loans for 
each bad loan avoided. To assess changes in profits, we assume a relationship 
between the cost per bad loan and the benefit per good loan. Because data for 
developing countries are not available, we use data from the credit card market in 
industrialized countries as a benchmark. In industrialized countries, practitioners 
maintain that at least 10 good loans are required to cover the cost of one bad loan 
(Schreiner 2003). Under this assumption, a cut-off of 7.4% for model 4 leads to an 
increase in profits of 26.12 billion VND (approximately €1,279,080), whereas a 
cut-off of 5.3% for model 3 leads to an increase in profits of only 0.40 billion 
VND (approximately €19,800), which would indicate that our bank should prefer 
model 4. Figure 3.4 shows how this change in profits varies for different cut-off 
points of the two models. In particular, it reveals that neither a cut-off of 5.3% for 
model 3 nor a cut-off of 7.4% for model 4 maximizes profits. Instead, maximum 
profits are obtained by model 4 at a cut-off of 9.1%. This results in an expected 
PD of 1.62%, which is slightly above target and implies that our bank has set a 
rather too conservative strategy. A further look at Figure 3.4 reveals that at all cut-
off values model 4 always outperforms model 3 in terms of profit-maximization. 
A cut-off of 9.1% also maximizes profit if model 3 is used. However, this 
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maximum profit is less than that achieved with model 4. The optimal cut-off point 
for model 3, moreover, results in an expected PD of 1.84%, which exceeds 1.62%, 
the expected PD if the optimal cut-off is used for model 4. In summary, because 
model 4, which is based on post-crisis data, always leads to superior profits 
compared with model 3, we conclude that an updated CSM does indeed provide a 
bank with an incentive to lend.  
Figure 3.4    Change in profit of model 3 and 4 with different cut-off values 
This figure presents the change in profit when different cut-off points are applied to model 3 
and 4 assuming that borrowers with a PD higher (lower) than the cut-off point will be 
rejected (accepted). 
  
3.4.2. Efficiency in transactional versus relationship lending 
Should banks rely exclusively on their CSM, i.e., transactional lending, or should 
there also be room for relationship lending? The benefits of transactional lending, 
e.g., credit scoring, are clear. Mester (1997), for example, reports that credit 
scoring has substantially reduced the length of the loan approval process, from two 
weeks to 12.5 hours for small-business loans in the US and from nine to three days 
for consumer loans in Canada. Once a CSM is in place, these benefits can be 
achieved at a cost of $1.50 to $10 per loan. Mester (1997) also reports that Banc 
One exclusively uses credit scores for loans of up to $35,000 and approves a 
further 30% of all loans below $1 million based solely on credit scores. The 
downside, however, can be substantial. Schreiner (2003) recalls the case of a 
Bolivian finance company that relied exclusively on its CSM and went bankrupt. 
The recent contraction in small business lending in the United State, where the use 
of CSMs is most advanced, has also cast doubt on transactional lending, which 
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relies exclusively on CSMs.
22
 Through their relationships with borrowers, banks 
can discover qualitative risks that are not quantifiable in terms of “hard” variables. 
Thus, a combination of transactional and relationship lending can be valuable. Rio 
et al. (2011) suggest that transactional lenders use CSM primarily for cost-saving 
purposes, whereas relationship lenders combine CSM with relationship lending to 
reduce the asymmetric information banks face with respect to potential borrowers. 
During the 2007/08 crisis, transactional lenders suffered higher default rates on 
loans approved exclusively on the basis of borrower‟s credit scores, e.g., using 
CSMs.
23
 In contrast, relationship lenders suffered lower default rates on those 
loans approved based on borrowers‟ soft information in combination with credit 
scores. Thus, a combination of relationship, soft-information-based lending and 
transactional, CSM-based lending might be especially valuable during and after 
periods of crisis when a borrower‟s condition, and thus the determinants of default 
probability, undergo fundamental change.   
To implement such a strategy in our CSM, we rely on Mester (1997), who reports 
that US banks have credit officers review their CSMs‟ decisions, particularly for 
loan applicants with scores close to the cut-off point. For the First National Bank 
of Chicago, this led to substantial changes in credit decisions regarding small-
business loans. Approximately 25% of the applications rejected by the CSM were 
later approved by the credit officer, while another 25% accepted by the CSM were 
later rejected by the credit officer. Based on our out-of sample, we illustrate this 
approach by setting two cut-offs for our CSMs, C1and C2, with 0<C1<C2<1. This 
calibration allows banks to define loans that require further examination instead of 
rejecting or accepting them outright. All loan applicants with an estimated PD<C1 
are accepted outright, whereas all applicants with an estimated PD>C2 are rejected 
outright. The remaining loans with (C1<PD<C2) are classified as marginal and are 
thus reviewed by the credit officer. The bank‟s credit assessment can thus be a 
combination of transactional lending via CSMs and relationship lending. 
Table 3.9 reports the results of this strategy for models 3 and 4. C1 and C2 are 
determined according to a somewhat ad hoc decision rule, which can be 
interpreted within the context of PCC. This rule specifies (1) that the proportion of 
incorrectly classified bad loans should be less than 20% of all bad loans, i.e., 
Bg/B<20%, and (2) that the proportion of correctly classified bad loans should be 
at least 50% of all bad loans, i.e., Bb/B≥50%. The emphasis on bad loans is 
justified by the relatively high penalty cost associated with overlooking bad loans. 
The benefit is the gain from reducing the number of good loans subjected to 
                                                          
22 See, for instance, “When Business Credit Scores Get Murky”, Wall Street Journal, March 18, 2010. 
23 For cost-saving motives, these lenders probably rely heavily, if not solely, on CSMs. 
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evaluation. We apply the above decision rule to both models 3 and 4. This allows 
us to determine whether model 4 is more efficient than model 3: to achieve a given 
target of Bg/B and Bb/B, according to the rule, would model 4 result in fewer 
applicants being reviewed manually than model 3? As shown in Table 3.9, the cut-
off points are C1=1.65% and C2=5% for model 3 and C1=3% and C2=6.5% for 
model 4. Given these cut-off points, model 3 predicts 7,079 good loans, 5,168 
marginal loans, and 2,159 bad loans, whereas model 4 predicts 9,135 good loans, 
4,282 marginal loans, and 1,371 bad loans. Thus, if model 4 is used, the bank will 
need to manually review 4,282 applications compared with 5,168 applications 
with model 3. By applying two cut-off points to the outcome of model 4, our bank 
can combine its transactional lending with relationship lending to achieve a pre-
determined default target, yet improve its efficiency by minimizing the number of 
manual reviews. Thus, the updated post-crisis CSM improves not only the bank‟s 
profitability, as shown in the previous section, but also its efficiency.  
Table 3.9     Predictive accuracy for credit scoring models with two cut-offs 
This table presents  how accurate models 3 and 4 can identify defaulted and non-
defaulted loans if two cut-off points are applied and how many applications should 
be referred to loan officers to be assessed manually. 
Panel A: Model 3 with two cut-offs at 0.0165 and 0.050 
  
    Predicted 
Observed 
 
Non-default 
 
Marginal 
 
Default 
     Non-default 7,079 
 
5,168 
 
2,159 
    Default 
 
79 
 
112 
 
191 
       Bg/B 
 
20.7%
    Bb/B 
     
       50% 
       Panel B: Model 4 with two cut-offs at 0.03 and 0.065 
  
  
   Predicted 
Observed 
 
Non-default 
 
Marginal 
 
Default 
     Non-default 9,056 
 
4,170 
 
1,180 
    Default 
 
79 
 
112 
 
191 
       Bg/B 
 
20.7%
    Bb/B 
     
50% 
        
3.4.3. Risk-based pricing 
In principle, a loan should be priced in accordance with the bank‟s cost of funds, 
origination costs, servicing costs, and implicit costs associated with potential 
default. While fixed costs do not generally vary within the same product category, 
expected default costs can vary across borrowers and should be calculated as PD 
times the loss given default (LGD). The risk-based interest rate R could thus be 
derived in a simple model as  
   R = cost of funds + overhead cost + expected default cost + profit margin    (3.6) 
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Because a crisis increases borrowers‟ default risk, a bank might respond by 
increasing interest rates, and because this increase in interest rates may in turn 
increase the bank‟s adverse selection problem, the overall effect might well be 
detrimental to the bank. An updated CSM, such as our model 4, enables the bank 
to better predict borrower default. A bank can thus improve the accuracy of its 
pricing strategy and thereby lessen the adverse selection problem. Based on our 
CSM, we can suggest a simple pricing strategy.  
Given the cut-off point that maximizes the bank‟s profit - a cut-off point of 9.1% 
in the case of model 4 - any applicant with an estimated PD above 9.1% will be 
rejected. As Panel B of Table 3.10 shows, we split the bank‟s accepted borrowers 
into three risk classes containing approximately 4,750 borrowers each. The 
predicted PD for the low risk class ranges from 0.00% to 1.39%, that for the 
moderate risk class from 1.40% to 3.12%, and that for the high risk class from 
3.13% to 9.09%. Based on discussions with Vietnamese bankers, a 2.00% profit 
margin and an average 1.50% overhead cost appear to be reasonable and realistic 
assumptions. However, customers with higher risk usually generate higher costs 
because they tend to take up more of the credit officer‟s time. To be consistent 
with customer-specific pricing, overhead costs of 2.00%, 1.50%, and 1.00% will 
be allocated to the high-, moderate-, and low-risk borrowers, respectively. The 
cost of funds can be approximated by the bank‟s deposit interest rate. In Vietnam, 
the annual deposit interest rate on local currency deposits between 2006 and 2010 
ranged from 7.5% to 11.2%, with an average of 9.3%. Finally, the expected cost of 
default, PD*LGD, must be considered. Our CSM provides estimates for PD, but it 
is beyond the scope of this study to accurately estimate LGD. LGD will be at least 
loan-type specific, as each type of loan is associated with a different type of 
collateral. However, nearly 99% of the collateral used in our data comprises real 
estate or savings certificates, both of which have a 100% recovery rate. Thus, we 
assume LGD on average is 20.2%, the percentage of unsecured loans. Thus, 
default cost can be quite significant. As a benchmark, note that in 1997 risk 
premia for US consumer loans ranged from as low as 0.10% to more than 2.00% 
for the highest-risk borrowers (Sangha, 1998). In line with this study, we assign a 
2.00% default cost to the high-risk borrowers, 0.20% to the moderate-risk 
borrowers and 0.10% to the low-risk borrowers. As Panel B in Table 3.10 shows, 
the bank could charge 12.40%, 13.00%, and 15.30% to the different risk classes, 
respectively. If, on the other hand, the bank decides to charge the same price to all 
borrowers, it could charge an average interest rate of approximately 13.57% to 
obtain the same profit margin. As the second set of calculations shows, these 
assumptions would be fairly consistent with an LGD of 20.2% and a PD based on 
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the realized PD of the risk class. In practice, PD could be based on the historic PD 
obtained from the loan portfolio used in estimating the CSM.
24 
 
To compare models 3 and 4 in terms of risk-based pricing, we repeat the above 
calculations, using the outcome of model 3 with the cut-off point of 9.1%, which 
maximizes profitability under that model. The calculations are shown in Panel A 
of Table 3.10. When model 3 is used, the low risk class has a higher observed PD 
than the low risk class classified as such by model 4; therefore, the interest rate 
corresponding to low risk class classified by model 3 is estimated to be higher 
than that for model 4. This is also the case for the moderate risk class. Thus, if the 
bank uses the outcome of the model constructed using pre-crisis data (model 3) to 
formulate its risk-based pricing policy, it will charge low-risk borrowers a 
relatively high interest rate while charging high-risk borrowers a relatively low 
interest rate compared with model 4. Thus, an updated CSM based on post-crisis 
data improves the bank‟s loan pricing ability and reduces its adverse selection 
problem. 
Table 3.10     Risk -based loan pricing 
The abbreviations are probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD). 
  Borrower class   
        Low risk Moderate risk        High risk                All 
borrowers Panel A: Model 3 based on pre-crisis sample       
Range of predicted PD 0.03%-0.97% 0.97%-3.64% 2.64%-9.09% 0.00%-9.09% 
Number of loans 4,776 4,772 4,772 14,320 
Overhead cost 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 1.50% 
Cost of funds 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 
Profit margin 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
          
Cost of default 0.10% 0.20% 2.00% 0.77% 
Loan interest rate 12.40% 13.00% 15.30% 13.57% 
LD = average observed PD 0.92% 1.57% 3.02% 1.84% 
LGD 20.20% 20.20% 20.20% 20.20% 
Cost of default = LD * LGD 0.19% 0.32% 0.61% 0.37% 
Loan interest rate 12.49% 13.12% 13.91% 13.17% 
Panel B: Model 4 based on post-crisis sample       
Range of predicted PD 0.00%-1.39% 1.40%-3.12% 3.13%-9.09% 0.00%-9.09% 
Number of loans 4,759 4,767 4,747 14,273 
Overhead cost 1.00% 1.50% 2.00% 1.50% 
Cost of funds 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 
Profit margin 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 2.00% 
          
Cost of default 0.10% 0.20% 2.00% 0.77% 
Loan interest rate 12.40% 13.00% 15.30% 13.57% 
          
LD = average observed PD 0.82% 0.94% 3.10% 1.62% 
LGD 20.20% 20.20% 20.20% 20.20% 
Cost of default = LD * LGD 0.17% 0.19% 0.63% 0.33% 
Loan interest rate 12.47% 12.99% 13.93% 13.13% 
 
                                                          
24 For an in-depth analysis of the interactions among risk-based pricing, profit-maximizing cut-offs, 
and adverse selection problems, see Blöchlinger and Leippold (2006). 
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3.5. Conclusions 
As banking markets in developing countries mature, banks face growing 
competition and increasing regulatory attention toward their risk management 
policies. Especially in the wake of the global financial crisis, banks have 
increasingly considered whether and how credit scoring can help them in these 
new circumstances. Based on our evidence from the Vietnamese retail loan 
market, the answer clearly favors credit scoring. First, after the crisis banks should 
update their CSMs, as the old CSMs, built on pre-crisis data, are no longer 
accurately predictive for the post-crisis population. Second, by replacing their 
current CSMs with properly updated CSMs, banks can expect a decrease in their 
default ratio even as profits improve. In addition, banks can use CSMs to 
implement risk-based pricing to manage loan portfolio composition. The updated 
CSM enables banks to set lower interest rates for borrowers that exhibit less credit 
risk. Thus, banks will be more competitive in this loan market segment and, by 
attracting more low-risk borrowers, will lessen the problem of adverse selection. 
Finally, an updated CSM reduces the costs in time spent by the loan officer in loan 
assessment. In contrast to corporate or government loans, retail loans are small 
and their credit assessment is more costly per $ or VND of loan volume. A CSM 
can thus be calibrated with this consideration in mind. Overall, with updated 
CSMs banks can benefit from reduced loan default, increased competitiveness, 
and reduced cost of manual loan assessment while optimally using its relationship 
lending tools, i.e., the loan officer‟s knowledge about the borrower. Thus, it is 
important to regularly update CSMs, especially after a crisis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BANK LENDING STRATEGY, CREDIT SCORING AND FINANCIAL CRISES 
 
74 
 
3.6. Appendix  
Table A 3.1    Descriptive statistics of model 4 
For model estimation purpose, with each variable borrower are categorized into groups of comparable 
probability of default. This table shows the categories of each variable and their corresponding probability 
of default. 
Variable Categories and default frequency of model 4     
Age 18 to 35 36 to 49 more than 50   missing 
  3.63% 2.30% 1.69%   2.94% 
Gender male female       
  2.99% 2.12%       
Marital status married single widowed divorced   
  2.27% 4.35% 1.74% 5.09%   
Education university 
graduate, post 
graduate 
college, high 
school 
graduate 
other   missing 
  3.13% 2.50% 2.05%   1.82% 
Resident status house owner tenant living with 
parents & other 
  missing 
  1.96% 3.73% 4.70%   6.40% 
Time at present 
address (in years) 
up to 5 6 to 16 more than 17   missing 
2.57% 1.99% 3.80%   12.50% 
Monthly Income   
(in million VND) 
up to 10 10 to 30 more than 30   missing 
3.20% 2.42% 2.61%   2.78% 
Occupation management labour work retired, 
unemployed 
other missing 
  3.30% 4.94% 1.67% 2.47% 2.65% 
Time with present 
employer  (in years) 
0 1  to 2 3 to 9 more than 10 missing 
2.28% 4.62% 3.05% 1.28% 5.38% 
Loan purpose commercial consumer real estate other   
  1.90% 3.33% 2.54% 2.71%   
Loan duration  
(in months) 
up to 6 7 to 12 13 to 120 more than 121   
0.00% 1.17% 3.11% 2.28%   
Collateral to loan 
ratio  
0 more than 0 
up to 1 
more than 1  
up to 1.5 
more than 1.5 
up to 5 
more than 
5 
  3.85% 5.20% 2.84% 2.33% 1.76% 
Time with bank  
(in years) 
0 1 to 5 more than 6     
  3.90% 2.41% 1.07%     
Number of prior 
loans 
0 to 1 2 to 7 8 to 19 more than 20   
  4.46% 2.47% 1.57% 1.83%   
Number of current 
account 
0 to 2 3 to 4 5 to 84 more than 85   
  2.95% 1.91% 2.88% 0.00%   
Number of saving 
account 
0 1 to 12 more than 13     
  3.35% 1.62% 1.06%     
Region central 
highland, 
south central 
coast 
south east Red river delta Mekong delta 
river, north 
central coast, 
north east 
  
  1.66% 2.47% 3.57% 6.10%   
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Appendix B 
When categorizing and coding the variables, we must take the specific 
circumstances of Vietnam into account. The categories, as well as the PDs 
associated with all 17 variables, can be found in Table 3.4. Outlined below are the 
details regarding these categories in the first three models, the specific 
circumstances of Vietnam, the ways in which the categories of model 4 differ 
from those of model 3, and the reasons why we expect these borrower 
characteristics, i.e., those captured by the variables ultimately selected, to be 
relevant. 
Regarding Education, we expect that better educated people will have more stable, 
higher-income employment and thus lower PDs. We therefore distinguish 
borrowers by their degree of educational attainment, ranging from post-graduate to 
non-high school graduate. In 2002, however, less than 0.5% of the Vietnamese 
working population held a graduate or post-graduate degree and only 13% held an 
undergraduate degree (GSO, 2002). The largest share of the working population 
thus falls into the bottom two educational categories. Our loan sample broadly 
reflects these demographics but includes more highly educated borrowers: 40% of 
borrowers hold a post-graduate or graduate degree, 5% hold an undergraduate 
degree, 35% hold a high school degree and 20% have less or other education. 
Contradicting our expectations, default frequencies do not appear to decline with 
increasing education. College and high school graduates, for example, have the 
highest default frequency, namely, 6.53%, followed by university graduates and 
post-graduates, with a default frequency of 5.11%.  
Gender can no longer be included in CSMs in many industrialized countries, as it 
is deemed discriminatory. In contrast, Schreiner (2003) argues that fair 
discrimination - for example, based on the statistical default rates of men versus 
women - is acceptable, as it is based on quantifiable data. The alternative - 
subjective scoring - discriminates equally if not more. Overall, there is ample 
evidence that women default less frequently than men on loans (Schreiner, 2004) 
but that most of this gender effect disappears when other risk factors correlated 
with gender are taken into account.
25 
We thus initially include gender and rely on 
the variable selection procedure to determine whether gender remains in the final 
CSM. In Vietnam, there is, furthermore, a specific relationship between gender 
and income that itself might be predictive of default. Specifically, the GSO (2004) 
reports higher income for women than for men. For wage earners, the average 
                                                          
25 For Bolivian microfinance, Schreiner (2004) shows that women are less risky borrowers than men, as 
women are more likely to be traders than manufacturers and have smaller businesses that require 
smaller, shorter loans. 
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monthly income per month is 228 thousand VND, if the head of the household is a 
woman, and 139 thousand VND, if the head of the household is a man. The same 
holds in the aggregate, when all income sources are combined. However, the 
aggregate differences between women and men are less pronounced, with women 
earning 589 thousand VND and men 489 thousand VND.
26 
It appears that women, 
who have higher average incomes than men, default less than men. Overall, 
default frequencies are 3.73% and 6.38% for women and men, respectively. 
Region represents the area of the country where the borrower lives. Because 
people of similar wealth tend to live in the same location (a suburb might attract 
richer residents and the resulting increase in housing and property prices may 
make such a location prohibitively expensive for poorer households), this 
geographic criterion can indicate a borrower‟s level of financial wealth. A typical 
proxy is an area‟s postal code, but in Vietnam a postal code is not part of the 
address. Instead, we approximate region by the branch where a loan is issued. 
According to bank policy, borrowers can only obtain loans from their local 
branches. Branch location therefore coincides with the borrower‟s residential area. 
The many bank branches are located in eight regions, defined by the government. 
These eight regions are then categorized into four groups based on their average 
frequencies of default. Note that, given this coding, region might not only proxy 
for borrower‟s wealth but might also reflect the credit assessment capabilities of 
the different branches. In our sample, it appears that borrowers from the southeast 
(branches in Ho Chi Minh City contribute the most to this region) are the best 
borrowers, while those from the central part of the country are the worst. This 
pattern can be understood in terms of per capita income, which is highest in Ho 
Chi Minh City, followed by the north and south, while the center is the poorest 
area in Vietnam (World Bank 2004). 
Time at current address represents the number of years that a borrower has resided 
at his current address. Crook et al. (1992) find that default risk drops with 
increases in this variable. Thus, time at present address might be a proxy for the 
borrower‟s maturity, stability, or risk aversion. However, this relationship does not 
hold in Vietnam, where default rates increase with time at present address. In 
Vietnam, people who acquire financial wealth tend to seek better living conditions 
and thus often move to a new home in a better area. Thus, changing addresses 
might be a signal that a borrower‟s financial wealth is high and/or improving 
rapidly. Under these conditions, he is better able to repay his loan.  
                                                          
26 For this and all other binary variables, coding the variable based on equation (3.4) leads to a more 
precise measure than simply assigning values of 0 and 1. 
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Residential status indicates whether borrowers own their home, rent, or live with 
their parents. Errunza et al. (1981) finds that land ownership is a significant factor 
in predicting default. Ex ante, the relationship between residential status and 
default is unclear. On the one hand, residential status can indicate financial wealth, 
particularly in the case of home ownership. On the other hand, residential status 
can indicate increased financial pressure on the borrower‟s income through 
insurance fees, taxes, or electricity costs. Crook et al. (1992) find that borrowers 
who are most likely to default belong to the “other” category, whereas borrowers 
living with their parents are least likely to default. We expect that this ranking will 
be different for our sample, as the reasons for having a certain residential status in 
Vietnam are dissimilar from those in industrialized countries. Almost 90% of all 
borrowers in our sample own their homes, which properly reflects the Vietnamese 
population as a whole, where 95% of all households own their own home. Home 
ownership is somewhat higher in rural areas, at 98%, compared with urban areas, 
where it is 86% (GSO 1999). If a home is used as collateral, as is likely when the 
borrower is a homeowner, default rates are among the lowest, whereas default 
rates are highest for tenants who do not own their homes. This pattern can be 
attributed to the importance of owning a home in Vietnamese culture, a norm that 
renders many Vietnamese borrowers averse to the prospect of losing their home. 
Marital status can matter if it has an effect on the responsibility, reliability, or 
maturity of borrowers. In our sample, the default rate is lower for married than for 
single and widowed borrowers. We conjecture that clients without a spouse may 
be considered riskier than married clients, who take responsibility for a partner 
and perhaps also a family. Furthermore, married clients may be considered less 
risky because of possible dual incomes available for loan repayment. Another 
linkage exists between marital status and age. The Committee for Population, 
Family and Children (2003) found that in 2002 Vietnamese women married 
mainly in their 20s. Among 20- to 24-year old women, only 46% were married, 
compared with 80% to 90% of older women. Thus, the age group that shows the 
highest default rates (18 to 35 years) also has the most unmarried people. 
However, because 87% of borrowers are married, it is unclear ex ante how 
informative marital status will be compared with other variables such as age or 
income. 
Loan purpose describes how borrowed funds are used. Generally speaking, 
pledging collateral reduces default risk. Most defaults occur in the uncollateralized 
or in the “other” loan purpose group. The “other” loan purpose group consists of 
credit card lending and loans to the bank‟s employees; 21.85% of these loans are 
collateralized with a physical asset, and 7.69% are in default. At the other end of 
the distribution, 98.62% of business loans are collateralized and only 2.88% are in 
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default. Of the real-estate-related loans, 85.51% are collateralized and 3.19% are 
in default. Because a majority of pledged collateral is real estate, this fact might 
indicate borrower‟s risk aversion regarding the loss of his house and is also 
consistent with Vietnamese culture in which people view their homes as important 
aspects of their lives. Finally, there is an overlap between collateral type and 
residential status, as only borrowers who live in their own homes can use their 
homes as collateral. Note, however, that many borrowers who own more than one 
property use as collateral a property they do not reside in for (business) loans. This 
could again be a strong signal of the cultural importance of owning one‟s own 
home. As a related proxy, the collateral to loan ratio reflects the value of 
collateral relative to loan value. The higher this value, the greater the incentive for 
the borrower, who does not want to lose her collateral, to repay.  
Loan duration measures the maturity of a loan in months. In preceding literature, 
Godquin (2004) establishes that loan duration is a significant determinant of 
repayment performance throughout all specifications. Usually, this feature of a 
loan results from negotiations between borrowers and banks and is thus excluded 
from CSMs. However, the Vietnamese situation is different. What we measure 
here is the loan duration as proposed by the borrower and not as negotiated 
between the bank and the borrower. This variable can thus be observed to reflect 
the borrower‟s intention, risk aversion, or self-assessment of repayment ability.  
Time with bank measures the length of the banking relationship in years. Within 
the context of relationship lending, it can be assumed that the longer a customer 
stays with a bank, the more the bank knows about him and the lower the default 
risk becomes. However, while this relationship is confirmed for industrialized 
countries (Crook et al. 1992), it does not entirely hold in Vietnam. The highest 
default rates are found for those borrowers who have been with banks for 7 years 
or more, whereas for relationships of less than 7 years, the longer the relationship, 
the lower the default rate tends to be. This could reflect the fact that the 
Vietnamese banking market is in the process of reform and that credit officers still 
have room for preferential credit allocation. As reform progresses and CSMs are 
put into place, the effect of this variable is expected to change and should thus be 
reassessed regularly. 
Number of prior loans counts the number of loans a customer was granted at the 
bank prior to the loan currently being considered. Many borrowers not only have a 
sequence of historical loans but also have taken out more than one loan at a time. 
Because a defaulted borrower has difficulty obtaining new loans, this proxy can be 
informative about default risk. As expected, default is least frequent for repeat 
borrowers: whereas 8.19% of first-time borrowers default, 3.67% of borrowers 
with one or two prior loans default, and only 0.49% of borrowers with more than 
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24 prior loans do so. This variable thus clearly reflects the importance of the bank-
borrower relationship and a good credit record.  
Number of current accounts is a variable that indicates how many bank accounts 
the borrower currently holds at the bank. In Vietnam, the concept of a personal 
bank account is still unfamiliar to most of the population, with only approximately 
6% of the population possessing a bank account in 2006. This percentage, 
however, is substantially higher for the urban middle class, at 35%, and had 
increased substantially from only 12% in 2001.
27
 In a recent conference on 
banking technology in Hanoi, it was reported that in 2012 approximately 20% of 
the population had a bank account; it is expected that this figure will increase to 
35-40% by 2015.
28
 Having a bank account is largely indicative of a modern 
lifestyle among young people and may thus suggest education or financial wealth 
(see also Crook et al. 1992). In our sample, 50% of borrowers have one current 
account and another 23% have two or more accounts at the time of the loan 
request - both of these percentages are higher than the population average. These 
borrowers have a higher default risk. The high growth in current accounts might 
substantially change the relationship between default and current account 
ownership in the future. Consequently, this variable must be reassessed regularly 
if it is to be included in a CSM.
29 
 
Number of saving accounts is expected to be a strong predictor of default. Because 
the number of savings accounts at the bank is an indicator of a borrower‟s wealth, 
a higher number of savings accounts should reduce the default rate. In our data, 
borrowers without a savings account have the highest default rate of 6.56%, 
whereas the default rate falls to only 0.77% for borrowers with more than nine 
savings accounts at the bank. 
Occupation refers to the type of job the borrower has. It is classified into five 
groups. Surprisingly, the management group, which counts for 10.84% of 
borrowers, has the highest default rate (7.16%), whereas the labor group and the 
retired and unemployed group have default rates of only 4.73% and 1.07%, 
respectively. This may be explained by the fact that individuals in the management 
group may involve themselves in riskier projects than members of the other 
groups. 
                                                          
27 Figures are obtained from two surveys conducted in 2006: (1) one by Visa International, as reported 
in the Thanh Nien News on January 8, 2007, and (2) TNS‟s VietCycle survey, as reported in the 
Vietnam Investment Review No 795 on January 8, 2007.  
28  Source:  http://vneconomy.vn/20120320124414420P0C6/20-dan-so-viet-nam-co-tai-khoan-ngan-
hang.htm 
29 We also consider income, occupation, employer type, time with employer, age, and the ownership of 
a mobile phone. As these variables are not part of our final CSM, they are not described here in detail. 
These categories and their default frequencies are, however, listed in Tables 3.4 and A 3.1 for 
illustrative purposes. 
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Chapter 4 
Comparing Tail Risk and Systemic Risk Profiles for 
Different Types of US Financial Institutions
30
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The Basel II framework identifies credit risk, market risk and operational risk as 
the key risk factors for financial institutions (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, 2001). Prior to the crisis, the dominant opinion used to be that by 
appropriately managing these risks, financial institutions can maximize the 
probability of their continued survival while delivering appropriate profit to the 
capital providers. However, this financial regulatory framework is essentially 
micro-prudential in nature in the sense that it is designed to limit each institution‟s 
risk individually; however Basel II typically did not take into account that 
distressed systemically important companies can destabilize the whole financial 
system as well as causing negative effects on real economic activity. The recent 
financial crisis created a conscience that there is an urgent need to complement 
Basel-II with regulations that also take into account these macro-prudential 
concerns, i.e. the need to monitor so-called “systemic risk”. Thus, in order to 
preserve monetary and financial stability central banks, a regulatory and 
supervisory framework ideally encompasses a micro-prudential layer as well as a 
set of tools to monitor the systemic importance of individual financial institutions 
in order to get a feel of the potential contribution of each financial institution to 
the overall financial sector instability. This is particularly challenging in a very 
large and complex economy with a highly developed financial system such as the 
United States where tremendous consolidation as well as the removal of regulatory 
barriers to universal banking have made the financial system‟s interconnectedness 
extremely complex, cf. the popular reference to so-called Large and Complex 
Banking Organisations (or LCBO‟s) as institutions that are “too complex to fail”.   
A significant body of theoretical and empirical literature on bank contagion and 
systemic risk emerged throughout the years and the amount of scientific 
contributions in this area has nearly exploded since the occurrence of the most 
recent systemic banking crisis. A majority of the empirical banking stability 
literature has proposed "market-based" indicators of systemic risk. That is because 
supposed driving factors of systemic instability like e.g. the financial system‟s 
interbank interconnectedness, the location of banks within the system‟s "network" 
                                                          
30
 This chapter is based on „Comparing tail risk and systemic risk profiles for different types of US 
financial institutions‟ co-authored with Stefan Straetmans. 
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or the correlations between loan or trading (investment) portfolios are often 
difficult to quantify.  Banks‟ interconnectedness may be of a “direct” nature and 
related to money markets, the payment system, or derivatives markets and 
resulting counterparty risk, see e.g. Allen and Gale (2000). However, it may also 
be of an “indirect” nature and induced by the overlap in banks‟ asset portfolios 
(Iori et al., 2006; de Vries, 2005; Zhou, 2010). Event studies are one of the oldest 
tools employed to measuring bank linkages by investigating the impacts of 
specific bank distress or bank failures on other banks' stock prices, see e.g. Swary 
(1986), Wall and Peterson (1990) or Slovin et al. (1999). Other studies regressed 
abnormal bank stock returns on proxies for asset-side risk, like Smirlock and 
Kaufold (1987) or Kho et al. (2000). De Nicolo and Kwast (2002) explain 
increases in bank equity correlations over time by means of proxies for bank 
consolidation. Gropp and Moerman (2004) and Gropp and Vesala (2004) use 
(market-based) equity-derived distances to default to measure bank equity 
spillovers. More recent market-based measures of systemic risk include the 
Conditional Value-at-Risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011), Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (Acharya et al., 2010) or SRISK (Brownlees and Engle, 2012). 
Most of the studies mentioned above assume that domino-type bank equity 
spillovers (often dubbed “bank contagion”) are at the heart of systemic risk. An 
alternative strand in the literature assumes that banking crises are triggered by 
aggregate (nondiversifiable) shocks that affect all banks simultaneously. Gorton 
(1988) argued that business cycles have often been leading indicators of bank 
panics. The studies by Gonzalez-Hermosillo et al. (1997), Demirgüc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) and Hellwig (1994) fit in the same tradition. The latter author 
argued that the fragility of financial institutions to large macro shocks may partly 
be due to the noncontingent character of deposit contracts to the state of the macro 
economy. The systemic risk indicator we are going to work with fits into this latter 
tradition.  
The use of market-based indicators for systemic risk is not without controversy 
and potential problems. First, it allows systemic risk assessment for listed banks 
only. This may lead to a biased view on the true level of financial fragility. 
Second, bank stocks can only be truly informative about current or future systemic 
risk (i.e. market-based indicators as “early warning indicator”) if bank stocks 
reflect all relevant and available information about the risks that characterize a 
given financial institution, i.e., if bank stocks are efficiently priced. The evolution 
of bank stocks prior to 2007 suggests that the markets did not foresee the banking 
crisis. We nevertheless believe that the most extreme spikes in bank stocks and 
their co-movements exhibit at least some information content about systemic risk 
and financial instability.
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This paper builds on the statistical extreme value (EVT) approach followed by e.g. 
Hartmann et al. (2006) and Straetmans and Chaudhry (2013). More specifically, 
we use extreme downside risk measures that assume Pareto-type tail decline to 
identify bank tail risk. To identify bank systemic risk, we employ the so-called 
tail-β indicator of “extreme systematic risk” as a tail equivalent of the traditional 
regression-based CAPM-β, introduced in Straetmans et al. (2008). The tail-β is 
defined as the probability of a collapse in the market value of a bank‟s equity 
capital conditional on a large adverse aggregate shock (typically an extreme 
negative return on a market portfolio like a banking index, overall stock market 
index, credit spread etc.). The tail-β is obviously market-based because it uses 
stock prices of individual bank equity as well as market information about 
aggregate shocks as input.  
Notice that the concept of Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) and the Conditional 
Value-at-Risk (CoVaR) resemble the tail-β because these indicators are also 
probabilistic in nature: MES is the expected loss on individual bank equity capital 
conditional on large market portfolio losses. CoVaR is the Value-at-Risk (VaR) of 
the financial system conditional on institutions being under distress and is 
implicitly defined using a conditional co-crash probability. Also, and in contrast to 
previous correlation-based approaches towards, MES, CoVaR and the tail-β 
identify non-linear dependencies (if present) in the data. The crucial difference 
between our approach and competing approaches like MES or CoVaR lies in the 
way the indicators are estimated: whereas we explicitly focus on the (univariate) 
extreme tail of bank equity capital and the tail dependence structure between bank 
stock returns, empirical studies on MES or CoVaR mainly use estimation 
techniques like quantile regressions or non-parametric estimation (historical 
simulation) that cannot go as far in the tail. One may wonder whether one truly 
captures systemic events if these indicators are estimated with, say, quantile 
regressions for quantiles that correspond with 5% or 1% significance levels. The 
latter studies typically assume that non-extreme outcomes are representative for 
what happens in the tail area but we believe this may be an overly restrictive 
assumption. Statistical EVT focuses on events that are severe enough to basically 
always be of concern for regulators and supervisors caring about financial 
stability, which cannot be claimed about events that happen 5% of 1% of the time.  
By applying techniques of univariate and multivariate EVT to the tails of bank 
equity returns, we want to make four contributions to the existing literature (and 
more specifically to papers like Hartmann et al. (2006) or Straetmans and 
Chaudhry (2013)). First, we want to perform a “cross-industry” comparison of tail 
risk and systemic importance, i.e. do traditional banks exhibit more or less tail risk 
and systemic risk as compared to e.g. investment banks or insurance companies? 
Indeed, besides deposit banks (depositories), insurance companies (including large 
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re-insures) and broker-dealers (investment banks) played a crucial role in the 
narrative of the 2007-2009 banking and financial crisis. It is to be expected that 
these different segments of the financial industry also exhibit different risk profiles 
and risk-taking behavior (and as a result differences in tail risk and systemic risk). 
Deposit banks, for instance, with their traditional banking activities are expected 
to expose to considerably lower systemic risk as compared to investment banks 
who carry large trading portfolios. Previous empirical systemic risk studies were 
often limited to measuring tail risk and systemic risk of “banks” in the narrow 
sense of the word without distinguish different types of bank. Second, we assess 
the forward-looking characteristics of these risk measures by looking at the 
stability of tail risk and systemic risk rankings over time. We achieve this by 
calculating rank correlations between pre-crisis and crisis ranks. Third, we 
reconsider the corroboration that a financial institution‟s size is a prime factor 
fueling systemic risk. We also look into the relation between tail risk and 
institutional size. We solely focus on size as a risk determinant because previous 
studies identified this variable as the single most important trigger of systemic 
risk. Finally, we want to assess whether the tail risk and systemic risk of the same 
institutions are positively or negatively related to each other. Suppose that both 
(micro-prudential) tail risk and (macro-prudential) systemic risk exhibit common 
drivers, these common factors will determine whether tail risk and systemic risk 
are positively or negatively related. For example, if size is the single most 
important variable and bigger banks exhibit less tail risk (diversification effect) 
but more systemic risk (too big to fail effect) than it follows that tail risk and 
systemic risk should be negatively related to each other across financial 
institutions. Whether tail risk and systemic risk are positively or negatively 
correlated is assessed by means of cross sectional rank correlations between tail 
risk and systemic risk. 
Turning to the data, our panel contains roughly the same banks as in Acharya et al. 
(2010) and Brownlees et al. (2012), i.e. the top 102 U.S financial firms with a 
market capitalization greater than 7 billion USD as of the end of June 2007 (just 
before the start of the subprime mortgage crisis). SIC codes are used to divide 
financial institutions into 4 buckets: deposit banks (e.g. JP Morgan, Bank of 
America, Citygroup), insurance companies (e.g. AIG, Berkshire Hathaway, 
Countrywide), broker-dealers (e.g. Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley), and a 
residual category (“others”) consisting of e.g. non-depository institutions or real 
estate agencies. Our dataset only includes 92 firms instead of 102 firms as in the 
original panel (some firms disappeared from the original panel due to mergers or 
bankruptcies). Stock prices and relevant balance sheet data to proxy institutional 
size are downloaded over the sample period January 1, 1990 to September 1, 
2011.  
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Anticipating our results, we find that different groups of financial institutions 
exhibit different levels of tail risk and systemic risk. The heterogeneity in tail risks 
and systemic contributions across different types of financial institutions suggests 
that regulators should not treat different financial industries as homogeneous when 
regulating and supervising their risks, i.e. a broker-dealer should be treated 
differently from, say, a deposit bank. The most salient outcome of our cross-
industry risk comparison seems to be that the insurance industry exhibits the 
highest tail risk but that deposit banks are characterized by the highest degree of 
extreme systematic risk (our indicator of systemic risk). The latter outcome is 
surprising given the key role investment banks (and more specifically the trading 
divisions) played in the narrative of the financial crisis. What is less surprising is 
that both tail risk and systemic risk dramatically increased during the financial 
crisis. However, this does not mean that EVT-based indicators of tail risk and 
systemic risk are of no value when making any judgment about the propensity 
towards future systemic crises: we actually observe that the ranking of institutions 
did not change dramatically when considering pre-crisis and crisis sample tail-β‟s: 
rank correlations between pre-crisis and crisis ranks are relatively high which 
implies that the riskiest institutions in terms of tail risk and systemic risk before 
the crisis stay the riskiest ones over the crisis sample. The ranks and 
corresponding cross sample correlations are nevertheless quite different across 
different types of financial institutions. Last but not least, financial institutions‟ 
size does not have much to say about financial institutions‟ tail risk; but size does 
seem to matter for their systemic risk. However, the size-systemic risk relationship 
is not very robust and varies with the considered size proxies, subsamples and 
types of financial institutions. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces 
indicators of downside risk and systemic risk based on statistical extreme value 
analysis. Section 4.3 provides estimation procedures for both measures. Section 
4.4 summarizes the empirical results. Finally, section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2. Tail risk and Systemic risk Indicators  
We first introduce alternative downside risk (“tail risk”) measures for financial 
institutions Next, we discuss a systemic risk indicator that reflects individual 
banks‟ sensitivity to system-wide non-diversifiable shocks (tail-β).  
4.2.1. Univariate tail risk indicators 
We define extreme downside risk (tail risk) measures for financial institutions by    
exploiting the empirical stylized fact that equity returns of financial institutions 
exhibit “heavy” tails. Mandelbrot (1963) observed that sharp short-term 
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fluctuations in financial markets (typically daily returns) are non-normally 
distributed – and bank stocks do not constitute an exception. Let    stand for the 
dividend-corrected stock price of a financial institution. Define       (
  
    
) as 
the loss variable we are interested in. For sake of notational convenience, the left 
tail of equity returns (market losses on equity capital) are mapped into positive 
losses which implies that all downside risk measure expressions and 
corresponding estimation procedures are expressed for the upper tail of a loss 
distribution. Loosely speaking, Mandelbrot‟s observation of the heavy tail feature 
implies that the marginal tail probability for X as a function of the corresponding 
quantile x can be approximately described by a power law: 
                                          *   +      ,     for large x.                                (4.1) 
This contrasts with the (much faster) exponential tail decay of thin-tailed 
processes like the normal distribution. The so-called tail index α can be interpreted 
as the rate at which the tail decay takes place when increasing the quantile or crisis 
barrier x: lower α implies a slower decay to zero and a higher probability mass for 
given values of the quantile x. The tail index has an interesting statistical 
interpretation in terms of the higher moments of an empirical process: fat tailness 
of an empirical process implies that all distributional moments higher than α are 
unbounded and thus do not exist. In contrast, for the normal distribution, all 
statistical moments exist. Mandelbrot‟s empirical observation of heavy tails 
implies that the normal distribution is not a good choice if one wants to make a 
probability assessment of extreme returns like financial crises, bank failures etc.  
Given this predominance of fat tails in financial markets, why is the normality 
assumption still so common when applying statistical tools into social sciences? 
This can be partly explained by (i) its analytical tractability; but more importantly 
(ii) by the predominant focus on sample averages in social science, which implies 
that versions of the Central Limit Theorem apply, i.e., under fairly general 
conditions sample averages converge in distribution to a standard normal 
distribution. However, if one is interested in assessing the likelihood of extreme 
events (financial crises, bank distress etc.) away from the mean and the 
distributional centre, other limit laws apply like the so-called extremal types 
theorem, see Embrechts et al. (1997).  The heavy-tailed model (4.1) is one 
possible outcome of this extremal types theorem.  
Popular distributional models often used in the finance literature like the Student-t, 
the class of symmetric stable distributions or the Generalized Autoregressive 
Conditional Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model all exhibit fat tails: they are all 
nested in the tail model (4.1) albeit with different pairs of tail parameters
 
(   ).  
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Clearly, the tail likelihood in (4.1) is defined for a given time horizon of the loss 
series X and values of the crisis barrier or Value-at-Risk (VaR) level x. 
Alternatively, (4.1) can be inverted and solved for the tail quantile x in function of 
p:  
       .
 
 
/
  
 ⁄
                                           (4.2) 
Although VaR has become an extremely popular device for financial risk 
management and a cornerstone of Basel-II, financial economists also argued it is 
not a “coherent” risk measure; alternative risk measures have therefore been 
proposed like e.g. the “expected shortfall”. This is the conditional expected loss on 
a firm‟s equity capital given a sharp decline in the equity capital (   )). It can 
be easily seen that expected shortfall is very closely related to VaR: 
       (   |   )  
 
   
 .                         (4.3) 
Thus, within an EVT framework, the expected shortfall at the p% significance 
level is the rescaled VaR  where the scaling factor depends on the tail index α. 
Notice that the expected loss beyond VaR falls below VaR provided the variance 
of the process exists (   ). The conditional expected loss in (4.3) reflects how 
severe the violation of the VaR crisis level is whereas a calculate VaR quantile 
itself does not provide that information. For tails of bank stock losses, it provides 
the expected decline in equity capital once a critical threshold is exceeded.  
4.2.2. “Extreme systematic” risk indicator or tail-β 
Similar to the downside risk measures discussed in the previous section, the 
proposed indicator of systemic risk is also market-based in the sense that it 
requires the input of daily extreme stock price movements of an individual 
financial institution together with daily sharp fluctuations in a nondiversifiable 
risk factor on which to condition. The aggregate (macro) factor is supposed to act 
as propagation channel of adverse aggregate shocks.   
Let us now define this so-called “tail-β” in more detail. Loosely speaking, this is a 
co-crash probability that reflects the dependence between the loss on an individual 
institution‟s stock and a macro factor during times of market stress. Assume these 
two losses are represented by    and    , respectively. As in the univariate case, 
we take the negative of stock returns such as to study joint losses in the upper-
upper data quadrant. Without loss of generality we choose the tail quantiles    and 
   such that the corresponding tail probabilities are the same across the two 
random variables, i.e.  *     ( )+   *     ( )+   . The crisis barriers 
   and    will generally differ because the marginal distribution functions for    
and    are unequal. However, a common significance level p makes the 
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corresponding tail quantiles or extreme “Value-at-Risk” level of    and    better 
comparable across assets or portfolios.
31
   
From elementary probability theory we can simply write down a bivariate 
probability measure by using the notation introduced above: 
                  *     ( )|     ( )+   
 *     ( )     ( )+
 
 ,             (4.4) 
and using the fact that  *     ( )+   . The probability measure    reflects 
the strength of the interdependence between     and    when both variables 
jointly exceed the crisis barriers    and   . Under complete statistical 
independence    reduces to 
  
 
   which acts as a lower bound for the tail-β. 
This tail-β measure is inspired by portfolio theory as it can be interpreted as a tail 
equivalent of the CAPM-β. Just as the CAPM-β, it relates individual stock return 
movements to movements in a market portfolio. However, the tail-β is neither a 
regression coefficient nor is it based on the entire sample. It is a probability that 
we evaluate on the tail area of the joint distribution which is the area one is 
interested in for sake of assessing systemic stability, i.e., low frequency co-
movements that do not strike often. In fact, correlation-based measures like 
ordinary β‟s can be quite misleading dependence measures for multiple reasons. 
First, CAPM or more general factor models only unveal linear relations between 
returns and supposed triggers whereas the systemic risk spillovers we are 
interested in may well be characterized by non-linear behavior. Also, correlations 
are often used in conjunction with the normality assumption. This is a rather 
dangerous cocktail because correlations tend to zero when truncated on the tail 
area and assuming multivariate normality. Thus, if tail co-movements exist in the 
true data, they will not be revealed by multivariate normal models and systemic 
risk will be severly underestimated as a consequence. For a more extensive 
discussion of the flaws of correlation-based measures, see e.g. the monograph by 
Embrechts et al. (1997).   
Tail-β‟s have been previously used. Straetmans et al. (2008) examine the intraday 
effects of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on US stocks before and after the attacks took 
place; Hartmann et al. (2006) and Straetmans and Chaudhry (2013) make a cross-
atlantic comparison of tail-β‟s for US and eurozone banks using slightly different 
techniques and time periods. De Jonghe (2010) runs cross sectional regressions of 
tail-β‟s on candidate-explanatory variables like size and sources of bank revenue 
to determine what drives banking system (in) stability. Conditional exceedance 
                                                          
31 If Q(1)>Q(2) for a common significance level p, the “tail” Value-at-Risk of position 1 exceeds that 
of position 2. The VaR levels become comparable by conditioning them on a common p-value. The 
common p-value choice is also in line with the basel-II requirements requiring banks to disclose (less 
extreme) 5% and 1% VaR numbers. This makes the downside risk of banks‟ trading books comparable 
across banks.    
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probabilities for higher dimensions are defined in the same manner (see Hartmann 
et al. (2006), Straetmans and Chaudhry (2013)). In the current paper, we select a 
Datastream calculated US banking market index as conditioning macro factor   . 
4.3. Tail risk and systemic risk estimation  
Imposing one and the same fully parametric model (marginal distribution as well 
as the bivariate dependence structure) for both the centre of the distribution as well 
as the tail observations would greatly simplify the quantification of the considered 
downside risk indicators and the tail-β for it would only require Maximum 
Likelihood estimation of the distributional parameters. However, if one makes the 
wrong distributional assumptions, the tail risk and systemic risk estimates may be 
severely biased due to misspecification. Moreover, there is no evidence that stock 
returns are identically distributed - even less so for the crisis situations we are 
interested in. We therefore want to avoid the model risk of making too restrictive 
distributional assumptions for bank stock returns. To that aim, we employ semi-
parametric estimation procedures from statistical extreme value analysis.  First, we 
introduce semi-parametric estimators for extreme downside risk (tail indices, tail 
quantiles and conditional expected shortfalls) before turning to estimation 
procedures for the systemic risk indicators.  
4.3.1. Estimating tail risk measures  
Univariate tail risk estimation exploits the empirical stylized fact that financial 
return distributions exhibit fat tails. More specifically, we are interested in a 
sample counterpart of (4.1)-(4.2)-(4.3). Let the “tail cut-off point”       (with 
                  representing the descending order statistics 
defined on the samples of return losses X > 0) represent the lower bound of the set 
of upper order extreme returns used to identify the tail probability (4.1) or tail 
quantile (4.2) with m the number of extremes used in the estimation. The tail 
probability (4.1) could then be estimated as: 
        (   )  
 
 
(     )
 
   ,                    (4.5) 
with 
 
 
(     )
 
an estimate of the scaling constant a in (4.1). In financial risk 
management the tail quantile or crisis barrier x is usually referred to as the "Value-
at-Risk (VaR)", although it is often used in a reversed fashion: what is the value of 
x for a given level of the tail probability p? (alternatively called “p-value” or 
“marginal significance level”). Simply inverting the tail likelihood estimator (4.5) 
renders:   
              ̂       .
 
  
/
 
 
 .            (4.6) 
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The tail quantile estimator  ̂  extends the empirical distribution function of the 
return loss data outside the historical sample boundary of X by means of the Pareto 
law parametric assumption for the tail behavior in (4.1). The quantile estimator 
(4.6) still requires plugging in a value for the tail index  . In line with the bulk of 
empirical studies on non-normality, power laws and extreme events, we estimate 
the tail index by the means of the popular Hill (1975) statistic: 
     ̂  (
 
 
∑          (
     
     
))
  
          (4.7) 
where m has the same value and interpretation as in (4.6). In fair conditions, it has 
been shown that the tail index and tail quantile estimators above exhibit 
consistency and asymptotic normality (see Haeusler and Teugels, 1985; De Haan 
et al., 1994). Further details on these estimators are provided in Jansen and De 
Vries (1991) and the monograph by Embrechts et al. (1997). An estimator for the 
expected shortfall (4.3) easily follows by plugging in the Hill statistic and the 
quantile estimator in the definition of the expected shortfall (4.3): 
        ̂(   ̂    ̂ )  
 ̂
 ̂  
 .                      (4.8)                                                                                        
The Hill statistic and accompanying quantile and expected shortfall estimators are 
still conditional on picking a value of the nuisance parameter m. Goldie and Smith 
(1987) suggest to select this threshold such as to minimize the asymptotic mean-
squared error (AMSE) of the Hill statistic. Due to the bias-variance trade-off 
characteristic of the Hill estimator such a minimum should exist. This 
minimization criterion actually constitutes the starting point for most empirical 
techniques to determine m. We determine m by both considering the curvature of 
so-called Hill plots  ̂    ̂( ) as well as implementing the Beirlant et al. (1999) 
algorithm which minimizes a sample equivalent of the AMSE. 
4.3.2. Estimating the systemic risk indicator (tail- ) 
In order to estimate the tail-β in (4.4) it suffices to calculate the joint probability in 
the numerator. Upon assuming a bivariate parametric distribution function for the 
return pair, the distributional parameters and resulting co-exceedance probability 
could be easily estimated using maximum likelihood optimization. However we 
want to avoid making very specific distributional assumptions about both the 
marginal return distributions as well as their (tail) dependence structure. We 
therefore opt for Ledford and Tawn‟s (1996) semi-parametric approach. The latter 
authors first propose to transform the marginal distributions to unit Fréchet 
distributions which leaves the tail dependence structure unchanged. We opt for an 
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alternative marginal transformation (to unit Pareto marginals) which renders 
comparable results, see Draisma et al. (2004) for a comparison of the two 
alternative marginal transforms‟ performance. After such a transformation, 
differences in joint tail probabilities across asset return pairs should be solely 
attributed to differences in the tail dependence structure of the return pairs.  
The unit Pareto transformation is performed in a purely nonparametric fashion by 
using the return‟s own empirical distribution: 
  ̃  
 
      (   )
                  (4.9) 
and where     stands for the (ascending) rank number of the observation     for 
stock return i in the time series dimension.
32
 Upon applying this unit Pareto 
marginal transformation, it can be easily shown that the bivariate numerator 
likelihood in (4.4) boils down to: 
 *     ( )      ( )+   {  ̃      ̃    }  
with s=1/p, see e.g. Draisma (2004) or Hartmann et al. (2006). Consequently, the 
common quantile s enables one to reduce the estimation of the bivariate 
probability to a univariate probability by considering the cross-sectional minimum 
of the two return series: 
 {  ̃      ̃    }   {    (   ̃   )̃   }   *      +,          (4.10) 
and where the auxiliary variable
 
     (  ̃   ̃) . In order to identify the 
marginal tail probability at the right-hand side, we assume that the auxiliary 
variable‟s tail inherits the fat tail property of the original returns, see e.g. Draisma 
et al. (2004) for further motivation:  
 *      +    
               (4.11) 
for large s. Obviously, fatter (thinner) tails of the      variable imply weaker 
(stronger) tail dependence.  
Steps (4.9), (4.10), (4.11) show that the estimation of join probabilities like (4.10) 
can be reduced to a univariate estimation problem. By using the inverse of the 
previously defined quantile estimator from de Haan et al. (1994), univariate excess 
probabilities can be estimated: 
 ̂  
 
 
(     )
    ,        (4.12) 
                                                          
32
 Division by n+1 instead of n is performed in order to prevent division by zero for the largest 
observational rank.  
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where the „tail cut-off point‟       is the (   )
   ascending order statistic of 
the auxiliary variable     . 
An estimator of the co-exceedance probability    in (4.4) easily follows by 
dividing (4.12) with p: 
   
  
 
 
 
 
(     )
      ,                       (4.13) 
for large but finite s=1/p. 
Clearly the tail index α plays a double role in (4.13): it both drives the tail 
thickness of the auxiliary variable Z as well as the degree of the tail dependence 
for the original return pair (     ). One can distinguish two polar cases in which 
the pair (     )  as well as the transformed pair (   ̃   )̃ either exhibit tail 
dependence (   )  or tail independence ( >1). Tail dependence implies that 
   , or alternatively:  
       *     ( )|     ( )+         {  ̃   |  ̃    }  
 
 
          
(4.14) 
Stated otherwise, the conditional tail probability never vanishes to zero regardless 
how far one looks into the tail of the joint distribution.  On the other hand, tail 
independence ( >1) implies that 
          *     ( )|     ( )+         {  ̃   |  ̃    }           (4.15) 
For obvious reasons the tail index of the auxiliary variable is also sometimes 
called the “tail dependence” parameter.33 The bivariate normal distribution or the 
bivariate Morgenstern distribution constitute popular examples of tail independent 
models whereas the bivariate student-t or the bivariate logistic model exhibit tail 
dependence, see e.g. Hartmann et al. (2006). The bivariate normal distribution is 
both characterized by thin tailed as well as tail independent marginal return 
distributions and may therefore lead to an underestimation of the true systemic 
risk when pairs of bank stock returns are actually tail dependent. To illustrate this, 
consider a pair of bank stock returns form our bank panel (Citigroup; Bank of 
America) and impose a bivariate normal distribution on this data pair. The 
estimated first and second moments (means, standard deviations and correlation) 
completely determine the joint distribution. Next, we employ the bivariate normal 
                                                          
33
 Lots of papers on multivariate extreme value analysis also talk about the tail dependence 
“coefficient” which is typically defined as the conditional asymptotic probability itself. The tail 
dependence parameter thus determines the tail decay of the tail dependence coefficient 
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model as a simulation vehicle to draw a sample of the same size as the raw data 
sample (n= 5659). The figure below shows both data clouds 
Figure 4,1     Joint bank crashes: historical vs. simulated (Gaussian) return pairs 
For sake of comparison, axes are identical. One observes that the RHS Gaussian 
data cloud does not reproduce the LHS joint downward bank stock crashes visible 
in the true data cloud (tail dependence). That there is so little tail dependence in 
the right hand side graph may seem surprising because the Pearson correlation 
between the two bank stock return series is found to equal 94.17%. However, the 
bivariate normal distribution is characterized by tail independence, which implies 
that statistical dependence (nonzero correlation for a bivariate normal) in the 
centre of the distribution disappears in the tails, i.e. condition (4.10). This explains 
why the bivariate normal draws in the right graph are unable to replicate the joint 
extremes in the left graph. Thus, one either has to opt for parametric models that 
nest both data features of heavy tails and tail dependence or one decides to work 
with purely nonparametric techniques that pick up these stylized facts in the data 
automatically. 
In this paper we do not want to make a parametric choice for either the marginal 
distributions or the tail dependence structure. We nevertheless decide to impose 
tail dependence on pairs of bank stock returns which implies the parameter 
restriction    . The economic intuition for this restriction goes as follows: if 
banks have common risky exposures either at the asset side or the liability side, 
and these common risk drivers are heavy tailed, bank stock returns should 
automatically be tail dependent. De Vries (2005) provides an analytic exposition 
of this argument. From a statistical point of view, the restriction     is 
convenient because it reduces estimation risk (the Hill statistic is not needed to 
estimate the tail dependence parameter α). Imposing tail dependence also imposes 
an upper bound on the systemic risk measure. From a regulatory point of view, a 
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conservative assessment of systemic risk by means of an upper bound seems 
preferable instead of potentially underestimating indicators of systemic instability.  
4.4. Empirical results 
Our empirical analysis boils down to a cross-industry comparison of tail risk and 
systemic risk contributions of top US financial firms based on daily data sampled 
from 1st January 1990 until 1st September 2011. We consider two subsamples: 
January 1990 to August 2007 is the “pre-crisis sample”; and September 2007 to 
September 2011 is the “crisis” sample (notice the crisis sample is also partly post-
crisis in nature). We would like to know to what extent our results on tail risk and 
systemic risk are robust across subsamples (more precisely the relative ranking of 
the institutions). In other words, even if the absolute values of tail risk and 
systemic risk change dramatically over subsamples, what about the ranking of the 
institutions relative to each other? And is the ranking in terms of univariate tail 
risk comparable to the ranking in terms of systemic risk? Also, what role does size 
play in the determination of tail risk and systemic risk? Finally, does the type of 
financial institution (deposit bank, broker-dealer etc.) matter in answering these 
questions?  
The considered top financial institutions fall within four industry groups, see 
Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012). The “deposit banks” group 
mainly contains standard commercial banks and constitutes the benchmark group 
of financial institutions. The “Broker-Dealers” group contains the top U.S. 
investment banks. Many of these firms were in severe distress in the crisis: 
Lehman Brothers declared bankruptcy, Bear Stearns was sold to J.P. Morgan, 
Merrill Lynch was sold to Bank of America, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley 
became commercial banks switching to a stricter regulatory regime. The group 
“Other” contains real estate firms and most of them were also severely hit by the 
sub-prime crisis. However, compared to the “deposit group” they fall under looser 
financial regulations.  
4.4.1. Tail risk and systemic risk 
Disaggregated (bank level) results in tail risk and systemic risk are reported in 
appendix A: Table A4.1 (Depositories), A4.2 (Others), A4.3 (Insurance 
companies), and A4.4 (Broker- Dealers) . Proxies for tail risk encompass the tail 
index α, the quantile or Value-at-Risk (VaR) and expected shortfalls. Extreme 
quantiles are calculated for a p-value of 0.1% which implies an expected VaR 
violation every 1,000 days (=1,000/260≈3.85 years). We calculate this extreme tail 
quantile using eq. (4.6). We also report extreme and nonextreme expected shortfall 
estimates conditioned on a crisis barrier of 50% and on p=5% VaR numbers, 
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respectively. The former is estimated using eq. (4.8) whereas the latter is 
determined via historical simulation, i.e., by conditioning the expected shortfall 
estimate on the p=5% downside risk quantile from the empirical return 
distribution. As concerns estimates of systemic risk, we report nonextreme values 
for the Marginal Expected Shortfall (MES) via historical simulation and extreme 
value estimates of the tail-β in (4.13) using extreme value analysis. The MES is 
defined along the lines of Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) 
as the expected loss on the banking market index given a simultaneously sharp 
drop in an individual bank stock:  
      (  |     (    ))                  (4.16) 
and with (     ) the pair of equity losses on the US banking market index and 
bank i‟s capital, respectively. The conditional expectation (4.16) can be interpreted 
as the systemic risk contribution of bank i to overall systemic instability. For sake 
of calculating MES, we condition on (nonextreme) crisis barriers   ( ) for 
individual bank stocks with a p-value of 5%.
34
 The MES and the tail-β are 
conditioned on the same banking market index. We estimate MES by historical 
simulation, i.e. by calculating the conditional average based on the joint empirical 
distribution of
 
(     ). All tail risk and systemic risk indicators are estimated for 
full sample, pre-crisis, and crisis samples. To make certain patterns in the 
appendix tables more easily visible, Table 4.1 summarizes tables A4.1, A4.2, A4.3 
and A4.4 by considering means, medians and standard deviations of all considered 
estimates per type of financial institution as well as for all financial institutions 
together. Table 4.1 reports mean and median estimates for each type of financial 
institution. We also report medians because the cross sectional distributions of 
bank risk might be skewed. However, mean and median estimates generally lie 
close to each other. Moreover, upon applying mean-median equality tests, we 
could nearly never reject the null hypothesis of equality.
35
 
                                                          
34
 We only report estimates for nonextreme versions of (3.12) as the nonparametric extreme value 
estimation of MES is still in its infancy, see e.g. Zhou (2013).   
35
 The testing results are not reported in the paper but they are available from the authors upon request.  
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Figure 4.1     Expected Shortfall E (X-50%|X>50%): cross sectional averages  
over 1-year rolling window 
 
Figure 4.2      Tail-β: cross sectional average over 1-year rolling window 
 
Before making any general inferences about Appendix Tables A4.1, A4.2, A4.3 
and A4.4 or the condensed version in Table 4.1, it is important to grasp the 
economic interpretation of the risk estimates in the tables. For example, consider 
the subsample results for Bank of America in Table A4.1. The tail index of Bank 
of America dropped from 4 to 1.6 indicating that the probability mass in the tails 
enormously increased during the crisis period. Indeed, the crisis values of extreme 
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quantiles and expected shortfalls have climbed sharply as compared to their pre-
crisis levels. Bank of America‟s 0.1% tail-VaR has increased from 13.7% to 
82.5% since the outbreak of the crisis whereas the tail-β‟s increase from 56.7% to 
75.9%; but what do all these percentages actually mean in economic terms? A pre-
crisis Tail-VaR level of 13.7% implies that one expects a (daily) decline of 13.7% 
or more in the market value of Bank of America‟s equity capital every 3.8 years; 
but that crisis barrier has risen to 82.5% over the crisis period. However, a VaR 
crisis barrier does not tell how severe the violation of the VaR barrier may be. For 
that purpose it is informative to calculate so-called coherent risk measures like the 
expected shortfall. For example, the pre-crisis value  (     |     )= 
16.7% for Bank of America implies that if  a VaR exceedance of 50% or more 
strikes, one expects an additional daily loss of 16.7%. Turning to the 
interpretations of the extreme systematic risk estimates (tail-β‟s), a crisis value of 
75.9% for Bank of America‟s tail-β implies that on average a meltdown in the 
banking sector (proxied by a crash in the banking index) will go hand in hand with 
a meltdown in Bank of America‟s equity 3 out of 4 times! Notice that, even before 
the crisis, the coincidence of a banking index collapse and a Bank of America 
collapse in common stock is more than 1 out of 2.     
Let us now analyze the outcomes in Table 4.1 in somewhat more detail. Table 4.2 
complements table 4.1 by assessing the statistical significance of the differences in 
average tail risk and systemic risk across the different industry groups and for the 
different sample periods considered. In general, there is a large cross sectional and 
time-series heterogeneity in bank risk. Going more systematically through Table 
A4.1-A4.4 and Table 4.1, one can see that: (i) all values of tail risk and systemic 
risk dramatically increase in the crisis period; (ii) risk estimates differ markedly 
across institutions but also across industry group. Tail risk is highest for insurance 
companies although this seems to be limited to the crisis period. For the full 
sample, insurance companies and the residual category “other institutions” 
dominate other types of financial institution in terms of tail risk. As concerns 
systemic risk, deposit banks seem most vulnerable during the crisis period and the 
full sample whereas deposit banks and broker-dealers share the first place for the 
pre-crisis episode. The relatively high degree of systemic risk for deposit banks is 
somewhat surprising given the important role investment banks supposedly played 
in triggering and propagating the financial crisis and resulting Great Recession. As 
the pre-crisis and crisis levels of bank risk in Table 4.1 also show, there is a 
spectacular surge in bank risk during the crisis period which is hardly surprising. 
This confirms earlier outcomes also based on EVT measures by Straetmans and 
Chaudry (2013). Table 4.2 shows that our observations above about cross industry 
differences in tail risk and systemic risk are indeed statistically significant.  
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To illustrate bank risk dynamics even further we also consider individual risk and 
systemic risk exposures over moving windows of six years, the first period 
covering the years 1990-1995. Since the sample period spans 21 years, we obtain 
17 rolling sub-samples. Rolling estimates are included in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. The 
figures further distinguish rolling estimates per type of financial institution. Figure 
4.1 confirms that insurance companies dominate broker-dealers in terms of tail 
risk whereas broker-dealers in turn dominate deposit banks and the residual 
category “other”. Figure 4.1 also reveals that this hierarchy of tail risk already 
seems to hold for the pre-crisis rolling samples (although tail risk lies much closer 
to each other over that period). Overall, tail risk for all groups exhibits a similar 
time series pattern which can be associated with the general level of risk in the 
economy. Brownlees and Engle (2012) report comparable findings for the average 
daily volatility within a GARCH framework but the rolling (overlapping) nature of 
our EVT estimates smoothens sharp peaks and troughs. The relatively higher 
levels of ES in the early 2000s correspond with the dot com bubble burst and 
resulting recession. Next follows a period of lower tail risk that lasts until mid-
2007. Afterwards, and similar to volatility, ES literally explodes in 2008 and peaks 
to the highest level measured over the considered sample. The degree of 
comovement between the average values of ES across banking groups differs 
across time. Prior to the crisis, ES clusters together for all sectors but during the 
financial crisis, all industry groups jump significantly and the spread between 
groups becomes much clearer. On average, the Insurance group takes the lead in 
ES, followed by the Broker & Dealers group. This contradicts the Brownlees and 
Engle (2012) findings where the Insurance group stays consistently least risky in 
term of volatility as compared to the other industry groups.    
Figure 4.2 confirms that deposit banks seem systemically the most important 
followed by Broker & Dealers, the residual category “other institutions” and 
“insurance companies”. The relative ranking of different financial industry types 
according to their systemic risk contribution confirms the findings in Harrington 
(2009) and Acharya et al. (2010). Notice also that for both figures tail risk and 
systemic risk both started to decline again towards the end of the sample period.  
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The vast increases in tail risk and systemic risk over the crisis sample - and thus 
apparent instability - raises the issue whether these measures have any value added 
towards predicting future systemic instability. If they only function as descriptive 
indicators that tell us what the current state of systemic risk is their value stays 
relatively limited. Acharya et al. (2010) and Brownlees and Engle (2012) already 
argued that their pre-crisis MES estimates exhibit some predictability towards 
adverse shocks in the banks‟ equity capital during the crisis. In order to judge 
whether the pre-crisis EVT-based measures exhibit predictive content toward their 
crisis counterparts, we take a slightly alternative route and scatter pre-crisis tail 
risk vs. crisis tail risk (Panel A) and pre-crisis tail-β‟s vs. crisis tail-β‟s (Panel B). 
The scatter plots are summarized in Figure 4.3. OLS regression lines are also 
included in the scatters. The graphs already provide some casual evidence of a 
positive relationship that pre-crisis values of tail risk (systemic risk) indeed have 
something to say about their crisis counterparts. 
Figure 4.3   Tail risk (ES (X>50%)) and  systemic risk (tail-β): pre-crisis versus crisis 
for all institutions and for separate industry groups 
Panel A: ES (X>50%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Tail-β 
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In addition to the scatter plot analysis, we also calculate (Spearman) rank 
correlations between pre-crisis and crisis ranks  of tail risk and systemic risk 
proxies. These rank correlations are reported in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3   Rank correlation  of tail risk and  systemic risk measures 
(pre-crisis versus crisis) 
The table presents Spearman's rank correlations (percentage) between pre-crisis and crisis for different 
risk measures. Statistically significant rank correlations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance level are 
denoted with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
     q (p=0.1%)   ES (X>50%)   ES (95%) MES (95%) tail-  
Depositories -3.3   16.7   -18.6 60.8 *** 70.2 *** 
Others 43.6 ** 44.6 **   19.4 39.1 * 16.8  
Insurances 35.6 ** 69.2 ***     2.4 57.0 *** 63.0 *** 
Broker-Dealers 53.9   72.1 **  24.9 44.8   0.0  
All 28.5 *** 58.4 ***    5.6 56.0 *** 56.8 *** 
 
Also here, we distinguish between rank correlations for the whole cross section of 
institutions as well as for rank correlations per financial industry sector. It is not 
because the bank risk measures nearly all doubled or tripled that the riskiness of 
institutions relative to each other has changed. The table clearly shows that the 
majority of rank correlations are statistically significant and quite high in most 
cases. The expected shortfall measure ES (95%), though, is very unstable over 
time. But those pre-crisis EVT indicators of tail risk and systemic risk that 
produce stable ranks over time exhibit some predictive power towards their crisis 
counterparts and thus still represent useful info for regulators and supervisors. Tail 
risk and systemic risk seem relatively persistent in that the riskiest (safest) 
financial institutions in the pre-crisis period seem to remain the riskiest ones 
(safest ones) once the crisis struck.  
4.4.2. Size as a potential driver of tail risk and systemic risk 
That there is a relation between the size of financial institutions and their systemic 
risk contribution seems to be taken for granted nowadays by governments or 
central banks. According to theory, systemic risk either arises because of “direct” 
channels via interbank market linkages or “indirect” channels such as similar 
portfolio holdings in bank balance sheets. However, bigger banks are not 
necessarily more interconnected with the rest of the financial system nor do they 
necessarily exhibit more diversified portfolio holdings. In the end, however, 
whether the size-systemic risk relation exists or not remains an empirical issue. 
Despite the consensus that seems to exist in the policy arena, the number of 
empirical studies that try to link some proxy of institutional size to systemic risk 
remains limited, see e.g. de Jonghe (2010) or Zhou (2010). The latter studies 
typically find a positive size-systemic risk relation but the relation is often 
unstable across different time periods.  
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Downsizing financial institutions‟ balance sheets is generally considered as one of 
the corner stones of financial reforms nowadays but one seems to forget that 
institutional size almost surely also impacts the diversification properties of 
financial institutions, see e.g. the discussion in Slijkerman et al. (2013). In other 
words, it may well be that although the systemic contribution of banks is 
decreased by shrinking the balance sheet, the banks become less diversified and 
thus more unstable as an individual institution, i.e. higher individual bank risk. 
Whereas the empirical work on the size-systemic risk relation is already pretty 
scant, empirical studies on the size-univariate bank tail risk relation are nearly 
nonexistent. This is somewhat remarkable because the “usual suspects” that are 
expected to trigger systemic instability and tail risk are probably partly 
overlapping, i.e., a joint analysis of tail risk and systemic risk seems a natural way 
to proceed. We apply two types of empirical exercises on the triangle size-tail 
risk-systemic risk. First, we calculate rank correlations between tail risk and 
systemic risk. Secondly, we calculate rank correlations between tail risk and size 
and systemic risk and size. Rank correlations are calculated for different time 
series samples (full sample, pre-crisis and crisis samples) and different cross 
sections (all banks as well as the separate segments of the financial industry that 
we earlier considered). We decided to solely focus on the size variable because it 
is the most widely considered trigger of bank systemic risk.      
Table 4.4     Rank Correlation between tail risk and tail-β 
The table reports Spearman's rank correlations (percentages) between the expected 
shortfall and tail-beta measures. Results are reported for the full sample, pre-crisis, 
and crisis period. Statistically significant rank correlations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
significance level are denoted with *,** and ***, respectively.  
      Full sample        Pre-Crisis Crisis 
                               ES (x>50%) vs. tail-β 
Depositories 41.6 ** -25.8   46.6 ** 
Others 34.8  32.3   -5.2  
Insurances 57.4 *** 11.0   42.9 ** 
B&Ds 16.4  73.0 ** -44.2   
All 41.4 *** -3.7   7.4   
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Figure 4.4   Tail risk (ES (X>50%)) versus extreme systemic risk (tail- ) 
 for full-sample, pre-crisis, crisis 
Panel A: Full sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Pre-crisis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Crisis 
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Rank correlations between individual tail risk and systemic risk are contained in 
Table 4.4 and Figure 4.4. Robust statistically and economically significant 
correlations only seem to exist for the full sample. Thus, we cannot conclude that 
there is a positive relationship between tail risk and systemic risk in a robust 
fashion because they do not seem to be related over the pre-crisis and crisis 
sample.  Next, we correlate the ranks of tail risk and systemic risk with the size 
ranks of the respective institutions. Rank correlations between different size 
proxies, tail risk and systemic risk are contained in Table 4.5. For sake of 
sensitivity analysis, we distinguish four different proxies for a financial 
institution‟s size: total market capitalization, total asset, total equity and total debt 
(all market values). We consider two tail risk proxies and the tail-β systemic risk 
measure. Conform to previous tables we distinguish different time series samples 
(full sample, pre-crisis and crisis outcomes) and different cross sections (results 
averaged across all institutions or across separate financial industry segments). 
Whereas size and tail risk seem rather independently evolving from each other 
(very few rank correlations are statistically significant), the size-systemic risk 
relationship appears to be significant in a majority of cases. However, notice that 
the significance is strongest for the full sample and the pre-crisis sample whereas 
the relation seems severely weakened over the crisis sample. The total asset size 
proxy seems most strongly correlated with systemic risk. Our results generally 
confirm earlier findings on the size-systemic risk relationship. 
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4.5. Conclusions 
The financial sector maintains a central role in an economy to finance investment 
and growth in the real sector, to create money and transmit monetary policy, but 
also because of its involvement in the multilateral payment system. Thus, long-
term financial stability, both for individual financial institutions (tail risk) as well 
as for the system as a whole (systemic risk) is of utmost importance. In this study, 
we borrow techniques from statistical extreme value analysis to estimate a 
downside risk measure (per individual institution) and a system-wide risk measure 
(systemic risk). Both are market-based indicators: they use the loss tails of the 
market value of equity capital as an input. The downside risk is measured using an 
extreme tail quantile estimator whereas the systemic risk is measured by the so-
called co-crash probability of an individual bank stock conditional on a banking 
market index, i.e., a so-called tail-β. Tail-β‟s are estimated by the so-called 
Ledford and Tawn approach and by imposing the tail dependence restriction. The 
latter implies that asymptotic co-crash probability values always stay bounded 
away from zero. 
We compare tail risk and systemic risk outcomes across four different industry 
groups containing 91 financial institutions as in Acharya et al. (2011) and 
Brownlees and Engle (2012): Depositors, Insurances, Brokers & Dealers, and 
Others. This enables one to make cross-industry tail risk and systemic risk 
comparisons which constitutes the main objective of the paper. First, we find that 
different groups of financial institutions exhibit different levels of tail risk as well 
as systemic risk. Insurance companies exhibit the highest equity tail risk. Second, 
and somewhat surprising, deposit banks (and not broker-dealers) seem to be most 
strongly exposed to adverse macro shocks. Third, both tail risk and systemic risk 
have increased over the crisis which does not come as a surprise. However, the 
relative ranking of the financial institutions‟ riskiness is not changing dramatically 
over time: extreme systematic risk seems to exhibit some predictability towards 
future distress as the rank correlations between pre-crisis and crisis tail-β‟s are 
found to be relatively high. Finally, institutional size proxies are not strongly 
correlated with tail risk (no diversification effect for larger institutions); but size 
seems correlated with our systemic risk measure. However, the size and related 
ranking results vary considerably across industries and subsamples. 
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5.1. Introduction 
Crisis episodes like the dotcom bubble burst, the 2007-2009 banking crisis or the 
euro area sovereign debt crisis are a reminder to academics, institutional investors 
and policy makers that “co-crash” linkages in financial markets or, alternatively, 
asset substitution phenomena like “flight-to-quality” or “flight-to-liquidity” exist 
and can be severe especially during periods of market stress. The severity of 
financial crises and crisis spillovers also potentially determines how severe the 
impact may be on real economic activity. Alternatively, flight-to-quality or flight-
to-liquidity spillovers may also enhance overall financial stability or increase the 
potential for diversifying the portfolio tail risk of large institutional investors like 
pension funds.  
The vast majority of empirical studies on financial crises and crisis spillovers 
implemented some form of correlation analysis, see e.g. King and Wadwhani 
(1990); Lin et al. (1994); Susmel and Engle (1994), Bae et al. (2003), Manganelli 
et al. (2004), Cappiello et al. (2005) or more recently Bekaert et al. (2009, 2010, 
2012) and White et al. (2013). Methodologies include, inter alia, multivariate 
versions of factor models, DCC-GARCH specifications, limited dependent 
variable models (multinomial probit and logit), multivariate quantile regressions 
etc. These articles typically study whether financial markets are more strongly co-
moving during periods of market turbulence compared to periods of low market 
volatility and also question the direction of international spillovers. An 
increasingly important subset of this “market linkages” literature focuses on 
whether financial crises are “contagious” (see Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Bae et 
al. (2003); Chan-Lau et al. (2004); Bekaert et al. (2005)). Hartmann et al. (2006) 
argue that the financial contagion concept is far from unambiguously defined and 
discuss the most frequent interpretations that co-exist nowadays. Brownlees and 
Engle (2012), Acharya et al. (2010) and Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) measure 
bank linkages between the top US financial institutions by introducing alternative 
indicators of systemic risk whose estimation is based on some form of covariance 
analysis.   
The main objection against the (bulk of the) market linkages literature is twofold 
in that it (i) is very correlation-oriented and (ii) often does not capture true crisis 
                                                          
36  This chapter is based on „Extreme Risks and the Business Cycle‟ co-authored with Stefan 
Straetmans. 
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episodes in the “systemic” sense of the word (i.e. very low frequency events) 
when focusing on high volatility regimes. Correlations can actually be very 
misleading indicators of dependence during crisis episodes. 
For example, Boyer et al. (1999) and Ang and Chen (2002) show for the bivariate 
normal distribution that the correlation varies considerably when conditioned on 
subsets of the overall distributional support. The conditional correlation eventually 
goes to zero when truncated on the tail area. This implies that correlations in 
conjunction with the normality assumption to assess, say, indicators of systemic 
risk, almost certainly result in severe underestimation of the latter. Moreover, 
truncated correlations differ across different classes of multivariate distributions; 
also, correlations can only capture linear dependence whereas one might suspect 
crisis spillovers to be fundamentally nonlinear phenomena.
37
 For a more in-depth 
treatment of the pitfalls of correlation analysis, see e.g. Embrechts et al. (1999). 
Another problem with existing comovement approaches is that it is questionable 
whether they truly capture the low-incidence character of crises and crisis 
comovements. For example, co-quantile regressions typically focus on the 5% or 
1% tail area which reflect crisis events expected to happen once in 20 days and 
once in 100 days, respectively. These events can hardly be considered “extreme” 
in the sense of large adverse shocks triggering companies into overnight 
insolvency. The latter types of extreme low-incidence events are the ones we are 
interested in.  
Mainly because of the above concerns regarding the applicability of covariance 
analysis during periods of high market volatility, a growing body of literature 
applies extreme value analysis (EVT).
38
 Loosely speaking, EVT enables one to 
estimate marginal and joint probabilities of infrequent tail events like crises 
without the need to resort to a parametric probability law for the returns. As will 
be discussed in the estimation section of this paper, some mild conditions on the 
tail behavior of the returns suffice for the purpose of estimation and statistical 
inference. Also, extreme value analysis studies the tail behavior of the 
unconditional distribution of financial returns which constitutes a second 
                                                          
37
 The latter pitfall can nevertheless be partly remedied by integrating elements of non-linear time 
series analysis (e.g. jump diffusions) in multivariate comovement models based on GARCH or 
stochastic volatility frameworks. 
38
 In univariate and bivariate settings EVT has been previously implemented to assess the severity of 
extreme market (co-) movements. For example, Koedijk et al. (1990, 1992) and Hols and de Vries 
(1991) study the (heavy) tails of foreign exchange rate returns. Jansen and de Vries (1991) and Longin 
(1996) analyze stock market booms and busts whereas de Haan et al. (1994) consider extreme up- and 
downturns in bond markets. Bivariate EVT has been employed to measure extreme stock market 
spillovers in either a parametric fashion (Longin and Solnik (2001)) or a semi-parametric way (see 
Straetmans, 2000; Poon et al., 2004). Hartmann et al. (2003, 2004) address various forms of currency 
and stock-bond spillovers. Finally, Hartmann et al. (2006), de Jonghe (2010), Zhou (2010) and 
Straetmans and Chaudhry (2013) apply EVT techniques to assess tail risk and systemic risk of financial 
institutions. 
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methodological difference with the bulk of the comovement literature traditionally 
focusing on the conditional distribution of returns (all kinds of conditional 
GARCH, stochastic volatility, co-quantile regressions etc.).
39
  
In this paper we take an intermediate position between these two long-standing 
traditions of either modeling the multivariate distribution in a conditional fashion 
(time dependent and typically with a short-term focus) or in an unconditional way 
(time independent and typically with a long-term focus). We develop the idea that 
the unconditional tail of financial return distributions (despite being stationary) 
may exhibit time dependent “regimes” of some kind. More specifically, we 
assume that the parameters governing the univariate (Pareto-type) tail decline and 
multivariate (tail dependence structure or tail copula) tail behavior can change 
through time due to e.g. shifts in monetary or fiscal policy regimes, financial 
liberalization (e.g. liberalization of capital controls, prudential FX measures, 
exchange rate regimes etc.) or changes in certain macro-economic variables to 
name only a few possible causes.  
In the aftermath of Hamilton‟s (1990) regime-switching paper, an “academic 
industry” developed on regime switching behavior in financial markets, see e.g. 
Engel and Hamilton (1990), Hamilton and Susmel (1994), Bekaert and Harvey 
(1995), Gray (1996), Ang and Bekaert (2002), Baele (2005), Guidolin and 
Timmermann (2008) or Ang and Timmermann (2011). In contrast, only a small 
number of papers tested for structural breaks in the unconditional tail behaviour of 
financial returns. The presence of structural breaks in univariate tail behavior (i.e. 
the tail index) has been investigated for different asset classes: exchange rate 
returns (Koedijk et al. (1990, 1992)), Bund Futures returns (Werner and Upper 
(2002)) and stock markets (Jansen and de Vries (1991), Pagan and Schwert 
(1990), Quintos et al. (2001), Galbraith and Zernov (2004) and Straetmans et al. 
(2008)). Straetmans and Candelon (2013) investigate the tail index constancy 
hypothesis for a variety of financial assets and summarize the univariate 
breakpoint literature. The general picture that emerges from this univariate EVT 
literature is that the tail index is remarkably stable over time: only emerging 
currency returns seem to exhibit jumps in the tail index, most probably due to 
                                                          
39 Conditional models enable one to identify dynamic (time varying) risk measures that are widely used 
by risk managers and investors with short time horizons for sake of short-term volatility forecasting 
and portfolio rebalancing. However, for long-term investors, financial regulators and supervisors that 
care about e.g. assessing the likelihood of financial instability, the more relevant exercise to undertake 
seems the assessment of extreme risks and worst cases scenarios based on the unconditional tail of 
portfolio returns. The unconditional return distribution will typically render more conservative 
outcomes than dynamic risk measures based on the conditional return distribution. Although 
conservativeness in risk assessment may indeed be desirable from a regulatory or supervisory point of 
view39, it may be less desirable for banks or portfolio investors themselves; financial institutions do not 
want to see their profitability squeezed too much and risk-averse portfolio investors may well care 
about tail risk events but typically also care about realizing some decent return. 
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changes in exchange rate regimes. As for temporal changes in the multivariate tail 
dependence structure, the number of studies is even more limited. Straetmans 
(1998) found only weak evidence for structural breaks in extreme linkages 
between international stock markets; on the other hand, the same author 
established that extreme spillovers between European currencies expressed against 
the Dmark numeraire were seriously dampened due to the introduction of the 
European Monetary System (EMS). More recently, Straetmans et al. (2008) 
established a statistically significant “9/11 effect” in conditional co-crash 
probabilities between US sectoral indices and a market index. Finally, using 
alternative market-based (extreme value) indicators of systemic risk, Hartmann et 
al. (2006) and Straetmans and Chaudhry (2013) show that systemic risk has 
increased at both sides of the Atlantic. 
The main contribution of this paper is to build further on this breakpoint literature 
by questioning the existence of regimes in the tail behavior of financial asset 
returns. More specifically, we investigate whether the tail behavior of asset returns 
(either single asset tail fatness or cross-asset strength of tail dependence) changes 
with the business cycle.  Traditional applications of EVT do not take economic 
cycles into account and estimate tail features using as much return data as 
possible, i.e. the “full” sample.  However, it seems natural to assume that the 
propensity towards financial crises or crisis spillovers is nonconstant over time 
and e.g. depends on the phase of the business cycle. If that is the case, full sample 
measures for e.g. tail-VaR or crisis spillover indicators will be biased estimates of 
the true state (recession-based or expansion-based estimates). If tail behavior 
varies with the business cycle, unbiased estimation of the tail characteristics 
requires splitting up the full sample into a “recession” and an “expansion” 
sample.
40
 First, we consider regime-dependent proxies of tail risk for different 
financial asset classes (stock indices, bond indices, bank stocks, exchange rates 
and commodities). Next, we calculate  market-based systemic risk measures 
conditioned on recessions and expansions using the stock prices of US financial 
institutions. Third, we compare the strength of co-crashes vs. flight-to-quality 
between stock and sovereign bond markets across recessions and expansions. 
Finally, we investigate to what extent business cycle phases matter for the 
potential of portfolio risk diversification. To that aim we estimate and minimize 
both portfolio variances and tail risks across the business cycle for simple two-
stock portfolios selected from the Dow Jones index.        
Anticipating our results, we find that extreme downside risk is significantly more 
severe for the recession sample as compared to the expansion sample. Second, this 
                                                          
40
 Notice, however, this also decreases estimation accuracy because recession and expansion samples 
are smaller than the full sample, i.e. the so-called bias-variance trade off in EVT estimation when 
varying the sample size.   
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is also present in tail risk and systemic risk indicators of selected US financial 
institutions. Third, previous EVT papers like e.g. Hartmann et al. (2004) 
established that stock-bond co-crashes and flight-to-quality phenomena are 
approximately equally likely (but using weekly data from 1987-1999). In contrast, 
our results suggest that stock-bond co-crashes are less likely than flight-to-quality 
during times of market stress and that this asymmetry is largest during recessions. 
More specifically, flight-to-quality from stocks into bonds happens nearly twice as 
often as compared to stock-bond co-crashes during recessions; but the two 
likelihoods are much closer to each other for the expansion sample and the full 
sample. Finally, we establish that portfolio risk (both central risk measures like 
variance as well as tail risk) is much harder to diversify during recessions as 
compared to expansions, i.e., a diversification meltdown.  The minimum tail risk 
portfolios are also substantially different across recessions and expansions which 
further confirms the rather different nature of the tail dependence structure during 
different phases of the business cycle.   
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes theory on extreme value 
analysis and introduces regimes in the unconditional tails. Regimes are introduced 
by considering mixture models of univariate and multivariate distributional tails. 
Section 5.3 presents semi-parametric estimation procedures that are common in 
statistical EVT and that can be applied on recession-based and expansion-based 
subsamples. Section 5.4 contains empirical results. Conclusions are summarized in 
the final section 5.5.       
5.2. Extreme linkages: probability theory and regime dependence  
We first introduce our EVT-based measures of tail risk and tail co-movement (the 
so-called tail-β) based on the unconditional distribution, i.e., without considering 
regime dependence.  The former is identified using a Pareto-type tail decline 
whereas the latter is expressed in terms of the so-called tail copula or stable tail 
dependence function (5.2.1). Next, we show how regime dependence of our tail 
risk and tail comovement measures can be easily introduced by means of 
distributional mixtures of univariate and bivariate tail models (5.2.2).  
 5.2.1. Probability theory 
Since Mandelbrot (1963), the stylized fact of fat tailed financial returns seems 
generally accepted within the financial economics profession. We employ it as an 
identification scheme for calculating tail likelihoods. Loosely speaking, it implies 
that the exceedance probability for a given exceedance level (or quantile) 
approximately evolves according to a power law of the quantile (i.e. polynomial 
tail decay).  Assume that we are interested in the distributional tail of financial 
return losses. Return losses will be denoted furtheron by a positive random 
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variable X which implies we focus on the right tail.
41
 The characterizing property 
for distributions with a power-type tail decay is the so-called regular variation at 
infinity property: 
                 
 *    +
 *   +
                             (5.1) 
From this condition it follows that distributions, like e.g. the Student-t, the class of 
symmetric stable distributions or the GARCH class have bounded moments up to 
α, where α is known as the “tail index”. In contrast, distributions with 
exponentially decaying tails or with finite endpoints have all moments finite 
(bounded). Another way of characterizing the class of regularly varying functions 
is by factorizing them into a power law part     and a slowly varying function 
part L(x):   
         *   +   ( )                                (5.2) 
with x large and where L(x) is a slowly varying function, i.e.,  
       
 (  )
 ( )
      . Estimation of the exceedance probability (5.2) for given 
quantile x (or, alternatively, of x for given exceedance probability p) will be 
discussed in the next section but basically amounts to estimating α and the linear 
(first order) part of L(x).   
So far the assumed power-type tail identification for sharp losses in financial 
returns. We now turn to the characterization of a tail dependence measure for pairs 
of extreme returns. Suppose one would like to know the likelihood that the market 
value of a bank‟s equity or, more generally, a financial asset or market index drops 
sharply if the same happens for another bank, asset or market. Alternatively, the 
interest may lie in identifying the joint likelihood of a crashing asset and a 
booming asset as reflecting substitution effects during times of market stress 
(flight-to-quality from risky stocks into safe heavens wit lower perceived riskiness 
like e.g. bonds or gold). Let x and y be the quantiles (or “crisis barriers”) above 
which we speak of a financial crisis or crash (in case of a large loss) or, 
alternatively, a boom (in case of an exceptional gain). From elementary 
probability theory (starting from the standard definition of conditional probability) 
we know that 
      *   |   +  
 *       +
* (   +
 
 *   +   *   +   *          +
 *   +
 
 
 
(5.3) 
                         with  *          +     *       +  
                                                          
41
 This corresponds with the negative of the (log) return series calculated on the original price series of 
the financial asset.  
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The question arises how the conditional tail probability in (5.3) should be 
estimated.     Upon assuming e.g. multivariate normality, estimating the first and 
second moments is sufficient to calculate the conditional probability (5.3). 
However, multivariate normality and the associated correlation structure are 
unsuited to assess extreme linkages between asset markets, mainly because the 
conditional probability      vanishes to zero regardless the covariance levels in 
the distributional centre. In other words, if extremal spillover potential is present 
in the data, it cannot be captured by the multivariate normal distribution. Imposing 
parametric models with tail dependent marginal distributions like e.g. the logistic 
dependence model (Ledford and Tawn (1996); Longin and Solnik (2001); Poon et 
al. (2004)) constitutes an alternative for multivariate normality because the logistic 
tail dependence allows for nonzero values of      beyond large crisis barriers x 
and y. However, within a parametric framework, one never knows what is the 
“true” underlying model and we therefore propose a semi-parametric estimation 
procedure. 
We aim to estimate      when the conditioning quantiles x and y become very 
large. This amounts to inverting the marginal distribution functions for X and Y in 
order to work out the asymptotic equivalent of our linkage measure (5.3) in terms 
of the (small) probabilities of having very extreme returns. In order to do this, we 
first introduce the upper quantile functions for the return losses X and Y  as  
  (  )  (    )
  (  ) 
  (  )  (    )
  (  ), 
for some small but positive values u and v and a scaling parameter t. Without loss 
of generality, we choose u,v and t such that tu and tv are smaller than one and thus 
interpretable as excess probabilities. Moreover set   (  )    and   (  )    in 
correspondance with the original crash levels in (5.3).  
Upon substituting the above quantile functions into (5.3), one obtains the 
following asymptotic equivalent for (5.3): 
   
   
    
 
   
   
   , *    (  )+   *    (  )+   *    (  )        (  )+-
   
   
    *    (  )+
   
 
     (   )
 
 
   (5.4)          
 
When the auxiliary variable t converges to 0 the excess probabilities tu and tv also 
tend to zero, and hence the corresponding quantiles    and    grow large. As for 
the limit function
 
l(u,v), it is defined as 
                        (   )         
   *    (  )        (  )+                  (5.5)   
                    
EXTREME RISKS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
120 
 
This is the so-called Stable Tail Dependence Function (STDF) and was introduced 
by Huang (1992). This limit function can also be interpreted as a tail version of the 
statistical copula between X and Y. Notice that the copula function that 
corresponds with a given joint distribution F(x,y) boils down to: 
 (   )   (  
  ( )   
  ( ))          
where   
  ( ) represent the general inverse functions of the marginal c.d.f. of X, Y 
(i=1,2). In other words, the copula is the joint distribution function with 
uniformized marginals which implies that the function solely reflects cross 
sectional dependence information about the random pair
 
(X,Y). Marginal 
information is filtered away by the marginal transforms. The STDF can now 
alternatively be defined as a tail version of the copula function, i.e., a “tail” 
copula: 
 (   )     
   
   ,   (         )- 
see Huang (1992) for further discussion on this relation.  
   Multivariate extreme value theory deals with existence conditions, properties 
and estimators for this function, see Huang (1992) or De Haan and De Ronde 
(1998). More specifically, one can show that the STDF is one-to-one with the 
bivariate extreme value distribution of the joint extremes of X and Y. In contrast to 
univariate extreme value theory, however, there is no generally applicable 
parametric limit law for the joint extremes. This provides an additional argument 
to opt for a semi-parametric estimation approach for tail dependence structures. 
The curvature of l(u,v) completely determines the tail dependence structure 
between X and Y. Basic properties of l(u,v) are its linear homogeneity, i.e., 
 (     )    (   ) and the inequality    (   )   (   )       
Equality holds on the left hand side if X and Y are completely dependent in the tail 
area, while equality on the right hand side obtains if X and Y are independent in 
the tail area. Note that independence means that for all Q₁ and Q₂ 
 *         +   *    + *    + 
while tail independence only requires this factorization to hold asymptotically (i.e. 
for Q₁ and Q₂ growing large). Thus it may well be that non-extreme return pairs 
are dependent although their extremes are asymptotically independent, e.g. the 
earlier example of the bivariate normal distribution with tail nonzero central 
correlation.  
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The STDF enables one to express joint exceedance probabilities as a function of 
marginal exceedance probabilities. In order to show this, let,
 
    *   +    
 *   +            *       +. Exploiting the homogeneity property 
of l(.,.) one can now easily show that the bivariate excess probability     and the 
marginal probabilities    and    are related via the STDF. For sufficiently small 
t>0, it approximately holds that  
 (   )      *    (  )        (  )+.                       (5.6) 
We can choose       and       such that  (   )   ( 
      
    ). STDF‟s 
linear homogeneity now implies that
 
  (       
    )   (     ) . Hence, for 
small values of     and     it approximately holds that  
 (     )     . 
In other words, the joint probability     only depends on the marginal 
probabilities    and      and the tail dependence structure reflected by the 
curvature of l(.,.). The linkage measure can thus be expressed as 
        
       (    )
  
.                                (5.7) 
Referring to expressions (5.3) and (5.4) as a “tail dependence” measure is 
somewhat misleading because it both reflects information about the tail 
dependence structure as well as the marginal inequality, i.e.,       . In financial 
risk management, however, it is common to calculate downside risk for common 
p-values of, say, 5% or 1%.  Conditioning on a common p-value has the advantage 
that it makes downside risk calculations - as reflected by the quantile or VaR level 
- comparable across risky positions which is not the case with unrestricted    and 
  . Moreover, by setting             conditional probability in (5.7) solely 
reflects information on the tail dependence structure (STDF) because one controls 
for marginal inequalities; thus it becomes a “pure” tail dependence measure:  
          
    (  )
 
     (   )                        (5.8) 
The marginal-free expression in (5.8) holds due to the approximate homogeneity 
of l(.,.) which implies that the marginal probability can be skipped from the 
numerator and denominator of (5.8). If both returns are completely dependent in 
the tails, i.e. l(1,1)=max(1,1)=1, then        and the pairs of assets, banks etc. 
co-crash with certainty. But without extreme co-movements in the two markets, 
       since  (   )    (the case of full tail independence). If the second 
(conditioning) asset Y represents a nondiversifiable risk factor like e.g. a stock 
market index one can call conditional  probabilities like (5.3) or (5.8) “tail-βs”, see 
e.g. Straetmans (2008).      
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5.2.2. Mixtures of tail models  
 In line with the traditional assumptions of statistical extreme value analysis, the 
unconditional measures of tail risk and tail comovement introduced in the previous 
subsection are based on stationary unconditional return distributions. Loosely 
speaking, stationarity in this context implies that the parameters governing the 
univariate and multivariate tail behavior are constant in the long-term. However, 
this does not exclude short-term tail parameter variation by means of e.g. regime 
dependence. Arguably the simplest way to introduce regime dependence in our tail 
risk and tail comovement measures is by means of distributional mixture models. 
The unconditional distributions of these mixture models still exhibit stationarity 
and thus constancy of the tail parameters; but the short-term parameters – and thus 
risk indicators – are allowed to change between regimes for a distributional 
mixture.  
Starting with univariate tail mixtures, assume that the (long-term unconditional) 
univariate marginal distribution of the random variable X is governed by n 
regimes, i.e., 
 *   +   ( )  ∑     ( ) 
 
     
where    is the probability that regime i occurs with corresponding c.d.f.   ( ). 
Obviously ∑   
 
     . It automatically follows that the mixture also holds for the 
corresponding survivor functions, i.e.,  
      *   +     ( )  ∑   (    ( ))
 
   .                  (5.9) 
Upon assuming that the regime dependent tail probabilities     ( )  in (5.9) 
exhibit a power-type tail decay as described in (5.2), eq. (5.9) specializes to a 
mixture of regularly varying functions:  
                  *   +  ∑      ( ) 
    
                               (5.10) 
From (5.10) it becomes clear that we allow for regime dependence in both the tail 
index and the slowly varying part L(.) determining the tail probabilities. It is 
straightforward to show that the regular variation property (5.1) also applies to the 
mixture of regularly varying functions in (5.10). In order to illustrate this, we 
assume (without loss of generality) n=2 regimes and      . The mixture tail 
(5.10) can be factorized as:  
 *   +   ( )    , 
with  ( )     ( ) 
      (   )  ( ) . Showing that L(x) is also slowly 
varying is straightforward, i.e.,       
 (  )
 ( )
       . Thus, the fattest of the 
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mixture tail models dominates (i.e., the tail index of the mixture equals      ) 
and thus determines the tail decay of the unconditional (long-term) distribution. 
It is equally straightforward to introduce mixtures into the tail dependence 
structure of asset return pairs. Analogous to the univariate case in (5.9), the joint 
survivor function is a mixture of survivor functions across different regimes. 
Consequently, the mixture automatically also holds for the corresponding stable 
tail dependence functions, i.e.  
 ( )  ∑     ( )
 
   , 
with ∑     
 
   , u reflects a vector of uniform variables and where    stands for 
multivariate generalizations of the STDF in (5.5).  
For sake of convenience, we limit ourselves to studying the regime dependence in 
bivariate tail dependence measures like the conditional co-crash probability in 
(5.3). Moreover, as in the univariate case we only assume the existence of n=2 
regimes but all concepts are readily generalizable to multiple regimes and multiple 
assets. We earlier argued that the conditional probability (5.3) can be readily 
expressed in terms of the stable tail dependence function, see (5.4). Suppose now 
that the bivariate stable tail dependence structure exhibits two regimes, i.e.  
 (   )     (   )  (   )  (   ) 
This mixture automatically implies a mixture in the conditional probability (5.8) 
via the following chain of equalities:  
        (   ) 
             (   (   )  (   )  (   )) 
            ((    (   ))  (   )(    (   )) 
                         
  (   )    
 .            (5.11) 
 
5.3. Estimation and hypothesis testing   
Univariate tail index and extreme quantile estimation (reflecting downside risk) as 
well as an estimation procedure for the STDF are presented in Subsection 5.3.1. In 
Subsection 5.3.2 we introduce equality tests in order to test the equality of tail 
indices, tail quantiles and conditional probabilities across regimes. Rejecting the 
null of equal values across regimes provides further support for our approach to 
split up the full sample into economically meaningful subsamples. The proposed 
estimation and testing approaches are semi-parametric in nature and mostly follow 
Hartmann et al. (2004) or Straetmans et al. (2008), the only difference being that 
we condition EVT-based measures on regime-dependent subsamples instead of the 
full sample.   
EXTREME RISKS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
124 
 
5.3.1. Semi-parametric estimation procedures  
We earlier assumed that the tails of financial returns are fat tailed, i.e. conditions 
(5.1)-(5.2), implying that tail likelihoods exhibit a power-type tail decay. The 
semi-parametric tail probability estimator from de Haan et al. (1994) is basically a 
first-order linear approximation of (5.2):  
 *   +   ̂  
 
 
(     )
                       (5.12) 
where the “tail cut-off point”       is the  (n-m)-th  ascending order statistic (or 
loosely speaking the m-th smallest return) from a sample of size n. The constant 
 
 
(     )
  can be seen as the linear part of the slowly varying function in (5.2). 
For values        , the estimator basically extends the empirical distribution 
further into the tail. The tail quantile x is usually referred to as the “Value-at-Risk” 
(VaR). In the empirical application, we will evaluate the regime dependence of the 
quantile or VaR levels for given p-values because it is the VaR for a given p-value 
that is so widely assessed as downside risk measure in modern-day risk 
management, not the exceedance probability for a given VaR. The quantile 
estimator is simply obtained by inverting the tail likelihood estimator (5.12):   
 ̂       (
 
  
)
 
                             (5.13) 
Estimators (5.12)-(5.13) still require an estimator for the tail index α. We estimate 
the tail index by means of the popular Hill (1975) estimator: 
   ̂  
 
 
∑    (
     
     
)                            (5.14) 
where m has the same value and interpretation as in (5.12). Further details are 
provided in Jansen and De Vries (1991) and the recent monograph by Embrechts 
et al. (1997). 
The estimation of the bivariate excess probability     either requires adopting a 
specific functional form for the STDF, like e.g. in Poon et al. (2004), or 
proceeding semi-parametrically. Since there does not exist a unique 
parametrization for the STDF, we like to pursue a semi-parametric estimation 
method based on the highest order statistics, see Huang (1992). An intuitive 
derivation of this estimator proceeds as follows. We start by setting t=k/n>0  in 
(5.6) where n equals the sample size and       represents a large real number 
such that  ( )     and  ( )    . The choice of k is discussed furtheron. 
Since the marginal probability estimates are available from the univariate step, we 
can also replace (u,v)  in (5.6) by ( ̂   ̂ ): 
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 ̂( ̂   ̂ )        
 
 
 {    .
  ̂ 
 
/        .
  ̂ 
 
/}         (5.15) 
In order to turn this expression into a proper estimator, we start by replacing P,    
and    by their empirical counterparts such that  
           ̂ ( ̂   ̂ )  
 
 
 
 
∑  *      ,  ̂ - 
 
              ,  ̂ - +     (5.16) 
where 1{.} denotes the indicator function and where [x] is the integer 
satisfying   , -     . The quantiles    and    have been replaced by order 
statistics. So, loosely speaking the estimator of l(.,.) boils down to counting the 
instances at which one or both of the markets experience an extreme return within 
a given sample period.  
However, the empirical probability measure (5.16) is still not operational at this 
stage because the marginal probability arguments of the STDF are typically 
smaller than the inverse of the sample size n which implies there are no 
exceedances to estimate the empirical measure.
42
 However, one can exploit the 
approximate linear homogeneity property of the STDF estimator, i.e.,  ̂( ̂   ̂ )  
    ̂(  ̂    ̂ ) and choose     such as to scale up the marginal probabilities in 
(5.15) and to obtain excess observations. In the remainder of the article, we 
assume that       and we choose the scaling factor    
  . The estimator 
 ̂(   ) that is required in (5.8) boils down to:  
 ̂(   )  
 ̂(   )
 
 
 
  
∑  *      ,  -           ,  - +
 
   
 
 
 
∑  *                    +
 
   
  
 
 
 
(5.17) 
This estimator evaluates l(.,.) inside the tail of the joint empirical distribution. 
Notice that this counting procedure of co-exceedances is also easily applicable in 
higher dimensions. A more extensive discussion on this derivation is provided in 
Huang (1992) or Straetmans (1998).  
An estimator for the conditional probability of simultaneous crashes      now 
easily follows by combining (5.8) and (5.17):  
     ̂      ̂(   )    
 
 
∑  *                    +
 
         (5.18) 
Conditional on the proper choice of the nuisance parameters m and k, the 
estimators of the Hill statistic and the stable tail dependence function (STDF) are 
asymptotically normally distributed. Goldie and Smith (1987) and Huang (1992) 
show that one can select m and k such as to minimize the respective asymptotic 
                                                          
42
 The order statistics that are supposed to estimate the quantiles   and    in that case correspond with 
the historical sample boundaries     and    , respectively. 
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mean-squared errors (AMSE). In small samples best practice is to plot the 
estimators as a function of the threshold, i.e.  ̂   ̂( )      ̂    ̂  ( ) and to 
select m and k in the region over which the estimators tend to be constant. More 
advanced algorithms for selecting m based on minimizing a sample equivalent of 
the AMSE also exist, see e.g. Beirlant et al. (1999). We use both Hill plots and the 
Beirlant algorithm in order to choose m and k.  
5.3.2. Hypothesis testing 
We want to perform equality tests for estimates of the tail index, the tail quantile 
and the co-crash probability (or, alternatively, the STDF), either for single asset 
tails across business cycle regimes (unequal sample sizes) or across asset tails 
within a given regime (equal sample sizes). Asymptotic normality of the Hill 
statistic, the tail quantile estimator and the STDF has been established by Haeusler 
and Teugels (1985), de Haan et al. (1994) and Huang (1992), respectively.
43
 Let 
est stand for an estimate of either of these three magnitudes. A simple T-test of the 
equality of est across regimes (or across asset tail within a given regime) boils 
down to:  
      
         
√  (    )  
 (    )
,                              (5.19) 
which is asymptotically normal in sufficiently large samples.
44
 The denominator 
still requires the calculation of asymptotic variances. The estimable expressions 
for the asymptotic variance of the Hill statistic, the quantile estimator and the 
STDF directly follow from the asymptotic normality derivations for these 
estimators.  
5.4. Empirical results 
We first provide a description of our data sources in 5.4.1. Estimates of extreme 
downside risk (tail risk) for a variety of financial asset classes are discussed in 
5.4.2.  In 5.4.3 we report estimates of systemic risk for a few representative US 
banks. In 5.4.4 we compare extreme linkages between stocks and bonds within G-
5 countries. More specifically, we compare stock-bond co-crash likelihoods with 
flight-to-quality likelihoods from stocks into bonds. Finally, in section 5.4.5, we 
minimize the portfolio tail risk for a few representative stock pairs selected from 
the Dow Jones Index. Every EVT application distinguishes between full sample, 
recession-based and expansion-based estimates in order to assess whether the 
                                                          
43
 As for MES estimates, the Central Limit Theorem guarantees asymptotic normality because MES is 
a sample average.  
44 For sake of convenience, we assume that the covariance term between est1 and est2 equals zero 
which is an obvious simplification.  
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differences in tail behaviour across business cycle regimes are statistically and 
economically significant.    
5.4.1. Data description   
All considered financial data are extracted from Thomson Datastream. The 
financial time series consist of 7,282 daily prices for stocks, bonds, US$ nominal 
bilateral exchange rates, gold, silver and oil.  The sample runs from 1 February 
1985 until 31 December 2012. We consider 16 (dividend-adjusted) stock price 
series of representative US banks. Next to individual stock prices, we also 
downloaded G-5 (US, UK, France, Germany and Japan) stock indices and 
corresponding G-5 long-term (10 year maturity) government bond indices. In 
order to estimate systemic risk for our set of representative US banks, we 
condition tail-β‟s on the Datastream US bank index. We express stock and bond 
prices in local currency. Prices of oil (Brent Crude), gold and silver are in US$ per 
barrel or per troy ounce, respectively. Financial returns are expressed as log price 
differences between daily closes.
45
 
To date US business cycles, we use the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER) peaks and troughs in economic activity to construct a binary variable that 
either reflects a recession phase or an expansion phase. The turning point dates 
published by the NBER represent a consensus chronology of the U.S. business 
cycle. As for France, Germany, Japan and the UK, business cycle data were 
downloaded from the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI).
46
 Comparable 
with what the NBER publishes on US business cycles, the ECRI reports binary (0-
1) business cycle information without specifying either the raw data used or the 
dating algorithm for determining business cycle peaks and troughs. Both NBER 
and ECRI business cycle dummies are at the monthly frequency.  
5.4.2.  Extreme downside risk for different asset classes and the business cycle 
Straetmans and Candelon (2013) recently studied the temporal stability in the tail 
index and accompanying quantile or “tail-VaR” for a wide variety of financial 
asset classes and found that structural breaks in univariate tail risk measures are 
relatively rare (except for emerging currency returns). This section‟s univariate 
analysis can be interpreted as an extension of this previous study because we 
consider a more general recession-based and expansion-based subsample 
partitioning instead of subsamples based on a single temporal breakpoint.  
                                                          
45 We refer to G-5 stock and bond indices in the tables and the text using the following abbreviations: 
France (FR), Germany (GE), United Kingdom (UK), United States (US), Japan (JP). We consider total 
return indices (=dividend-adjusted and coupon-adjusted) for G-5 stock indices and 10-year benchmark 
government bonds.  
46  The NBER and ECRI business cycle data are available at http://www.nber.org and  
http://www.businesscycle.com 
EXTREME RISKS AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
128 
 
Table 5.1 contains full sample, recession-based and expansion-based estimation 
and testing results for the tail index  and the accompanying quantile or downside 
(tail) risk  (conditioned on a p-value of 0.1%) and for a wide variety of asset 
classes. The “testing results” panel reports the equality test of the null hypothesis 
of equal recession-based and expansion-based tail indices and tail quantiles, 
respectively. Given that Straetmans and Candelon (2013) already showed that 
unconditional (long-term) asset tail risk may considerably differ across asset 
classes, we also consider a relatively large cross section of different asset types. 
More specifically, we distinguish between 5 different asset classes: US bank 
stocks (Panel A), G-5 stock indices (Panel B), G-5 bond indices (Panel C), US$ 
exchange rates (Panel D), and commodities (Panel E). The downside risk for 
banks reflects the downside risk in the market value of bank equity capital. For 
sake of completeness, we also report full sample and subsample average returns 
and volatilities.  
The table reveals that recession-based estimates of the standard deviation, the tail 
index and the corresponding tail quantile nearly all exceed their expansion-based 
counterparts for basically all considered assets. It may not come as a surprise that 
the asymmetry in point estimates is most pronounced for bank stocks (panel A). 
For some banks the differences in tail properties across the business cycle is 
staggering. Half of the considered banks exhibit a tail index below 2 during 
recessions whereas none exhibits this property in the expansion phase. Notice this 
moment violation (   ) implies that in recession phases, financial return 
variances are no longer properly defined (the distributional second moment is not 
finite and thus does not exist).  The huge discrepancy in the tail index translates 
into huge differences in downside risk across the business cycle. For example, 
Bank of America‟s 0.1% Value-at-Risk equals a skyrocketing 76% during 
recessions but drops down to 12% during expansions. Most other banks with 
comparable discrepancies in the tail index also show huge discrepancies in their 
equity Value-at-Risk across business cycle regimes.  
Business cycle asymmetries are also present in US$ foreign exchange risk despite 
the fact that we solely partition using the US business cycle whereas the very 
nature of exchange rates implies that two business cycles exhibit potential 
influence. Along the lines of Danielsson and de Vries (1997) or Straetmans and 
Candelon (2013), the regime dependent outcomes for foreign exchange tail-VaR 
can be used to determine regime dependent upper limits on open positions to 
foreign currency dealers by the treasurers of the forex dealing room of an 
international bank.
47
 Our innovation here lies in the fact that we can make the 
                                                          
47 See Danielsson and de Vries (1997) for a more elaborate discussion and for other applications of 
extreme quantile estimation for e.g. institutional investors. 
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trading limit regime dependent (higher limits during recessions and lower limits 
during expansions) whereas the previous papers propose trading limits that did not 
distinguish between recessions and expansion phases.   
Suppose a trading limit depends on the probability p on a single large negative 
currency return that can bring the bank‟s solvency in jeopardy. In this example, 
the level p is interpretable as the insolvency risk the management considers 
“acceptable”. Suppose the management chooses a critical loss level s < 0 which 
stands for the maximum loss that can be incurred without running into solvency 
problems. A simple way to determine the maximum allowable investment I is to 
set     ̂ ⁄
  with   ̂ the extreme quantile estimator as defined in (5.13). Clearly, 
a full sample trading limit would be too conservative relative to the expansion 
regime and not sufficiently conservative relative to the  recession regime, so a 
regime dependent trading limit seems desirable. Straetmans and Candelon (2013) 
illustrate that trading limits can hugely differ across subsamples when considering 
temporal breaks in the tail index; but trading limit differences remain comparable 
in magnitude for more complex subsample conditioning like the ones performed 
here. Apart from bank stocks and exchange rates, Table 5.1 clearly shows that 
other asset classes also exhibit tail asymmetries across business cycle regimes 
albeit to a lesser extent (except bond index returns that hardly show any regime 
dependence).  
Turning to the statistical significance of the asymmetries (right panel “Testing 
results”), the tests reveal that the null hypothesis of equality between tail indices 
and tail quantiles across the business cycle is rejected in a majority of cases at the 
1% significance level. Rejections are strongest for banks followed by commodities 
and exchange rates. Also, the equality of tail quantiles across regimes is slightly 
more often rejected than tail index equality. This is probably due to the fact that 
the quantile estimates also take account of the assets‟ scaling constants, i.e., even 
if the tail indices are invariant across regimes, tail quantiles can still be regime 
dependent if the scaling constants are.  
Finally, notice that despite the fact that financial risk (either measured by the 
standard deviation or the tail quantile) is nearly always higher during recessions, 
this is mostly not reflected into a higher average return during recessions. On the 
contrary, the average recession return falls below the average expansion return in 
all cases. One interpretation of this outcome may be that the idiosyncratic 
(diversifiable) part of volatility and tail risk becomes a relatively more important 
component of total risk during recessions.   
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Table 5.1    Extreme downside risk for different asset classes and the business cycle 
The table presents estimates and equality tests for the tail index and accompanying quantile estimates (p-value 
of 0.1%) for US bank stocks (Panel A), G-5 stock indices ( Panel B), G-5 bond indices (Panel C), exchange 
rates (Panel D), and commodities (Panel E). The threshold m=250 is consistent with making Hill plots and 
applying the Beirlant et al. algorithm. The equality T-test evaluates whether expansion-based and recession-
based estimates of tail characteristics differ in a statistically significant way. All estimates reflect percentages 
except the tail index estimates”  
                                       Estimations   Testing results 
  Full sample  Recession  Expansion        Equality test 
      q  R  R R qR   E E qE   R= E    qR=qE 
 Panel A: Bank stock returns (1/2/1985-31/12/2012) 
BANK OF AMERICA  0.025 2.6 2.3 19.1 -0.125 6.0 1.8 76.1 0.042 1.9 2.7 12.3 -3.3 *** 2.5 *** 
BB&T  0.040 2.0 2.7 12.8 -0.033 4.0 2.4 29.8 0.048 1.7 3.1 9.2 -2.0 ** 2.8 *** 
BANK OF NEW YORK  0.040 2.3 2.8 13.7 -0.066 4.5 1.9 45.7 0.052 1.9 3.3 9.9 -3.9 *** 2.6 *** 
COMERICA 0.037 2.1 2.5 14.8 -0.066 4.4 1.9 48.8 0.049 1.6 2.9 9.9 -2.9 *** 2.6 *** 
HUNTINGTON BCSH.  0.024 2.9 2.0 24.8 -0.115 7.1 1.8 83.6 0.039 1.8 2.7 12.0 -2.9 *** 2.7 *** 
JP MORGAN CHASE  0.032 2.4 2.8 14.4 -0.080 4.6 2.2 39.8 0.045 2.1 3.2 10.7 -3.0 *** 2.7 *** 
KEYCORP 0.021 2.5 2.3 18.5 -0.164 5.8 1.8 69.5 0.042 1.7 2.8 11.1 -3.3 *** 2.6 
 
***
NORTHERN TRUST  0.054 2.0 2.8 12.1 -0.016 3.7 2.1 33.6 0.062 1.7 2.9 9.9 -2.4 *** 2.5 *** 
PNC FINL.SVS.GP.  0.035 2.2 2.7 13.2 -0.042 4.7 2.4 32.2 0.044 1.7 3.1 9.4 -1.9 * 2.9 *** 
WELLS FARGO & CO  0.059 2.3 2.6 14.3 0.001 4.9 2.0 45.1 0.065 1.7 3.3 9.1 -3.5 *** 2.8 *** 
M&T BANK 0.059 1.7 2.3 12.8 -0.023 3.4 2.2 30.8 0.068 1.4 2.5 9.2 -1.0   2.6 *** 
REGIONS FINL.NEW 0.014 2.7 2.1 21.6 -0.169 6.4 2.1 58.5 0.035 1.9 2.8 11.8 -2.1 ** 2.9 *** 
SYNOVUS FINL. 0.027 3.0 2.5 22.0 -0.189 5.1 1.8 65.0 0.052 2.7 2.8 17.5 -3.1 *** 2.3 *** 
STATE STREET  0.052 2.6 2.6 15.2 -0.031 5.8 2.0 46.2 0.062 1.9 3.0 10.9 -3.1 *** 2.6 *** 
US BANCOR 0.055 2.1 2.5 14.4 -0.066 4.1 1.8 50.8 0.069 1.7 3.1 9.5 -3.9 *** 2.5 *** 
ZIONS BANCORP. 0.031 2.6 2.2 20.6 -0.162 5.4 2.0 57.4 0.053 2.0 2.8 12.8 -2.3 *** 2.7 *** 
Average 0.038 2.4 2.5 16.5 -0.084 5.0 2.0 50.8 0.052 1.8 2.9 10.9         
 Panel B: Stock index returns of G-5 countries (1/2/1985-31/12/2012) 
US 0.039 1.1 2.7 7.41 -0.045 1.9 2.0 19.9 0.049 1.0 3.0 6.1 -2.8 *** 2.4 *** 
GE 0.030 1.2 2.9 7.61 -0.033 1.4 2.5 10.2 0.050 1.1 2.8 7.4 -0.9   1.5   
UK 0.038 1.1 2.6 7.15 0.017 1.3 2.5 9.9 0.043 1.0 2.7 6.3 -0.8   2.0 ** 
FR 0.039 1.2 2.8 7.79 -0.047 1.7 2.4 13.0 0.050 1.2 2.9 7.0 -1.4   2.0 ** 
JP   0.005 1.3 2.9 7.72 -0.035 1.5 2.9 8.9 0.021 1.1 2.6 7.7 0.7   0.9   
Average 0.030 1.2 2.8 7.53 -0.028 1.6 2.5 12.4 0.043 1.1 2.8 6.9         
 Panel C: Bond index returns (1/2/1985-31/12/2012) 
US 0.029 0.5 3.3 2.4 0.028 0.6 2.7 4.1 0.029 0.4 3.4 2.3 -1.6   2.0 ** 
GE 0.026 0.3 3.1 1.9 0.036 0.3 2.3 2.6 0.023 0.3 3.2 1.9 -2.9 *** 1.4   
UK 0.035 0.4 3.2 2.2 0.042 0.4 3.2 2.3 0.033 0.4 3.1 2.3 0.1   0.1   
FR 0.032 0.4 3.1 2.0 0.052 0.4 2.6 2.4 0.029 0.4 3.1 2.0 -1.1   0.7   
JP   0.018 0.3 2.3 2.5 0.026 0.3 2.2 2.6 0.015 0.3 2.3 2.6 -0.3   0.1   
Average 0.028 0.4 3.0 2.2 0.037 0.4 2.6 2.8 0.026 0.4 3.0 2.2         
 Panel D: Exchange rate returns (1/2/1985-31/12/2012) 
US$/UK£ 0.005 0.6 3.1 3.5 -0.034 0.8 2.5 6.5 0.010 0.6 3.2 3.2 -1.8 * 2.1 ** 
US$/JPY -0.010 0.8 3.1 4.5 -0.061 1.2 2.2 10.9 -0.004 0.7 3.3 3.9 -3.2 *** 2.4 *** 
US$/SFR -0.010 0.6 3.0 3.4 -0.036 0.8 2.2 7.5 -0.007 0.5 3.5 2.8 -3.3 *** 2.4 *** 
Average -0.005 0.7 3.1 3.8 -0.044 0.9 2.3 8.3 0.000 0.6 3.3 3.3         
 Panel E: Commodity returns (1/2/1985-31/12/2012) 
OIL 0.019 2.4 2.8 14.4 -0.087 3.8 2.2 31.9 0.031 2.2 3.3 11.5 -2.9 *** 2.4 *** 
SILVER 0.022 2.1 2.5 13.7 -0.046 2.4 2.0 23.8 0.029 2.0 2.5 13.2 -1.6   1.5   
GOLD 0.023 1.0 2.7 6.6 0.018 1.5 2.4 12.7 0.024 0.9 2.9 5.6 -1.4   2.2 ** 
Average 0.021 1.8 2.7 11.5 -0.038 2.6 2.2 22.8 0.028 1.7 2.9 10.1         
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5.4.3. Systemic instability and the business cycle  
In this section we discuss recession-based and expansion-based estimation and 
testing outcomes for two separate systemic risk measures: the linear correlation 
between a bank stock return and a banking market index, the tail-β (see e.g. 
Hartmann et al. (2006) or Straetmans and Chaudhry (2013)). The latter systemic 
risk measure  is based on the same pairs of losses on individual bank stocks and a 
banking market index as the correlation is. The tail-β was defined in (5.8) and 
estimated according to (5.16) using the stable tail dependence function. 
The two considered measures differ in the extent to which they explicitly focus on 
the tail behavior. The correlation is calculated for the full sample of data pairs 
(including the tails). The tail-β and corresponding stable tail dependence function 
are evaluated “as if” one looks infinitely far into the tail: expression (5.18) does 
not depend on a cut off point or threshold such that it truly reflects an asymptotic 
value of the co-crash probability. In contrast to linear correlations, the tail-β 
indicator can also detect non-linear comovements if present in the data.  
The estimation results and testing results are summarized in Table 5.2. The table is 
organized in the same way as Table 5.1: the left and right parts of the table 
correspond with estimation and testing results, respectively. We further distinguish 
full sample, recession-based and expansion-based estimates. The testing results 
panel reflects outcomes for testing the null hypothesis of equal recession-based 
and expansion-based tail-β.  
Turning to the results, recession values always exceed the corresponding 
expansion values although there is still a large cross sectional heterogeneity. This 
seems to be in line with that part of the fundamentals-based banking crisis 
literature that claims that banking crises and systemic instability become more 
likely during recessions, see e.g. Gorton (1988). The economic interpretation of 
the numbers in the table is straightforward. For example, the 61% full sample 
value for Keycorp implies that a crash of the banking sector as a whole (i.e. a 
banking market index) coincides with a crash in the market value of Keycorp 
equity in 61% of cases; whereas this number rises to 69% during recessions and 
drops to 54% during expansions. In general, however, the tail-β values are 
astonishingly high, even during periods of economic expansion, which is 
somewhat unexpected.  
As concerns the magnitude of the tail-β differences across the business cycle, they 
are sometimes quite spectacular (e.g. JP Morgan Chase) whereas for others they 
are quite small. In other words, banks seem to differ quite a lot in terms of their 
responsiveness to business cycle fluctuations. One possible explanation for this 
may be that banks that are engaged in more traditional banking activities 
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generating interest-related revenues are more recession-prone than banks with a 
relatively important investment and trading division (non-interest related revenue 
sources). However, we leave the study of the determinants of this cross-regime 
variation for future research. It is also interesting to note that correlations between 
bank stock returns and the market as a whole are generally higher during 
recessions. We will also report “recession and expansion” correlations in the other 
tables still to be discussed in order to illustrate this alternative dimension of 
diversification meltdown.
48
 
Turning to the testing outcomes in the right panel, it is obvious that recession-
based and expansion-based systemic risk indicators are statistically significantly 
different from each other (typically at the 1% level). Upon looking at the gaps 
between the regime-dependent point estimates in the left panel, it is fair to say 
these differences are also strongly economically significant.  
Finally, it is interesting to observe in Table 5.2 that the correlation-based systemic 
risk rankings differ from the tail-β ranking. This may be due to the fact that tail-β′s 
capture non-linear spillovers during crisis periods whereas the linear correlations 
do not.
49
 
 
 
                                                          
48Traditionally, the term “diversification meltdown” characterizes a situation of rising correlations in 
highly volatile regimes, see e.g. Ang and Chen (2002).  The question arises whether this correlation 
jumps are genuine changes in interdependence or induced by the rising volatilities themselves. Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) constitutes the classic reference on disentangling financial contagion vs. 
interdependence in a context of diversification meltdown.  
49 This also holds when comparing rankings based on the CAPM-β and the tail-β, see Straetmans and 
Chaudhry (2013).   
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5.4.4. Co-crash versus Flight-to-quality effects and the business cycle 
During crises, it is typically assumed that some assets that are perceived by 
investors as “safer” and/or more “liquid” may act as “flight to quality”, “flight to 
liquidity” or “safe heaven” assets.50 This implies that the investors sell off the 
asset whom they perceive as riskier and buy the supposedly safer asset. As a 
result, one expects opposite return movements and negative dependence between 
pairs of these asset returns. The literature on these types of substitution effects is 
surprisingly scant. Using bivariate statistical extreme value analysis Hartmann et 
al. (2004) estimate the potential of co-crashes between G-5 stock indices and 
government bonds, both domestically and cross-border.  They find that flight-to-
quality/liquidity effects into sovereign bonds has happened as frequently as co-
crashes between stock and bond markets and hence their paper remains 
inconclusive as to which of both phenomena (co-crashes or flight-to-quality) 
dominates. Other more recent studies on whether government bonds or gold may 
act as safe heavens in case of stock crashes include, inter alia, Connolly et al. 
(2005); Baur and Lucy (2009); Brière et al. (2012); Baele et al (2013); but the 
evidence remains mixed and inconclusive.  
We compare the likelihood of co-crashes (abbreviates as “CO”) vs. flight-to-
quality (abbreviated as “FTQ”) for three assets (stocks, bonds and gold) by 
measuring the probability of stock-bond co-crashes and flight-to-quality using the 
conditional probability estimator in (5.18). Although also based on multivariate 
extreme value analysis, our comovement indicator differs from the one in 
Hartmann et al. (2004). Moreover, the latter paper does not condition on recession 
and expansion subsamples.  
Although initially defined for pairs of return losses, the bivariate comovement 
measure (5.18) can be calculated for all four data quadrants. Stock-bond (SB), 
stock-gold (SG) or bond-gold (BG) co-crash probability measures boil down to: 
   
    *    (   )|    (   )+  
   
    *    (   )|    (   )+                 (5.20) 
   
    *    (   )|    (   )+  
Whereas flight-to-quality spillover probability expressions for the same asset pairs 
read:  
    
    *    ( )|    (   )+ 
    
    *    ( )|    (   )+                    (5.21) 
    
    *    ( )|    (   )+ 
                                                          
50 All three concepts are often used interchangeably in the literature.  
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In the above expressions, the abbreviations S, B and G refer to the returns on 
stocks, bonds and gold, respectively. If the marginal tail probability p becomes 
small, the quantile function  ( )  (   )  ( ) grows large (extreme right tail) 
whereas Q(1-p) becomes very small (extreme left tail). Stocks are considered to be 
the riskiest asset and we want to assess whether the tendency of stock to co-crash 
with bonds or gold is stronger or weaker than selling of stocks and re-investing the 
proceeds into bonds or gold.  
The results are summarized in Table 5.3. Just like the previous tables, the table is 
split into estimation results (left part) and testing results (right part). Horizontal 
panels distinguish between full sample outcomes (Panel A), recession outcomes 
(Panel B) and expansion outcomes (Panel C). The estimation results refer to all 6 
conditional probabilities in (5.20)-(5.21). The probability estimates generally 
reveal that cross-asset co-movements (whether it be CO or FTQ) are present but 
highly heterogeneous (larger cross-asset pair and sample variation). Our main 
interest, however, lies in assessing whether FTQ probabilities exceed CO 
probabilities, for which type of asset pair this is the case and whether the gap 
between the two likelihoods is regime dependent. More specifically, one would 
expect that the CO-FTQ gap is widening during recessions as compared to 
expansions and the full sample results. The table only provides robust evidence for 
a dominance of FTQ over CO for pairs of stocks and bonds: FTQ probabilities 
exceed CO probabilities for the full sample and the recession sample; but the CO-
FTQ asymmetry is strikingly bigger during the recession. The dominance of stock-
bond FTQ is also reflected in the reported correlations: they are mostly negative 
and recession-based correlations are even lower. Moreover, the rise in CO-FTQ 
spreads during recessions is driven by a decrease in CO probability and an 
increase in FTQ probability. The testing outcomes (right panel) show that nearly 
all these CO-FTQ asymmetries are statistically significant for the full sample and 
the recession sample and to a lesser extent for the expansion sample. CO-FTQ 
asymmetries are also visible for other asset combinations but the testing panel 
shows that most of these asymmetries are not statistically significant. 
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5.4.5. Minimizing portfolio tail risk 
As a final illustration of the role regimes can play in influencing the tail behavior 
of returns, we consider the impact of the business cycle phase on the potential for 
portfolio risk diversification. The regime-dependent correlations in the previous 
tables already shed some light on this issue and suggest that there is also a 
diversification meltdown when entering a recession. However, the traditional 
concept of diversification meltdown refers to a situation where correlations all 
jump to values close to 1 during high financial market volatility regimes. This 
implies that the potential for diversifying portfolio risk melts away during times it 
is most needed, see e.g. Boyer et al. (1999), Forbes and Rigobon (2002) or Ang 
and Chen (2002). Here we argue that also the real state of the economy seems to 
matter for the diversification potential in the financial sphere (and this regardless 
of the state of financial market volatility). We show that this is because asset 
return comovements (either correlations in the distributional centre or 
comovements in the tail) determining the potential for risk diversification depend 
on the business cycle. 
In order to investigate the potential impact of business cycle regimes on portfolio 
risk diversification we opted for the most stylized portfolio setup thinkable: two 
stocks and a risk averse investor that does not care about realizing return. Portfolio 
risk of his two-asset portfolio is either measured  by the portfolio variance or with 
an EVT-based tail-VaR risk measure like in (5.13). Suppose the portfolio return of 
the two-asset equity portfolio is defined in the usual way as        (  
 )  . Minimizing the portfolio variance   
      
  (   )   
    (  
 )      renders the minimum variance (MV) portfolio: 
    
  
       
  
    
        
 .    
On the other hand, minimizing the Value-at-Risk of a portfolio for a given p-value 
(p) amounts to choosing the portfolio weight w such as to minimize the portfolio 
quantile estimator   
      ̂ ( )       ( )(
 
  
)   ,                    (5.22)                                                                           
and with      the (n-m)-th ascending order statistic of the portfolio return   .  
Notice that (5.22) is equivalent to (5.13) except that the quantile estimator is made 
dependent on the portfolio investment weight w. 
The empirical application consists in calculating the risk-minimizing portfolio 
weight    as well as the corresponding minimized risk levels for the two risk 
measures (minimum standard deviation and minimum VaR) across the phases of 
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the business cycle. To that purpose we select the 8 largest companies (based on 
market cap) from the Dow Jones index which implies a total of 28 possible 
portfolios. 
Table 5.4 reports the outcomes of this stylized portfolio risk minimization exercise 
for the full sample, the recession sample and the expansion sample. Each of these 
panels further contains the correlation, the minimizing risk weight    as well as 
the corresponding minimized risk (and this for both risk measures: portfolio 
standard deviation and Value-at-Risk).  
First, we observe that the correlations are in line with previous tables: the 
recession-based correlations dominate the expansion-based correlations. In line 
with that result, it is not surprising that the recession-based minimized risk (either 
measured by Value-at-Risk or standard deviation) always exceeds its expansion-
based counterpart. This can be dubbed as an alternative form of diversification 
meltdown, i.e., portfolio risk is more difficult to diversify during recessions 
because correlations and tail dependencies move upward during that phase of the 
business cycle. It is important to realize that this outcome holds regardless the 
level of financial volatility.  Last but not least, one observes that the risk 
minimizing portfolio weights strongly depend on the chosen risk measure but also 
on the regime.   
Table 5.4    Minimum Standard Deviation and  
Value-at-Risk (VaR) portfolios across business cycles 
The table presents the optimal weights that minimize either the 99% Value-at-Risk (VaR) or standard 
deviation for 28 equity portfolios consisting of 2 stocks selected from the 28 stocks in the Dow Jones 
index with the largest Market Cap. 
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5.5. Conclusions 
In this paper we apply statistical techniques from univariate and multivariate 
extreme value analysis on subsamples of financial data. Our motivation for doing 
this is that (univariate) tail properties like the tail index and scaling constant or 
multivariate tail properties like the strength of the tail dependence may depend on 
regimes like e.g. the business cycle. The regime dependence then determines the 
sample partitioning. However, we argue this regime dependence is still 
reconcilable with stationary unconditional long-term return distributions.  
The subsamples are determined according to the business cycle “regime”, i.e., 
recession and expansion subsamples, in order to study whether univariate extreme 
risk (downside tail risk) or extreme return co-movements (co-crashes or flight-to-
quality for stock and bond pairs, systemic risk for banks etc.) fluctuate across the 
business cycle. We consider different measures of tail risk and tail co-movements 
across the business cycle and find that regime dependence of these measures is 
quite general across many different types of assets or asset pairs. 
In a first application, we establish that the tail indices are lower and all the 
corresponding tail quantiles (downside tail-VaR) are higher during recessions than 
during expansions. This asymmetry seems to hold for a variety of assets (US bank 
stocks, G-5 stock and bond indices, US$ exchange rates and commodities). The 
observed regime dependence for bank stock tail risk is somewhat in line with the 
so-called “recession hypothesis” (see e.g. Gorton (1988) that states that recessions 
may trigger bank panics).
51
 The regime dependence in tail risk for foreign 
exchange rate returns may be exploited to determine regime dependent trading 
limits for bank traders. Previous applications of this idea only considered (fully 
unconditional) full sample trading limits thereby neglecting the asymmetry 
between tail indices and scaling constants across business cycle phases.  
In a second application, we establish regime dependence for market-based 
indicators of systemic risk (correlation and tail-β) and find that systemic risk rises 
during recessions regardless the considered indicators. Moreover, the cross-regime 
differences are most of the time strongly significant, especially for the EVT-based 
tail-βs. The outcomes are in line with the earlier observed “procyclicality” of 
market-based systemc risk indicators which is undesirable because it basically 
                                                          
51 An important difference with papers like Gorton (1988) is that we do not study whether there is a 
relation between lagged states of the business cycle and extreme financial returns. We leave lead-lag 
relationships between extremal behavior and the business cycle for future research. In this paper we 
deliberately do not want to make statements about causality relations between extreme risks and the 
business cycle. We only focus on the coincidence of both phenomena.  
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signals the highest systemic risk during crises and the lowest prior to crises (when 
risks are supposed to build up despite low volatilities and correlations). One 
suggestion to deal with this may simply be to re-allocate the indicators of systemic 
risk to the other business cycle regime in order to establish anticyclical behavior.  
In a third application, we study to what extent flight to safety phenomena between 
stocks, bonds or gold become more or less likely depending on the state of the 
business cycle. We find that flight-to-quality from stocks into bonds for G-5 
countries more strongly dominates stock/bond co-crashes during recession relative 
to expansion outcomes. The asymmetry also exists for the full sample but much 
smaller. But empirical evidence for flight to quality from stocks or bonds into gold 
is weak regardless whether one considers full samples or whether one conditions 
on recessions.   
Finally, we establish that diversification meltdowns are not limited to periods of 
high financial volatility only. In fact, the potential for financial risk diversification 
is also reduced during recessions as compared to expansions. We illustrate this 
point by means of minimizing the portfolio variance vs. the portfolio Value-at-
Risk for the recession and expansion sample separately. Also, the optimal 
portfolio weights seem to vary quite substantially across the regimes for a given 
minimized portfolio risk indicator. 
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Chapter 6   
General Concluding Remarks 
 
In order to manage risk both financial institutions and regulators have to be able to 
measure it accurately. This dissertation consists of four essays that strive to 
provide a better understanding of the different aspects of institutional risk 
management and macro risk management as well as to show how good 
measurements of risk can be utilized for management purposes. 
First, lending is characterized by information asymmetry between lenders and 
borrowers. Borrowers have an informational advantage over lenders with respect 
to their own credit risk worthiness. Collateral is an important instrument to help 
mitigate the problem of information asymmetry. Ex-ante, collateral reduces 
adverse selection because it signals high quality borrowers and consequently high 
quality borrowers with collateral are offered lower interest rate. Ex-post, collateral 
reduces moral hazard as the borrower‟s pay-off from strategic default falls. 
However, if lenders are able to accurately assess borrowers‟ credit worthiness they 
will require more collateral from risky borrowers to reduce loss given default. In 
Chapter 2, thanks to our unique data set that contains information on both the 
borrowers‟ ex-ante credit risk and their ability to pledge collateral, we can 
examine these theories simultaneously. We find that the likelihood of 
collateralization increases for borrowers that are perceived by the bank as riskier 
borrowers.  However at the same level of perceived risk, borrowers with ability to 
pledge collateral would do so in order to benefit from a lower interest rate. 
Moreover, the bank-borrower relationship as well as the economic conditions has 
strong impact on the use of collateral. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, it is important for banks to have a proper risk 
assessment process so they can make good decisions on loan contracts including 
the decision to require of collateral. CSMs play a central role in that process. The 
development of CSMs is a statistical process that utilizes historical data to predict 
a future outcome. In Chapter 3 we show that the accuracy of a CSM is dependent 
on the quality of the data and the matching of the data elements to an appropriate 
forecasting horizon. It is crucial that the data utilized is timely enough to predict 
future behaviors and outcomes. Therefore, CSMs require ongoing evaluation and 
maintenance to ensure they maintain their effectiveness. This includes adjustments 
to respond to decreases in the value of information over time, the banks‟ internal 
strategies and external shift such as changes in the economic environment 
including the global financial crisis. By carrying out right adjustments credit 
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rationing during economic downturns can be avoided while profitability and 
efficiency can still be improved. 
In Chapters 4 and 5 we focus on different measures of tail risk and systemic risk 
for financial institution, or more generally to assess systemic instability in 
financial markets. To that aim we employ statistical extreme value analysis such 
as to capture the lower frequency character of systemic banking crises or, more 
generally, crisis spillovers in financial markets.  In Chapter 4 we divide financial 
institutions into 4 sub-groups to assess to what extent tail risk and systemic risk is 
industry-specific. We find that there is quite some cross-industry heterogeneity in 
average tail risk and systemic risk that is also statistically and economically 
significant. More specifically, industries that exhibit a lot of tail risk (the insurance 
industry) are not necessarily the ones that also contribute most to overall systemic 
instability (deposit banks). We also find  that rankings of financial institutions 
according to tail risk or systemic risk measures stay relatively stable over time. In 
other words, although tail risk and systemic risk can vary quite a lot over time, the 
positioning of institutions relative to each other is not dramatically changed over 
time. Finally, size proxies seem to correlate with systemic risk but the outcomes 
differ a lot depending on the used size proxies and considered subsamples (full 
sample, pre-crisis or crisis). Chapter 5 investigates whether there is a relation 
between extreme risks and phases of the business cycle. More specifically, we 
wonder whether and to what extent univariate tail behavior and multivariate tail 
comovements are dependent on the business cycle. To that aim, we partition 
financial data sets into recession and expansion samples and perform subsample 
analysis for measures of tail risk and tail comovements. First we find that tail risk 
is generally higher during recessions for a variety of financial assets (stocks, 
bonds, currencies and commodities). Next, also market-based indicators of bank 
systemic risk that focus on the tails indicate a higher potential of systemic 
instability during recessions. Third, flight-to-quality effects from stocks into either 
bonds or gold seem to become much more severe during recessions. Finally, 
portfolio diversification becomes more problematic during economic recessions 
because correlations and comovements in the tail increase which adds another 
dimension to the concept of diversification meltdown.  
To sum up, my dissertation explores a number of important factors in risk 
management. At the institutional level, asymmetric information problems can be 
mitigated by securitization and by proper risk assessment processes where CSMs 
play a critical role. And at the macro level, tail risk and systemic risk are not 
necessarily substitutes and they both varies over time. It is important for regulators 
to understand the pattern of these risks and quantify them accurately in order to 
effectively maintain the stability of the financial system. 
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Chapter 7 
Valorization 
Consumer loans have been growing remarkably in emerging markets. It has 
become a crucial request for both banking practitioners and regulators to better 
understand the behavior of borrowers and lenders with regard to contractual terms, 
of which collateral usage is an important one. Unfortunately, while there is a 
significant amount of research addressing the role as well as the determinants of 
collateral for commercial loans in developed markers, there is little empirical work 
on the factors that affect decisions to pledge collateral for consumer loans in 
emerging markets. Using a unique and confidential dataset of more than 30,000 
consumer loans in Vietnam, we are able to answer the following questions 
regarding the choice between collateralized and uncollateralized consumer loans 
in an emerging market: Does the bank require riskier borrowers to pledge 
collateral? How does the availability of pledgable assets influence the borrower’s 
loan choice? How does the relationship between bank and borrower influence the 
loan choice? We thereby obtain new insights that differ from those papers that 
study corporate loans mostly in developed markets. For instance, by answering 
the last question, we suggest that in an emerging market where the property right 
is probably not fully developed yet, the hold-up effect dominates the benefit of 
relationship lending and results in a higher likelihood of collateral. If property 
rights can be improved the borrower can make more flexible choices of pledging 
their asset, for instance to pledge one asset at several banks with clearly identified 
seniority, and thus reduce the hold-up problem.  
 
The world has been experiencing fundamental economic changes as a results of 
the recent financial crisis. It is therefore very important to understand the potential 
impact of these changes on risk management strategies taken by  banks and 
monitored by regulators. During and after an economic and financial crisis, banks 
find it more difficult to distinguish good from bad borrowers due to changes in 
behavior and performance of borrowers. In addition, increased default risk 
translated into higher risk premium and this causes more good borrowers to drop 
out of the market. Thus, in general after a crisis banks are struggle to set an 
optimal balance between business volume and the associated risk they would take 
while maintaining a certain level of profit.  In chapter 3 of this dissertation we 
illustrate how banks can better overcome these difficulties to set up an optimal 
level of business volume. From a bank’s perspective, we argue that re-estimating 
CSMs by using more recent data constitutes one way of improving the 
performance of the existing rating systems and therefore it can do a better ex-ante 
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screening of potential borrowers. From regulators’ perspective, our results suggest 
that after – or even during a crisis - banks’ existing CSMs in particular and risk 
models in general ( developed prior crisis) should be reviewed and monitored 
closely as they might not function anymore as they once did. If those risk models 
that are not predictive anymore are still in place to determine factors used as input 
for calculating economic and regular capital, e.g. Probability of Default (PD), Loss 
Given Default (LGD), etc. this will lead to a bias estimation, and event more 
dangerous, an underestimation. This can have a serious impact on how banks can 
cover their risk and survive a worst-case scenario once the crisis unfolds. Thus, for 
the financial systems that are still faced with crises and unresolved structural 
problems it is important to take into account the performance of their risk models 
as soon as possible.  
In chapter 4, we find that different groups of financial institutions exhibit different 
levels of tail risk and systemic risk. The heterogeneity in tail risks and systemic 
contributions across different types of financial institutions suggests that 
regulators should not treat different financial industries as homogeneous when 
regulating and supervising their risks, i.e. a broker-dealer should be treated 
differently from, say, a deposit bank. The most salient outcome of our cross-
industry risk comparison seems to be that the insurance industry exhibits the 
highest tail risk but that deposit banks are characterized by the highest degree of 
extreme systematic risk. The latter outcome is surprising given the key role 
investment banks played in the narrative of the financial crisis. Furthermore, we 
find that these EVT-based indicators of tail risk and systemic risk are good 
judgment about the propensity towards future systemic crises: rank correlations 
between pre-crisis and crisis ranks are relatively high which implies that the 
riskiest institutions in terms of tail risk and systemic risk before the crisis are also 
often the riskiest ones over the crisis sample. Thus, it may be worthwhile for 
regulators to pay attention to those financial institutions that exhibit high pre-crisis 
systemic risk because once a crisis strikes they are expected to stay among the 
biggest contributors to the financial instability. Last but not least, in this chapter 
our results suggest that financial institutions’ size does not have much to say about 
financial institutions’ tail risk; but size does seem to matter for their systemic risk. 
This seems to confirm the way regulators are currently carrying out their 
monitoring strategies concerning systemic risk: size driven instead of exposure-
linkage driven.  
Our results in chapter 5 suggest that stock-bond co-crashes are less likely than 
flight-to-quality during times of market stress and that this asymmetry is largest 
during recessions. Understanding correctly the linkage across asset classes is 
interesting for investors who have to choose their investment portfolios according 
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to their preferred risk-return combinations. On the other hand, policy makers and 
supervisory bodies are interested in these linkages because they potentially 
influence the level of systemic risk in financial markets. In addition, we establish 
that portfolio risk (both central risk measures like variance as well as tail risk) is 
much harder to diversify during recessions as compared to expansions, i.e., a 
diversification meltdown. 
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Nederlandse Samenvatting 
Bestaande regelgeving  en risicobeheer kon de financiële crisis die in 2007 begon 
niet voorkomen. De wortels van deze crisis reiken veel verder, en er bestaan 
uiteenlopende meningen over de fundamentele oorzaken. Het doel van deze 
dissertatie is een beter inzicht te geven in een aantal van deze factoren: 
'securitizering', falende computermodellen voor institutioneel risicobeheer en 
bestaande gebreken  in regelgeving en toezicht op bancaire risico‟s op zowel 
micro-als macroprudentieel vlak. In dit proefschrift: (i) laten we zien onder welke 
omstandigheden banken credit-hulp behoeven, d.w.z. onderpand, voor leners 
(hoofdstuk 2); (ii) laten we zien hoe de beperkingen van credit scoring-modellen 
overwonnen kunnen worden en hun geldigheid kunnen behouden gedurende de 
recente financiële crisis (hoofdstuk 3); (iii) we bediscussiëren het systemisch 
belang (“systemic importance”) en staartrisico van verschillende types van 
(Amerikaanse) financiële instellingen (hoofdstuk 4); (iv) we analyseren tenslotte 
de extreme samenhangen tussen verschillende types van financiële activa 
(aandelen, obligaties, goud, zilver, valuta etc.) en hoe die afhangen van de staat 
van de economische conjunctuur.     
Het institutionele financiële risico management 
Lenen wordt eerst en vooral gekarakteriseerd door het feit dat kredietverstrekkers 
en leners niet over dezelfde hoeveelheid informatie beschikken. Leners hebben 
een voordeel t.o.v. hun kredietverstrekkers omdat zij op de hoogte zijn van hun 
eigen kredietwaardigheid. Het eisen van een onderpand is een belangrijk 
instrument om de ongelijkheid in informatiebeschikking te verminderen. Een 
onderpand kan bijvoorbeeld voorkomen dat slechte leningen worden afgesloten en 
goede leners worden opgepikt zodat hen een lage rente kan worden geboden. Dit 
reduceert ook de kans op 'moral hazard' nadat leningen zijn toegekend. Maar als 
kredietverstrekkers niet in staat zijn om op accurate wijze de kredietwaardigheid 
van een lener in te schatten, zullen ze een hoger onderpand vragen van risicovolle 
leners om verlies tegen te gaan. In hoofdstuk twee, gebruikmakende van unieke 
data, die zowel informatie bevat over het a-priori kredietrisico van een lener en 
haar vermogen om een onderpand aan te dragen, kunnen we deze theorieën 
tegelijk bestuderen. We vinden dat de waarschijnlijkheid van 'collateralization' 
toeneemt bij leners die door de bank als risicovol bestempeld worden. Maar bij 
een gelijk waargenomen risico zullen leners met de mogelijkheid een onderpand 
aan te dragen, dat doen om in aanmerking te komen voor een lager 
rentepercentage. Bovendien hebben zowel de relatie tussen de bank en de lener 
alsmede de economische omstandigheden een sterke invloed op het gebruik van 
een onderpand. 
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Zoals bediscussieerd in hoofdstuk twee, is het belangrijk voor banken de 
beschikking te hebben over een nauwkeurige methode om risico's mee in te 
schatten. Zo kunnen banken de juiste beslissingen nemen wat betreft het 
verstrekken van leningen, inclusief het wel of niet eisen van een onderpand. 
Kredietscoremodellen (Credit Scoring Models of CSMs) spelen een centrale rol in 
dat proces. De ontwikkeling van een CSM is een statistisch proces dat gebruik 
maakt van informatie uit het verleden om een voorspelling te doen over het 
eventueel voorkomen van een gebeurtenis in de toekomst. In hoofdstuk drie laten 
we zien dat de nauwkeurigheid van een CSM afhangt van de kwaliteit van de 
beschikbare informatie alsmede de manier waarop de informatie gebruikt wordt 
om uitspraken over de toekomst te doen. Het is van cruciaal belang dat de 
gebruikte informatie de juiste periode uit het verleden beschrijft (afdoende ver 
teruggaat, dan wel afdoende actueel is) om toekomstige gedragingen en 
gebeurtenissen te beschrijven. Daarom hoeven CSMs continu geëvalueerd te 
worden opdat ze hun effectiviteit behouden. CSMs moeten aangepast worden 
omdat informatie waarde verliest naarmate de tijd vordert maar aanpassingen zijn 
ook nodig om veranderingen in de interne strategie van de bank te weerspiegelen 
alsmede aanpassingen vanwege externe veranderingen zoals schommelingen in 
het economische klimaat. Door het juiste beleid te voeren tijdens perioden van 
economische tegenspoed kunnen banken economisch verlies voorkomen terwijl 
winstgevendheid en efficiëntie tegelijkertijd verbeterd kunnen worden. 
Macro financieel risicomanagement 
In hoofdstukken vier en vijf richten we ons op verschillende maatstaven van 
staartrisico en systeemrisico voor financiële instellingen, en meer in het algemeen 
op het meten van het potentieel tot systemische instabiliteit in financiële markten. 
Daartoe maken we gebruik van statistische extreme waarde analyse om onder 
andere vat te krijgen op de laagfrequente aard van systemische bankencrises, of in 
bredere zin, crisis 'spillovers' in financiële markten. In hoofdstuk vier verdelen we 
financiële instellingen in vier deelgroepen om vast te stellen in welke mate 
staartrisico en systemisch risico afhangen van de betreffende tak van industrie. We 
vinden dat het gemiddelde staartrisico en systeemrisico tamelijk heterogeen 
aanwezig is in alle takken van de industrie (maar er zijn dus belangrijke 
verschillen tussen industrieën onderling). Industrieën die gekenmerkt worden door 
een aanzienlijk staartrisico (de verzekeringsindustrie) zijn bovendien niet perse 
degenen die het meest bijdragen aan de algemene systemische instabiliteit 
(depositobanken). We vinden ook dat rangordes van financiële instellingen op 
basis van hun staartrisico of systemische risicomaatstaven relatief stabiel blijven 
over de tijd. Met andere woorden, hoewel staartrisico en systemisch risico over de 
tijd kan variëren, doet dit niet veel af aan de relatieve positionering van 
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instellingen ten opzichte van elkaar. Tenslotte lijkt de grootte of omvang van 
financiële instellingen (gemeten aan de hand van verschillende proxies) te 
correleren met systemisch risico maar de uitkomsten verschillen naar gelang de 
gebruikte 'proxies' en de beschouwde deelsteekproeven (volledige steekproef, 
voor- of tijdens de crisis). Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt of extreme risico‟s alsmede  
hun samenhangen afhangen van de conjunctuurcyclus. Om dat te bewerkstelligen 
verdelen we onze financiële tijdreeksen in zgn. recessie- en expansiesteekproeven 
en analyseren we de deelsteekproeven op (univariate) staartrisico en (multivariate) 
samenhangen in het staartgedrag. Ten eerste concluderen we dat staartrisico hoger 
is gedurende recessies en dit voor een heleboel financiële activa. Daarnaast 
berekenen we een aantal indicatoren van systemisch risico voor banken. Deze 
duiden op een hogere waarschijnlijkheid van systemische instabiliteit gedurende 
recessies. Ten derde vinden we dat zgn. 'flight-to-quality' effecten van aandelen 
naar obligaties of goud lijken toe te nemen gedurende recessies. Tenslotte wordt 
het spreiden van risico‟s moeilijker gedurende economische recessies omdat de 
staartafhankelijkhied groter wordt tijdens recessies en het potentieel op 
risicodiversificatie daalt. 
Samenvattend: mijn dissertatie onderzoekt een aantal belangrijke factoren in 
risicobeheer. Op institutioneel niveau kunnen asymmetrische informatieproblemen 
worden geminimaliseerd door 'securitizering' en gedegen risicobeheerprocedures 
waarin CSMs een cruciale rol spelen. Op macro-niveau zijn staartrisico en 
systeemrisico niet noodzakelijkerwijs uitwisselbaar en beiden zijn aan fluctuaties 
onderhevig. Voor beheerders is het belangrijk om de patronen van deze risico‟s te 
begrijpen en om ze nauwkeurig te kwantificeren en zo op effectieve wijze de 
stabiliteit van het financiële systeem te monitoren. 
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